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The purpose of this Master Business Administration (MBA) Professional Report 
is to investigate and analyze the means by which Contingency Contracting Officers 
(CCO) can effectively operate in a Joint contingency environment and to validate the 
Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA) entry and exit criteria for contingency 
contracting missions.  Joint contingencies encompass regional conflicts, humanitarian 
and peacekeeping missions, and international or domestic disaster relief missions 
supported with the immediate deployment of military forces.   
This research was accomplished by reviewing the current guidance, policies, and 
doctrine pertinent to contingency contracting operations and conducting personal 
interviews.  The researchers conducted interviews with representatives of the Joint Staff, 
J4 (Logistics), each Service Component’s acquisition headquarters, U.S. Central 
Command’s J4 (Logistics), U.S. Pacific Command’s J4 (Logistics, Engineering, and 
Security Assistance), and the DCMA to explore how contingency contracting operations 
are planned and executed; current issues and lessons learned; and understand the current 
structure/organization of Service Component and Combatant Command for 
accomplishing contingency contracting.   
Conclusions and recommendations address perceived shortfalls in the 
methodologies the Services use to plan, communicate, integrate and execute contingency 
contracting operations.  Three possible solutions to these shortfalls include adoption of 
the Yoder Three-Tier Model, establishment of the Joint Contingency Contracting 
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Contingency contracting has been performed in one shape or another in every war 
the United States (U.S.) has ever fought.  That being said, are the Department of Defense 
(DoD), Military Services, and DoD defense agencies conducting contingency contracting 
the best way?  Are there areas that can be improved?  If so, what areas could use 
improvement?  These questions form the backdrop that prompted the Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) to request a team 
to investigate and analyze the means by which Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) 
can effectively operate in a Joint contingency environment.  In addition, the Defense 
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) wanted a team to validate its Contingency 
Contract Administration Services (CCAS) support proposed entry and exit criteria.  How 
would these criteria affect DCMA’s ability to effectively prepare for and execute 
contingency operations? 
There are many definitions for the word contingency.  Specifically, the 
Contingency Contracting Student Handbook (CCSH) defines a contingency as “an 
emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversions, 
or by required military operations.”  The U.S. continues to deploy troops to many foreign 
countries including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Djibouti, in response to the above mentioned contingencies. Since most of these 
operations are precipitated by unforeseen events, they often require the quick deployment 
of troops.  CCOs are sent to provide direct support to these warfighters. 
Within the Joint, multi-Service, and multi-National areas, CCOs are responsible 
for acquiring or procuring supplies, services and construction that help to provide combat 
support, combat service support, and other logistics support to deployed units since they 
are the only personnel authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of the U.S. 
Government.  One of the principal ways the CCO gets the information needed to execute 
their mission is from the Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP), which is the 
vehicle that describes the support required when troops are rapidly deployed.  Part of this 
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research focused on the robustness and execution of the CCSP at both the Service 
Component and Combatant Command (COCOM) level.   
Two methodologies were employed to complete this research: (1) subjective 
literature reviews of U.S. Joint contingency contracting polices and guidelines; library 
information resources; books and magazines; and websites, and (2) qualitative personal 
interviews with representatives from the Joint Staff J4; Office of the Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OSD(AT&L)); Secretary of the Air Force 
(Acquisition); Army Contracting Agency (ACA); ASN(RD&A); Headquarters, Marine 
Corps; DCMA Headquarters Combat Support Center (CSC); DCMA International 
District (DCMAI); U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); and U.S. Pacific Command 
(PACOM).  While the principal focus was on preparation for contingency operations and 
validation of DCMA’s entry and exit criteria, recommendations emerged on how the 
DoD might improve manning, experience, and structure to accomplish contingency 
contracting operations, and the feasibility of creating a Joint Contingency Contracting 
Command (JCCC) within DoD to serve as a central point for all contingency contracting.  
Other keys issues discovered during this research: (1) there is contingency contracting 
guidance from DoD and each Service, but a combined Joint publication would be useful; 
(2) each Service and most DoD agencies collect information on lessons learned, some of 
which is put into the Joint Uniform Lessons Learns System (JULLS), but some 
Components do not take advantage of this wealth of information before a person deploys 
for a contingency; (3) some Service Components and COCOMs do not have fully 
qualified contracting officers fulfilling the necessary roles given specific contingency 
contracting mission requirements; (4) the current structure/organization of Service 
Components and COCOMs in terms of contingency contracting may need to be altered to 
better support the warfighter; and (5) DCMA CSC and DCMAI are critical participants of 
the contingency contracting team and need clear entry and exit criteria.   
While this report covers many issues dealing with Joint contingency contracting, 
there is still much research that could be done in this area.  Areas of interest for further 
research include: (1) conducting a more thorough analysis of Joint Publications (JP) and 
Service specific information on contingency contracting; (2) reviewing the background as 
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to why DCMA was asked to perform preaward activities as well as contract 
administration at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom; (3) conducting a critical 
analysis on why DCMA needs clear contingency contracting entry and exit criteria; and 
(4) conducting an analysis as to how each Service and DCMA can ensure that for 






























There are many definitions for the word contingency.  To have a common 
knowledge base, the research team used the one from the Defense Acquisition 
University’s (DAU) Contingency Contracting course.  Specifically, the Contingency 
Contracting Student Handbook (CCSH) defines a contingency as “an emergency 
involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversions, or by 
required military operations.”  The U.S. continues to deploy troops to many foreign 
countries including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Djibouti, in response to the above mentioned contingencies. Since most of these 
operations are precipitated by unforeseen events, they often require the quick deployment 
of troops.  Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) are sent to provide direct support to 
these warfighters. 
As one can imagine, contingency contracting has played an important combat 
support and logistics role in the success of those deployments that ultimately become 
military operations.  What is contingency contracting?  There is no agreed-to term, so 
again the team referred to the CCSH definition.  
Direct contracting support to tactical and operational forces engaged in the 
full spectrum of armed conflict and Military Operations Other Than War, 
both domestic and overseas. 
 
Within the Joint, multi-Service, and multi-National areas, CCOs are responsible 
for acquiring or procuring elements that help to provide combat support, combat service 
support, and other logistical support to deployed units.  Since they are fundamentally 
contracting officers, they are the only personnel who can obligate Government funds.  
One of the vital ways the CCO gets the information they need to execute their part of the 
mission is from the Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP).  The CCSP is the 
vehicle that describes the support required when troops are rapidly deployed.  Part of this 
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research focused on the use of the CCSP at Service Component and Combatant 
Command (COCOM) level.   
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
The objective of this report is to investigate and analyze the means by which 
CCOs can effectively operate in a Joint contingency environment and to validate the 
Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA) entry and exit criteria for contingency 
contracting missions.  Through this research and analysis, the research team provides 
information that will improve how CCOs from the U.S. Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, 
Navy and Contingency Contract Administration Services (CCAS) support teams from the 
DCMA operate in a Joint contingency environment.  The research focused on 
contingency contracting guidance, policy, doctrine, lessons learned; contracting officers’ 
roles, responsibilities, education; and the current structure/organization of Service 
Component and COCOM contingency contracting.   
Recommendations will include how the Services’ CCOs and the DCMA CCAS 
support teams can effectively prepare for and execute their contingency contracting 
missions; how the Department of Defense (DoD) can improve manning, experience, and 
structure to accomplish contingency contracting operations; and to determine if the 
establishment of a Joint Contingency Contracting Command (JCCC) within the DoD, 
which would have the responsibility of controlling the actions of contingency contracting 
in theater, is feasible.     
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The focus of this research effort includes: (1) an overview of the current guidance, 
policy and doctrine shaping today’s contingency contracting environment; (2) an 
overview of the Services’ and DCMA’s contracting organizations; (3) a comparative 
analysis of two COCOM’s--Pacific Command (PACOM) and Central Command 
(CENTCOM)--approach to contingency operations; and (4) a validation effort of 
DCMA’s entry and exit criteria. 
This research is limited to the roles and responsibility of the Joint CCOs we 
interviewed in the acquisition headquarters of the Service Components, CENTCOM, and 
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PACOM.  The research team believes that DoD might be able to apply some of these 
recommendations to improve all contingency contracting.  Also, the majority of the 
contingency contracting lessons learned come from operations over the last 15 years.  
Since Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1990-1991, there has been a conscious effort in 
DoD to collect this information and place it into the Joint Uniform Lessons Learned 
System (JULLS).  That information is only as good as the people who make the effort to 
write down those lessons and the Commands who capture it while it is still relevant. 
Throughout this research it is assumed that the reader has a basic knowledge and 
understanding of: (1) the organization of the U.S. military; (2) contracting procedures and 
regulations including both the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS); and (3) essential tools used to 
plan contingency operations such as Joint Operation Plans (OPLAN), CCSP, the Joint 
Operation Planning Execution System (JOPES), and Time-Phased Force and Deployment  
Data (TPFDD). 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this report includes a literature review of U.S. Joint 
contingency contracting polices and guidelines, library information resources, websites, 
books, and magazines.  The researchers also conducted personal interviews with 
representatives from the Joint Staff J4; Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition); Army 
Contracting Agency (ACA); Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, 
and Acquisition) [ASN(RD&A)], Headquarters, Marine Corps; DCMA Headquarters 
Combat Support Center (CSC); DCMA International District (DCMAI); CENTCOM; 
and PACOM. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is:  How can the U.S. Air Force, Army, Marine 
Corps, Navy, and DCMA organize to better conduct Joint contingency contracting?  The 
secondary research questions are:   
1. Is the current Joint contingency contracting guidance/policy/doctrine 
useful?  
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2. Is it appropriate that only one Service is designated the Executive Agency 
for contingencies? 
3. Do PACOM and CENTCOM have qualified personnel and the appropriate 
structure to effectively plan contingency contracting operations? 
4. Are we truly moving to a Joint contingency contracting environment? 
5. Should all the Services recognize each other’s warrants during 
contingency contracting operations?  
6. Should all Services’ CCOs have the same length (time) of deployment? 
F. DEFINITIONS 
Acquisition – The FAR 2.101: Definitions of Words and Terms, defines 
acquisition as acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or services 
(including construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government through purchase 
or lease, whether the supplies or services are already in existence or must be created, 
developed, demonstrated, and evaluated.  Acquisition begins at the point when agency 
needs are established and includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency 
needs, solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contract financing, 
contract performance, contract administration, and those technical and management 
functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency needs by contract. 
Contingency – An event that requires the deployment of military forces in 
response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law and order, 
political instability, or a military operation.1  Contingencies require plans for rapid 
response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, 
installations and equipment. 
                                                 
1 Defense Acquisition University, Contingency Contracting (CON 234) Student Handbook, November 
2000, p. 2-3. 
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Contingency Contracting – Direct contracting support to tactical and operational 
forces engaged in the full spectrum of armed conflict and military operations other than 
war (MOOTW), both domestic and overseas.2 
Contingency Operation – Title 10 (10 [United States Code] U.S.C. 101(a)(13)) 
defines a contingency operation as a military operation that— 
(1) Is designated by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) as an operation in which 
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, 
or hostilities against an enemy of the U.S. or against an opposing military force; or 
(2) Results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the 
uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12305, or 12406 of 10 
U.S.C., chapter 15 of 10 U.S.C., or any other provision of law during a war or during a 
national emergency declared by the President or Congress. 
Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) – A person with delegated contracting 
authority to enter into, administer and terminate contracts on behalf of the U.S. 
Government in support of a local contingency, steady-state deployments, or other 
contingency operations.  The CCO also acts as the primary business advisor to the 
deployed or on-scene commander.3 
Contract – The FAR 2.101 defines a contract as a mutually binding legal 
relationship obligating the seller to furnish the supplies or services (including 
construction) and the buyer to pay for them.  It includes all types of commitments that 
obligate the U.S. Government to an expenditure of appropriated funds and that, except as 
otherwise authorized, are in writing.  In addition to bilateral instruments, contracts 
include (but are not limited to) awards and notices of awards; job orders or task letters 
issued under basic ordering agreements; letter contracts; orders, such as purchase orders, 
under which the contract becomes effective by written acceptance or performance; and 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
3 Department of the Air Force.  (2002)  Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(AFFARS).  Washington D.C.  Appendix CC-102, p. 1. 
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bilateral contract modifications. Contracts do not include grants and cooperative 
agreements covered by 31 U.S.C.6301, et seq.  
Contracting – The FAR 2.101 defines contracting as purchasing, renting, leasing, 
or otherwise obtaining supplies or services from nonfederal sources.  Contracting 
includes description (but not determination) of supplies and services required, selection 
and solicitation of sources, preparation and award of contracts, and all phases of contract 
administration.  It does not include making grants or cooperative agreements. 
Contracting Officer (CO) – The FAR 2.101 defines a CO as a person with the 
authority to enter into, administer, and/or terminate contracts and make related 
determinations and findings.   
Executive Agent (EA) – The DoD Directive 5101.1 defines the DoD EA the head 
of a DOD Component to whom the SECDEF or the Deputy SECDEF (DEPSECDEF) has 
assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of 
support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that 
involve two or more of the DoD Components.  The nature and scope of the DoD EA’s 
responsibilities, functions, and authorities shall be prescribed at the time of assignment 
and remain in effect until the SECDEF or DEPSECDEF revokes or supersedes them. 
Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) – Authorized streamlined purchasing 
methods in FAR 13: SAP is used to expedite purchasing support to the warfighter.  SAPs 
are authorized for construction up to the Simplified Acquisition Threshold and 
commercial commodities and services up to $5 million.4 
Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) – The FAR defines the SAT term as 
$100,000, except for acquisitions of supplies or services that, as determined by the head 
of the agency, are to be used to support a contingency operation or to facilitate defense 
against or recovery from nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack (41 U.S.C. 
428a); the term means-- 
                                                 
4 Ibid. Appendix CC-102, p. 2.  
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(1) $250,000 for any contract to be awarded and performed, or purchase to be 
made, inside the United States; and 
(2) $1 million for any contract to be awarded and performed, or purchase to be 
made, outside the United States. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
This report presents the information gained from this research in what the 
research team believes is a logical manner.  Chapter I outlines the report’s structure and 
direction.  It discusses the objectives of the research, scope, limitations, assumptions and 
methodology.  Chapter II presents an overview of today’s Joint contingency contracting 
environment and its issues.  Current guidance, policy and doctrine; command structures; 
phases of contingency contracting; designation of executive agents (EAs), and how each 
Service applies their FAR supplement are but a few of the topics discussed.  Chapter III 
explores how various DoD (Service Component and DCMA) contingency contracting 
organizations are structured to perform their contracting roles and responsibilities and the 
issues related to performing the same in a contingency contracting arena.  Chapter IV 
compares two unified combatant commands--PACOM and CENTCOM--approach to 
theater logistics support through contracting.  Chapter V highlights issues related to the 
validation of DCMA’s entry and exit criteria.  The research team’s overarching 




































II. POLICY, GUIDANCE AND DOCTRINE 
A. OVERVIEW  
Before examining Joint contingency contracting issues and challenges facing 
Contingency Contracting Officers (CCO) in today’s Joint area of operations, it is 
essential to establish a basic level of understanding of the policy, guidance and doctrine 
that shapes that environment.  In order to improve the reader’s understanding of the 
contingency contracting environment, the first section of this chapter describes the types 
of contingencies and typical phases of contingency contracting.  The second section 
provides a brief synopsis of the command relationships; Joint Publications (JP); and 
Department of Defense (DoD) contracting regulations, directions and instructions that 
shape the contingency contracting environment.  In addition, the education and training 
requirements that affect contracting officer (CO) certifications and actions in a Joint 
contingency contracting environment are explored.  Issues surrounding the current policy, 
guidance and doctrine are highlighted and analyzed in the third section; conclusions are 
presented in the following section.  The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the 
policy, guidance and doctrine findings and highlights previews of the upcoming chapter.  
B. CONTINGENCIES 
1. Types of Contingencies 
The definition of contingencies is purposely broad enough to include four types of 
contingencies: Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs), Lesser Regional Conflicts (LRCs), 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and Domestic Disaster/Emergency 
Relief.  However, it is also purposely exclusive of military training exercises, routine 
installation and base operations, and systems and inventory control point contracting, 
both in the continental United States (CONUS) and land outside the CONUS 
(OCONUS).  Contracting for contingencies is set apart from these later types of 
contracting efforts because each of these exclusions lacks an element of immediate risk to 
human life or national interests. 
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MRCs are conflicts where hostilities are on-going, imminent or likely and where 
there is a substantial commitment of United States (U.S.) military forces.  Operation 
Unified Assistance, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) are examples of MRCs. 
LRCs are also conflicts involving on-going, imminent or likely hostilities 
involving U.S. military, but where there is less than substantial commitment of forces.  
Operation Just Cause (Panama) is an example of a LRC. 
Per JP 3-05, MOOTW encompasses a wide range of activities where the military 
instrument of national power is used for purposes other than large scale combat 
operations usually associated with war.  MOOTW are usually conducted outside the U.S.; 
however, they also include military support to U.S. civil authorities.  JP 3-0 lists the 
following categories of MOOTW: Arms Control, Combating Terrorism, Counter-Drug 
Operations, Nation Assistance, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), Civil 
Support Operations, Peace Operations, and Support to Insurgents.  Operations Provide 
Comfort (Northern Iraq), Uphold Democracy (Haiti) and Joint Endeavor (Bosnia) are 
examples of MOOTW conducted in recent years. 
Domestic Disaster Emergency Relief is technically a subset of MOOTW.  These 
operations can range from natural and man-made disasters to civic disturbances to 
terrorist activity.  Military missions in this area include efforts to mitigate the results of 
natural or man-made disasters such as hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, oil spills, riots, 
and major air, rail or highway accidents.  Support to Hurricanes Charley, Jeanne and 
Andrew are examples of domestic disaster emergency relief. 
2. Phases of Contingency Contracting 
Contingency contracting will be conducted in two types of environments: mature 
and immature.  A mature contracting environment is one characterized by a sophisticated 
vendor base and distribution system that can rapidly respond to changing requirements 
                                                 
5 Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 Sep 01, page V-1. 
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and priorities.6  Typically, the vendors in a mature environment have prior experience 
with U.S. Government contracting requirements and regulations and can readily satisfy 
most contingency requirements.  In the best case, there is an existing DoD contracting 
office in place to process contingency force requirements.  Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Korea 
and Western Europe are examples of mature contracting environments. 
On the other hand, an immature contracting environment is in an area with little 
or no built-up infrastructure.  There are few vendors and of the available vendors few, if 
any, have previous experience contracting with the U.S.  Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda are 
examples of immature contracting environments. 
There are basically four phases7 of contracting support that can occur during 
contingencies: Mobilization/Initial Deployment, Build-Up, Sustainment, and 
Termination/Redeployment.  While not all operations will follow the framework outlined 
below, it is useful for conceptualization and discussion of the contracting actions 
necessary to support contingencies.   
a. Phase I: Mobilization/Initial Deployment  
This is normally the first 30-45 days of a deployment and is characterized 
by an extremely high operations tempo, confusion and controlled chaos.  The CCO’s first 
priority will be responsiveness to basic life support requirements including billeting, food 
service--especially potable water, transportation and equipment rental, ground fuel, 
laundry and bath services, and refuse and sanitation services.  During this phase, CCOs 
may find themselves in the undesirable position of being the requestor, approving 
official, certifying officer and transportation office for deliveries.  Detailed planning can 
preclude some of these additional duties; however, physical limitations on the number of 
support personnel deployed in the early stages of a contingency will require a high degree 
                                                 
6 Defense Acquisition University, CON 234, Contingency Contracting Student Handbook, (2000), p.2-
5. 
7 The four phases of contracting support required during contingencies were developed by the authors 
from material reviewed and lessons learned from coursework at the Naval War College (NWC) and 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy (GSB&PP).  Specifically NW3276 Joint Maritime 
Operations (JMO) – Part 2 described and provided lessons learned of the typical phases of military 
operations.  MN3303 (Principles of Acquisition and Contract Management) described and provided lessons 
learned about the typical tasks a CCO would face in establishing, running and disestablishing a contracting 
office in both immature and mature contingency environments. 
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of flexibility on the part of the CCO.  Oral orders, use of U.S. Government charge card 
and cash payments will be the primary contracting actions. 
b. Phase II: Build-Up 
This phase is characterized by a reception and bed-down of the main body 
of deploying forces.  In this phase, additional contracting personnel will generally arrive 
with their units, though not necessarily at a rate commensurate with the number of troops 
to be supported.  The CCO’s priorities during this phase will continue to be 
responsiveness to life support requirements, but attention must also be given to: 
(1) Gaining effective command and control over contracting and 
contracting support personnel. 
(2) Establishing a vendor base.  
(3) Putting requisitioning, funding and contracting controls and 
procedures in place.  
(4) Establishing Non-Appropriated Funds (NAF) contracting 
procedures to support quality of life programs. 
(5) Establishing Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA), consolidating 
requirements into purchase orders and contracts rather than using 
the high volume, and physically time consuming cash transactions.  
(6) Establishing an ordering officer (OO) network with effective 
control measures. 
c. Phase III: Sustainment   
This phase provides contracting support from the completion of the build-
up phase until redeployment begins.  The contracting activity will expand into contracts 
for additional quality of life, more permanent facilities and equipment, additional office 
supplies, and discretionary services.  The CCO’s priorities during this phase will be: 
(1) Establishing long-term contracts (indefinite delivery-indefinite 
quantity (IDIQ) and additional BPAs) and consolidating 
requirements wherever possible to achieve economies of scale, 
reduce costs, and mitigate risks. 
(2) Improving documentation of contracting actions and internal 
controls.  
(3) Increasing competition and depth of vendor base, to include off-
shore sourcing for items and services not available within the 
immediate area.  
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(4) Planning for transition to follow-on forces or termination and 
redeployment. 
d. Phase IV: Termination/Redeployment   
This phase is characterized by significant pressure and urgency to send the 
troops home.  Typical new requirements include packing, crating and freight services; 
construction and operation of wash racks for vehicles; and commercial air passenger 
services if the Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is not providing this service.  
The CCO will be required to terminate and close out existing contracts and orders.  
Ratifications and claims must be processed to completion.  Contracting for life support 
services must continue until the last troop leaves.  When a follow-on force is required, the 
CCO must prepare contracts and files for delegation or assignment to the incoming 
contracting agency such as the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the 
United Nations (UN). Often, the CCO can expect to be the one of the last persons to 
leave the area.  
Hostilities may break out during any phase of a contingency.  The more 
rapidly the contracting operation matures, the better support CCOs will be capable of 
providing when hostilities do occur.  During hostilities several problems are unavoidable.  
Contractor employees may not report for work, abandon the job site or refuse to drive 
vehicles in certain areas; vendors and shops may close during hours of darkness or 
completely; the threat of snipers, terrorists and enemy action against the CCO while 
traveling in the local community may increase significantly.  The CCO must advise 
supported units of these likelihoods so they can plan to perform essential contracted tasks 
with military manpower, or they will be forced to do without. 
C. BACKGROUND 
1. Command Relationships 
The chain of command begins with the National Command Authority (NCA), 
which is comprised of the President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), who 
control the armed forces.  The chain of command follows two distinct branches (Figure 
1).  The first branch of authority runs from the President, through the SECDEF, directly 
to the Combatant Commanders for missions and forces assigned to their commands.  The 
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second branch, used for purposes other than the operational direction of forces assigned 
to the Combatant Command (COCOM), runs from the President, through the SECDEF, 
to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.   
The chain of command for contracting follows both branches.  Planning for and 
executing contracting operations follows the first branch while the official authority to 
contract follows the second.  The chain of command at every level should be involved in 
planning and providing for contracting support.  In addition, communication and 




Figure 1.   Chain of Command 
(Source: From JP 3.0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, p. II-5) 
 
The Military Departments operate under the authority, direction, and control of 
the SECDEF.  The Secretaries of each Military Department direct and control their forces 
through the Service chiefs.  In addition, the Secretaries provide administrative (personnel 
and finance), legal, and logistical support to their own forces.  Contracting authority 
begins at the Military Department level.  For example, COs in the Army get their 
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authority from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology (ASA(ALT)).  The ASA(ALT) has the authority to appoint a command or 
theater contracting executive (Head of Contracting Activity (HCA)) or Principal 
Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC). 
2. Joint Publications  
A myriad of JPs address various aspects of planning for and executing contracting 
missions in a Joint environment.  The subjective literature reviews and qualitative 
personal interviews exposed the research team to several of these publications, especially 
JP 3.0 – Joint Operations, JP 4.0 – Joint Logistics, JP 4.07 – Common User Logistics, 
and JP 4.08 – Logistics in Multinational Operations, which contain cursory language 
pertaining to the acquisition of contracted supplies, services and construction in support 
of military operations.  While all of these publications touch upon broad, top-level 
aspects of contracting, none provide a detailed strategic approach for articulating and 
understanding the mission, objective, purpose of the operation, and commander’s intent.  
3. Contracting Regulations, Directives and Instructions 
a. Contracting Regulations 
Normally, DoD contracting is performed in accordance with the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS), and various Service or COCOM supplements including: Army Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS), Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (AFFARS), Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(NMCARS), and Special Operations Command Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (SOFARS).   
The FAR is the primary regulation used by COs to purchase supplies, 
services and construction, and the DFARS specifically applies to DoD contracting 
activities.  The DFARS does not specifically address contingency contracting; therefore, 
each Service and the DCMA have developed tailored guidelines and procedures to fill 
this void.  The following Table outlines the various Services’ and DCMA’s Contingency 
Contracting guidance.   
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Table 1.   Services’ and DCMA Contingency Contracting Guidance8 
  
SERVICE/AGENCY SUPPLEMENT 
Air Force AFFAR Supplement Appendix CC 
Army AFARS Manual No. 2 
Navy Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Instruction 4230.37A and NAVSUP 713 
Marine Corps Marine Corps Order (MCO) P4200.15, Appendix B 
DCMA 
DCMA Instructions and DCMA Guidebook;  
chapter entitled Contingency CAS9 
 
While these procedures are similar and typically include discussions on 
policy, authority, funding and structure, each is different.  These differences manifest 
themselves when COs from different Services are brought together to perform 
contingency contracting operations.    
During contingency operations, several common exceptions10 to the 
normal DoD contracting procedures may be invoked.  These include:  
x Limiting sources in solicitations when an urgent and compelling requirement 
precludes full and open competition. 
x Omitting synopses of proposed contract actions when it would delay award 
and injure the U.S. Government. 
x Using oral solicitations, awarding letter contracts and other forms of 
undefinitized contract actions to expedite the start of work. 
x Requesting authority to award emergency requirements before resolving a 
protest against contract award. 
x Raising the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) to allow for the 
acquisition of supplies or services in support of a contingency operation; the 
SAT is raised to $250,000 for any contract awarded inside the U.S. and 
$1,000,000 outside the U.S. 
                                                 
8 Created by the research team based on research data collected/analyzed. 
9 The Contingency CAS chapter of the DCMA Instruction and DCMA Guidebook is currently 
unavailable pending rewrite.  New instructions and/or guidance are anticipated in the third quarter of Fiscal 
Year 05. 
10 McMillon, Chester L.  Contingency Contracting within the Department of Defense: A Comparative 
Analysis, p. 5 
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b. Department of Defense Directives and Instructions 
Literature reviews of current DoD directives and instructions 
(DoDD/DoDI) such as DoDD 1400.31 and DoDI 3020.37, which discuss DoD policy and 
guidance regarding contractors deploying with the force (CDF), or accompanying the 
force (CAF), do not reflect current realities.  Interviews with senior officials on the Joint 
Staff (J4) and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics) (USD(AT&L)), Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy reveal 
that these policies and guidance are being updated to reflect lessons learned during OEF 
and OIF. Additionally, DFARS Case 2003-D087 is expected to be approved shortly, 
which will redefine contract language for contractor personnel supporting a force 
deployed outside the U.S.   
4. Education and Training 
When the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 1991, was 
signed into law11 on November 5, 1990, the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) was enacted.  Essentially, the DAWIA requires the 
SECDEF, acting through the USD(AT&L), to establish education and training standards, 
requirements, and courses for the civilian and military acquisition workforce.  Its impact 
on the contracting career field was immediate and far-reaching.   
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2002, signed into law12 
December 28, 2001, amended the DAWIA CO qualification requirements as originally in 
Public Law (PL) 101-510.  The amendment raised the educational bar that new entrants 
in the contracting career field must meet to serve as a CO with authority to award or 
administer contracts exceeding the $100,000 SAT, yet exempted some personnel already 
in place.  Specifically, Section 824 of this Act amended 10 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) § 1724 to 
include a requirement for a baccalaureate degree and 24 semester credit hours of study in 
a business-related discipline and to exempt the following DoD employees or members of 
the military from the requirement that COs and others in GS-1102 series contracting 
                                                 
11 PL 101-510 applies 
12 PL 107-107 applies 
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positions and similar military positions had to meet: (1) those who served as a CO with 
authority to award or administer contracts in excess of the $100,000 SAT on or before 
September 30, 2000; (2) those who served as an employee in the GS-1102 series or as a 
member of the armed services in a similar occupational specialty on or before September 
30, 2000; (3) those in the contingency contracting force (e.g. “members of the armed 
forces whose mission is to deploy in support of contingency operations and other 
operations of the DoD"); and (4) those appointed by the SECDEF to developmental 
positions.   
COs must meet all DAWIA career field and level certification education, 
experience, and training requirements before requesting or being approved for 
certification.  Under DAWIA, incumbents of all acquisition positions (officer, enlisted 
and civilian) are expected to meet these requirements.  A graphic depiction of these 
changes is provided in Figure 2.  On April 10, 2003, in accordance with the exemption 
provision of PL 107-107, then USD(AT&L) Aldridge issued a memorandum that 
established "minimum qualification criteria for accession, development, and deployment 
of the contingency contracting force workforce." In turn, each Military Department was 

































Figure 2.   GS-1102 Educational Requirements 
(Source: From DCMA website, http://www.dcma.mil) 
 
D. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 
1. Issues 
Several issues were identified that reflect shortcomings in current policy, 
guidance and doctrine; specifically: 
x Operation Plans (OPLAN) do not address contracting for contingency 
operations on a strategic level. 
x Command relationships are unclear and contribute to inefficiencies and 
ineffective accomplishment of the contracting mission. 
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x Unqualified COs are deployed to support the OIF contingency contracting 
effort. 
x Contracting billets are filled based on rank versus capability. 
x Designation of a single executive agent (EA) leads to confusion when 
deployed CCOs are mandated to use another Services’ FAR supplement.   
The following sections explain and analyze these issues in more detail. 
2. Operation Plans  
 Interviews with senior officials on the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) J3, J4 
and J5 staff found PACOM does not address contingency contracting on a strategic level.  
The strategic level is defined as, “The level of war at which a nation, often as a member 
of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security 
objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these 
objectives.”13  OPLANs do not fully address contracting; however, J4’s annexes 
designate a lead service or EA for each plan.  For example, Appendix 9 to Annex D 
(Logistics) for one of PACOM’s concept plans (CONPLAN) states “[Headquarters, 
Pacific Air Force] HQ, PACAF is designated EA and lead contracting service for 
coordinating contingency contracting planning and support.  HQ PACAF/LGC is the 
designated Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) for this CONPLAN.”   
The designation of lead service or EA is rotated between Services for Joint 
exercises and crises.  No personnel with a contracting background were found on either 
the J3, J4 or J5 staffs.  Neither J3 nor J5 had contact with the DCMA liaison officer 
(LNO).  PACOM staff indicated that, while they would like to have a knowledgeable 
contracting person on staff, current resource levels would not support it.  PACOM 
recently experienced a 15 percent staff reduction and are currently staffed at about one 
person for every four in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). 
Planning for today’s contingency contracting operations must occur at a strategic 
level.  Gone are the days when the Services cultivated their own organic logistic 
capabilities.  The end of the Cold War contributed to this loss.  Following the fall of the 
                                                 
13 DoD Dictionary of Military Terms.  Retrieved on June 7, 2005 from 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/s/05084.html 
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Berlin Wall, each Service’s end strength was reduced.  Decisions made at the highest 
echelons meant that non-combat roles would be reduced and combat related positions 
would be maintained or even grown (more teeth than tail).  To supplement their reduced 
capabilities, the Services turned to civil augmentation programs (CAP) to provide logistic 
support for deployed troops; however, they did not change their approach to planning 
operations.  Key partners are not included in deliberate or crisis action planning, and the 
rationale as to when to initiate, execute and disengage CAP support is not adequately 
documented.  JPs should be revised to reflect this new era of logistic support.    
Recently, the Joint Staff (J7) has appointed the U.S. Army as the Lead Agent for 
the development of JP 4-XX, Contracting and Contractor Management in Joint 
Operations; Joint Staff (J4) is assigned as the Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor.  Joint doctrine 
is to be developed at the tactics, techniques, and procedures level for contracting and 
contracting management.  
The researchers believe that language of the following nature be considered by the 
Army in their development of the new JP: Future CAP requirements should be 
considered early in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 
process, (e.g. in the initial phase of both the Deliberate Action and Crisis Action 
Planning processes).  By considering the types of requirements that the Services will 
need prior to actually deploying, arrangements through Host Nation Support (HNS) and 
“husbanding” contracts can be made.  This will ensure the Services only use the CAP 
contracts for a limited amount of time and not for extended periods.  By doing this, they 
are able to both save money and guarantee the best possible support for deployed forces. 
3. Command Relationships 
The Army Contracting Agency (ACA) was established on October 1, 2002.  
Regional Contracting Office (RCO) Hawaii reports to ACA Pacific Region.  While 
contracting personnel are assigned to the RCO, individual service members belong to 
either the 25th Infantry Division (ID) (now U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)) or 45th 
Corps Support Group (CSG).  At the time of the research team’s January 2005 visit, the 
Chief, Contingency Contracting Division, was assigned to the 25th ID and attached to the 
RCO. This matrix organization structure results in a conflict between the contracting and 
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operational chains of command.  The research team observed high levels of frustration 
with the current structure especially with regard to evaluations, career progression, and 
securing funds for mission-related activities such as participation in theater exercises and 
execution of the contracting mission. 
The Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) delegated the Department of the 
Army (DA) responsibility for acquisition and program management support for all efforts 
supporting security, humanitarian relief and reconstruction in Iraq, yet the DA was not 
ready to fully execute the contingency contracting mission shortly after OIF was initiated.  
In the beginning, the command structure led to inefficiencies as Services competed 
against one another for scarce resources.  Not having the proper structure to integrate 
contingency contracting led to a misalignment of contracting plans and OPLANs via the 
Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN).14   In the 3rd Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) after action 
report, several problems were noted that resulted from inadequate prior planning (e.g., 
lack of appropriate amounts of vehicular fluids and repair parts).  The lack of these 
products had a lasting effect on fleet readiness.  Units had to purchase these items on the 
local economy, competing in effect with other Service components.  Additional items in 
high demand throughout OIF were vehicle leases, concrete, and bottled water.  A senior 
official with CENTCOM J4 concurs that poor initial planning caused various contracting 
offices to compete for items on the local economy.  (Despite subsequent research and 
telephonic inquiry, the research team was not able to validate specific details on how 
these problems adversely impacted actual missions.)  
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which later 
became the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), was not ready to execute its 
contracting mission.  Historically, the Department of State (DoS) has taken the lead in 
reconstruction and humanitarian assistance projects.  In this case however, DoD asked for 
and was granted the authority to assume this responsibility.  This authority was given in 
late January, and by March, U.S. forces were engaged in war.  Due to the insufficient 
                                                 
14 Anderson, M. and Flaherty, G.  MBA Professional Report: Analysis of the Contingency Contracting 
Support Plan within the Joint Planning Process Framework  (Monterey: NPS, December 2003), 41. 
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amount of time ORHA had to plan, they were not able to adequately set up and staff this 
office. 
Initially ORHA did not have sufficient contracting personnel in country to handle 
the enormous amount of contracting required to support the war effort.  Additionally, 
those personnel they did have were missing the necessary forms and equipment to 
prosecute the mission.  As a result, they requested assistance from DCMA, which led to 
DCMA Iraq being granted a waiver to perform preaward contract activities, contract 
award and contract management.  Today, through missteps and lessons learned, the 
command relationships have matured.  This proves the critical nature of planning in the 
success of any mission.  When planning, it is paramount that you have early involvement 
of key stakeholders, because only then can you mitigate future risks and ensure all 
interests are covered.  During this early planning, there needs to be a clear delineation of 
each stakeholder’s roles, responsibilities, and function.   
In October 2004, U.S. CENTCOM established the Joint Contracting Command-
Iraq15 (JCC-I in Figure 3).  JCC-I was established to provide a unified contracting effort 
and complete visibility over all contracting forces in Iraq as well as reconstruction 
projects.  Brigadier General Seay was appointed the first HCA; Major General Urias is 
the current HCA.  Time will tell if the JCC-I is able to: (1) achieve through unity of effort 
economies of scale that exemplify best business practices; (2) establish common 
procedures for other Service component contracting offices; (3) establish theater 
contracting officer warrant procedures; (4) establish a Joint Logistics Procurement 
Support Board (JLPSB); and (5) serve as a model for commerce in Iraq and a catalyst for 
economic growth.      
 
                                                 
15 Bolton letter to General Seay, 27 Oct 04, re: HCA Appointment. 
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Figure 3.   Joint Contracting Command-Iraq 
(Source: From U.S. CENTCOM Interview, February 22, 2005) 
 
4. Contracting Officer Qualifications 
ACA utilizes the Individual Development Plan (IDP) concept coupled with 
DAWIA guidelines to train their members of the Army Acquisition Corps (51C).  During 
the research group’s interview in September 2004 with a senior officer in RCO Hawaii, 
the team was told that a junior officer deployed to Afghanistan as a CCO despite the fact 
that he had not completed CON 234, Contingency Contracting, or fulfilled all the 
DAWIA mandated education, training and experience required for Level I certification.  
Due to his lack of qualifications, this CCO’s ability to effectively contribute to the 
contingency contracting mission was severely limited.  During his time in theater, a more 
experienced senior Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) mentored this “green” CCO.  The 
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officer was basically doing a contracting specialist’s job (for which he was also not 
trained), where he was writing contracts and then submitting them to the NCO for review.  
He did not know how to work the Procurement Desktop Defense (PD2); the NCO   
negotiated all the contracts, and the officer worked under his supervision.    
This above situation developed because of the matrix organization structure.  The 
matrix organization structure can often lead to an internal power struggle.  The power 
struggle in this case was waged between the CCO’s operational and administrative chains 
of command.  RCO Hawaii (his administrative chain of command) did not want to deploy 
this junior officer.  Instead they wanted to give him extensive on-the-job training and 
formal training.  In this case, the 25th ID (his operational chain of command) had a 
requirement to meet and ordered the billet filled.  The 25th ID commander knew that he 
had a CCO that “belonged” to him and wanted him back at his unit.  He did not take into 
consideration the fact that this CCO was one month out of school and had not yet 
received the required certification for contingency contracting, and had minimal 
experience in the field.  Unfortunately, this conflict adversely impacted the contingency 
contracting mission.  Had there been a clear chain of command, (e.g. resulting from 
placing this individual under some form of contingency contracting command), this 
power struggle would not have occurred.  By establishing a Joint Contingency 
Contracting Command (JCCC), there would be a larger pool of COs to pull from, and the 
command would be better prepared to match mission requirements with the correct CO’s 
rank, education, experience, and warrant levels. The establishment of a consolidated 
contingency contracting organization could alleviate this type of issue in the future.  
5. Contracting Billets 
The U.S. Air Force (USAF) uses the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept to 
plan, train and execute contingency/war operations.  The USAF contains 10 AEFs which 
operate on 20-month cycles.  For 14 months of each cycle, members of an AEF will work 
at their assigned duty stations completing their ‘normal’ job.  Then, for the next two 
months, they train and prepare for possible deployment.  If a contingency arises needing a 
unit to deploy, and it is their unit’s “turn”, they will be the deploying unit during the 
following four months.  If no operation/contingency arises, then that specific unit will not 
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deploy, and the next AEF (in sequential order) will be the deploying unit during the 
following four-month time block. While the known yet short deployment period 
promotes retention, it can create a continuity problem in theatre.  For example, a 
contractor will outwait a CCO they do not want to deal with.   
The USAF approach for fulfilling mission requirements is not necessarily based 
on rank.  The USAF fills billets to the mission requirement versus filling billets based 
upon a rank requirement.  For instance, a Level II/7 Senior Master Sergeant (SMSgt) who 
is fully qualified will be deployed instead of a Captain.  This approach often creates 
conflict with other Services or lead agents who may be expecting an officer.  Joint 
language needs to be drafted that addresses filling billet requirements based upon mission 
requirements and experience levels versus filling billets solely upon rank.  This allows 
the Joint Commander to take advantage of the significant experience and expertise that 
resides within the Services professional enlisted contracting specialists. 
6. Executive Agent 
In September 2004, a senior official with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Research, Development & Acquisition) (ASN(RDA)) expressed concern that other 
Services were apprehensive about executing contracting in accordance with the AFARS 
instead of their own Service supplements.  Examination showed that this unease is based 
on CCOs’ familiarity with their own doctrine versus that of other Services.  The steep 
learning curve associated with gaining familiarity with another Service’s acquisition 
supplement may have an adverse impact on the CO’s ability to support the contingency 
operation.  The research team’s initial recommendation is to require that all Services 
exclusively follow the FAR and DFARS while in theater.  This would create a level 
playing field for all participants by forcing each Service to follow the same regulations.  
The second possible solution is for Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the 
Joint Staff to create a Joint Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (JFARS) that will 
be specifically used in theater for Joint operations.  
Operating solely under the FAR/DFARS is a good first step measure to moving to 
a new supplement.  The reason is the Services are familiar with these documents, and it 
would require no additional training and would not subject one Service to follow another 
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Service’s supplement.  The disadvantage is that each Service would still need to change 
the way they typically conduct business by diverting from their supplement to the 
FAR/DFARS.   
Contingency contracting in a Joint environment should be governed by the FAR 
and DFARS.  Individual Service supplements should be set aside, and a single 
supplement encompassing Joint contingency contracting guidance should be introduced.  
In developing this new supplement, the best of the best from the current Service 
supplements (as detailed in Table 1 of Chapter II), should be brought together to form a 
single cohesive and comprehensive document. 
Another problem the researchers discovered was that CCOs must also await their 
new warrant even though they probably already have a valid warrant from their home 
station.  Often the HCA is reluctant to take on the responsibility of awarding a warrant to 
a person he or she believes is not fully compliant with the required education, 
certification, and in particular, experience levels.  It was mentioned in the interviews that 
in the case of Iraq, the Army HCA was concerned about awarding a warrant to Marine 
COs.  The reason noted has to do with the impression that Marines tend to be COs “part-
time,” (e.g. they only do a three year payback tour) and their lack of experience worried 
him.  The Air Force also experienced some problems relating to the fact that some of 
their personnel, although warranted by their home unit, did not have all the required 
certifications.  Since they were missing some of these prerequisites, the HCA did not feel 
comfortable awarding them a warrant, even though they were perhaps the most 
experienced in contracting.  This proves a significant burden considering that Air Force 
personnel were deploying for four-month cycles—a two-week delay in awarding a 
warrant means the CCO personnel were inefficient a large portion of the time they were 
in country. 
E. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
All the issues described above are symptoms of inadequate planning, ineffective 
communications, limited integration and poor execution.  To resolve these issues, the 
research team recommends adoption of the following courses of action: 
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1. OPLANs do not address contracting for contingency operations on a 
strategic level. 
x Ensure the planning for today’s contingency contracting operations occurs at a 
strategic level. 
x Involve key stakeholders in every stage of the planning process, but especially 
during the initial phases when the requirements are being shaped. 
x Reflect new era of logistics support in revised JPs.  The Joint Staff (J7) has 
recently appointed the U.S. Army as the Lead Agent for the development of 
JP 4-XX, Contracting and Contractor Management in Joint Operations, which 
should deal with this problem. 
2. Command relationships are unclear and contribute to inefficiencies and 
ineffective accomplishment of the contracting mission. 
x COs should be assigned to the RCO instead of assigned to their operational 
unit. 
3. COs were not qualified before they were deployed to support the OIF 
contingency contracting effort. 
x Each Service needs to conduct early identification of roles, functions and 
missions to alleviate some of the problems that occurred with the contingency 
contracting operation. 
x Each Service has a limited number of COs available.  With the increasing 
regularity of contingencies throughout the world, the chances of them 
deploying are increased.  The onus remains on the individual and the units to 
ensure their personnel are properly trained and have the requisite knowledge 
and certifications to fill a contingency contracting billet when required. 
4. Billets for contracting are filled based on rank versus capability. 
x When requesting contingency contracting personnel from sister Services, the 
requestor must be aware of the differences in the rank and experience of their 
personnel, and make sure our requirements are based on the experience and 
capability of an individual vice that person’s rank. 
5. Designation of a single EA leads to confusion when deployed CCOs are 
mandated to use another Service’s FAR supplement.   
x Conduct all contracting actions in accordance with the FAR and DFARS only; 
this mandate would level the playing field.  
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x Develop, as an alternative, a contingency contracting FAR supplement that all 
Service contracting components would adhere to for conducting contracting 
operations in theater.    
This chapter provides an overview of the current policy, guidance and doctrine 
that shapes the contingency contracting environment.  It highlights issues that have the 
potential to degrade CO support of a contingency operation and provides several 
recommendations to improve contingency contracting efficiency and effectiveness.  
Additionally, it sets the framework for the next chapter that will analyze the structure of 
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III. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING ORGANIZATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter describes the various Services’ and the Defense Contract 
Management Agency’s (DCMA) contingency contracting organizational structure.  After 
exploring the various contracting organizations, the chapter examines contracting 
authority, Joint contingency operations, the acquisition team, the  contingency 
contracting environment and the three civil augmentation programs (CAP) that support 
them: the United States (U.S.) Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), 
the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP), and Construction Capabilities 
(CONCAP) for the Navy and Marine Corps.  The chapter concludes with a thorough 
analysis of the acquisition pipeline16 and the Limitre17 Personnel Assignment Model 
(LPAM). 
B. CONTRACTING ORGANIZATIONS 
1. U.S. Army (USA) 
The Army is organized by corps, divisions, brigades, battalions and companies 
(Figure 4).  In addition, support commands such as Corps Support Command (COSCOM) 
and Division Support Command (DISCOM) support tactical units (the warfighters).   
Typically, contracting officers (CO) are assigned to the COSCOM and/or 
DISCOM for administrative purposes, but are really assigned to the installation 
contracting office for day-to-day activities, as an installation CO.  When called upon to 
assist their unit in real world contingencies, COs prepare contracting support plans in 
concert with the senior COs and/or the respective Principal Assistant Responsible for 
Contracting (PARC). COs take part in site surveys and establish contact with local 
                                                 
16 Acquisition pipeline is a reference to the Services’ ability to recruit, train, promote and retain 
qualified members for the contracting career field. 
17 In parallel to this research, one member of the research project along with two members of her 
cohort developed the Limitre (Lisa Haptonstall, Michael Lassen and Gordon “Tres” Meek) Personnel 
Assignment Model based on the principles presented in the Naval Postgraduate School’s Graduate School 
of Business and Public Policy course GB4043, Business Modeling.  The working paper, dated 15 March 
2005, is entitled Contingency Contract Administration Services (CCAS) Team Assignment Model. 
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Figure 4.   Department of the Army Contingency Contracting 
               (Source: From CON 234, Contingency Contracting Student Handbook) 
When deployed, the COs usually co-locate with the established contracting 
offices in or near the mission area from which they might derive support and determine 
the location of the local vendor base and the availability and suitability of commercial 
goods and services.  In addition, they fill support requirements, as directed by their 
commander.  
COs are usually company or field grade officers with limited contracting 
experience.  Unlike other Services, COs begin their careers in another field other than 
contracting. Once accessed into the acquisition career field, COs receive contracting 
education, training and experience and earn their contracting warrants. Once officers 
have been accessed into the Acquisition Corps, they will remain in the acquisition career 
field for the remainder of their military career.  
In addition to the CO, the USA also recruits Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) 






























exclusively assigned to contracting enlisted billets alongside the CO. Though this 
mentoring program is still in its infancy, the Army has plans to increase these pairings 
over the coming years.  
2. U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
The Air Force is organized by numbered wings, groups, squadrons and flights 
(Figure 5).  COs and NCOs are located in the contract squadron under the logistics group 
of an air wing.  The Air Force maximizes the use of its Officer and NCO ranks by 
assigning them to the contracting field upon entry.   
The Air Force has a well-defined and long-established career Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS) for enlisted contracting personnel.  Enlisted personnel can 
be accessed into the contracting field upon entry into the service.  This is not to say the 
Air Force does not assign enlisted personnel of other grades into contracting.  The Air 
Force accesses NCOs from all other MOSs in grades E-4 to E-7.  However, the USAF 
considers accession at the earliest opportunity in the career development process vital to 
developing the future acquisition work force.  Using two sources of accessions provides 
the Air Force with a mixture of enlisteds promoted within the system and personnel with 











Figure 5.   Department of the Air Force Contingency Contracting 



















The Air Force contingency contracting office reviews contingency taskings and 
designates a sufficient number of qualified individuals to perform those assignments.  If 
the contracting office requires more manpower to support Operation Plans (OPLAN) than 
can be reasonably provided without degrading home station functions, then the chief of 
the contracting office notifies the Major Command (MAJCOM) of the shortfall.  
MAJCOM functional areas will identify these manpower shortfalls through the Wartime 
Manpower Requirements/Force Sizing Exercises (MANREQ/FORSIZE) computation for 
their command and designate alternate resources to meet the tasking to include Air 
National Guard or Air Force Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) if 
necessary. 
3. U.S. Navy (USN) 
The Navy is organized by five fleets18 and the supporting commands that sustain 
them.  The Pacific Fleet is composed of the THIRD and SEVENTH Fleets.  SEVENTH 
Fleet units serve throughout the western Pacific and Indian Ocean region, while THIRD 
Fleet units serve in the eastern and northern Pacific Ocean including the Bering Sea, 
Alaska, the Aleutian Islands and a sector of the Arctic.  The SECOND (LANTFLT) and 
SIXTH (Naval Forces Europe) Fleet units serve in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, 
respectively.  FIFTH Fleet (Naval Central Command) units serve throughout the Persian 
Gulf and Middle East.  Other major claimants consist of the major weapon system 
commands such as Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA) and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).  
Two major commands—Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) and Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC)—play a significant role in Navy and Joint 




                                                 











Figure 6.   Department of the Navy Contingency Contracting 
                (Source: From CON 234, Contingency Contracting Student Handbook) 
 
Navy forces afloat are self-contained and self-supporting.  As such, in 
some ways the contingency contracting mission is built-in to the logistical 
support for the fleet. Each ship’s Supply Officer has a simplified 
acquisition threshold warrant for emergency purposes, but they rely on 
their port based contracting officers for replenishment purchases.19 
 
4. U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) 
The Marine Corps can rapidly shape and reshape itself to meet existing and 
emerging mission requirements.  A pre-existing infrastructure is not required to assemble 
a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to meet an operational requirement.  The 
MAGTF may be comprised of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Brigade (MEB), 
Unit (MEU) and Special MAGTF (SPMAGTF).  Each of these organizations serves a 
different purpose.  The MEF is designed to fight the Nation’s wars, the MEB responds to 
crises, the MEU promotes peace and stability, and the SPMAGTF is designed to 
accomplish a specific mission such as riot control in Los Angeles (SPMAGTF LA), 
disaster relief (SPMAGTF Dade County), and noncombatant evacuation operations 
(NEO) in Somalia (SPMAGTF Somalia).   
                                                 




















The Marine Corps is organized around three MEFs20, which are the principal war 
fighting element in the active force structure.  The size and composition of a deployed 
MEF varies depending on the needs of the mission.   Primarily though, each MEF is 
composed of one Division and one Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) along with various 
supporting elements.  The divisions are further broken down into regiments, battalions, 
and companies, and the MAWs are further broken down into groups and squadrons.  A 










Figure 7.   Marine Expeditionary Force Contingency Contracting 
               (Source: From CON 234, Contingency Contracting Student Handbook) 
 
In the Corps, enlisted Marines are accessed into the contracting field at the E-5 
level and can remain in a contracting MOS throughout the remainder of their careers.  
The primary candidates for accession into the contracting field are from the supply 
administration field.  Before personnel are accessed into the contracting field, they must 
successfully complete six months of mandatory on-the-job training.  This requirement 
                                                 
20  I MEF (California): 1st Marine Division and 3rd MAW 
   II MEF (North Carolina): 2nd Marine Division and 2nd MAW 
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provides them with the basic skills and technical expertise needed to become a 
contracting NCO. 
Officers, on the other hand, are selected via the Special Education Program (SEP) 
to attend the resident Master of Business Administration (MBA) course at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS).  These officers represent the spectrum of Marine Corps 
officer MOSs and are not specifically accessed from the supply field.  The majority of 
applicants have no prior contracting experience.  These officers receive defense-focused 
graduate education in acquisition and contracting at NPS.  Upon graduation from NPS, 
they satisfy Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level III 
education requirements for the contracting career field.  Once they graduate, they incur a 
three-year obligation in the contracting MOS (9656).  Here, their primary mission is to 
serve as warranted COs to bases, Marine Corps Systems Command 
(MARCORSYSCOM), Contingency Contracting Force (CCF), and Joint/DoD Individual 
Augmentee (IA) positions (as required). 
After this obligation is fulfilled, they revert back to their primary MOS (PMOS) 
and leave the contracting field, although they do maintain a secondary designation as a 
CO.  In other words, once these officers have the rank and an appropriate matching 
experience level, they leave the field, resulting in a significant drain to the career fields’ 
knowledge base.  
There is a current proposal to make the Marine contracting MOS a permanent 
career field (within the recently introduced Acquisition MOS), similar to the Army’s 
structure. This would allow Marine officers to move into the contracting field and 
continue to perform in that capacity as a CO for the remainder of their military career. 
The current movement aims to develop contracting capability as a skill set within the 
Supply and Logistic officer community.  This initiative will provide a mechanism to 
allow for multiple tours in acquisition to further develop and refine contracting skills, and 




5. Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) 
The DCMA was established in March 2000 as the DoD contract manager.  Their 
primary responsibility is to ensure federal acquisition programs, supplies, and services 
are delivered on time, within cost and meet performance requirements.  DCMA provides 
customer focused acquisition life cycle and combat support to ensure readiness, 
worldwide 24 hours per day every day.  DCMA professionals serve as the "eyes and ears" 
and in-plant representatives for buying agencies throughout the acquisition life cycle.   
Their vision is to be an indispensable partner chosen by their customers for the best 
solutions.   
DCMA Headquarters is supported by three Districts: East, West and International.  
These Districts manage Contract Management Offices (CMO) designed around 
geographic boundaries, major defense contractors, and product lines or service specialties 
(Figure 8).  For contingency contracting operations, the East and West Districts (DCMAE 
and DCMAW, respectively) act as force providers while the International District 





Figure 8.   Defense Contract Management Agency 
             (Source: From http://home.dcma.mil/command/hqorg.htm) 
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In accordance with U.S. Code (U.S.C.) Title 10, Section 193, DCMA is also 
designated as an independent combat support agency (CSA) within the DoD under the 
direction and control of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology & 
Logistics) [USD(AT&L)]; Figure 9 depicts DCMA’s relationship to other Defense 










Figure 9.   DCMA’s Lines of Authority 
      (Source: From DCMAI Combat Support Ops Briefing, 20 Jan 05) 
 
It is DCMA’s CSA designation that gives rise to its contingency contracting 
management role.  One of their many functions includes assembling, training and 
deploying contingency contract administration service (CCAS) support teams to perform 
contract management services in declared and/or undeclared contingency environments 
such as Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans.   
Since its creation as an independent CSA in March 2000, DCMA has deployed 
CCAS teams to manage contracts in virtually every contingency operation supported by 
the U.S. military in the past five years.  CCAS teams are currently deployed to the 
Balkans (Bosnia/Kosovo), Horn of Africa (Djibouti), Philippines, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.  In these contingency environments, DCMA 
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provides contract management services for LOGCAP and AFCAP contracts.  DCMA 
does not usually provide contract management for the Navy’s CONCAP; NAVFAC 
usually retains administration of this contract and its associated orders.  Typical 
contingency contract management tasks include monitoring cost performance and quality 
assurance compliance, inspection of services, property administration, purchasing system 
reviews and surveillance of contractors’ theater performance, and acquisition planning 
support service and technical support to negotiations.   
C. CONTRACTING AUTHORITY 
Unless specifically prohibited by another provision of law, authority and 
responsibility to contract for authorized supplies, services and construction are vested in 
the Head of the Contracting Agency (HCA).  The HCA may establish contracting 
activities and delegate broad authority to manage the agency’s contracting functions to 
heads of such contracting activities.  Contracts may be entered into and signed on behalf 
of the U.S. Government only by COs.  In some agencies, a relatively small number of 
high level officials are designated COs solely by virtue of their positions.  COs below the 
level of a HCA shall be selected and appointed under FAR 1.603.  
COs have authority to enter into, administer or terminate contracts and make 
related determinations and findings.  COs may bind the U.S. Government only to the 
extent of the authority delegated to them.  COs shall receive from the appointing 
authority (see FAR 1.603-1) clear instructions in writing regarding the limits of their 
authority.  Information on the limits of the COs’ authority shall be readily available to the 
public and agency personnel.  No contract shall be entered into unless the CO ensures 
that all requirements of law, executive orders, regulations, and all other applicable 
procedures, including clearances and approvals, have been met. 
D. JOINT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
1. The Unified Combatant Commands 
Operational control of the U.S combat forces is assigned to the nation’s Unified 
Combatant Commands (UCC).  A UCC is composed of forces from two or more 
Services, has a broad and continuing mission and is normally organized on a geographic 
basis; however, organization may also be along functional lines of responsibility.  The 
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Unified Command Plan establishes the mission and geographic responsibilities of the 
combatant commanders.  The number of UCCs is not fixed by law or regulation and may 
vary from time to time.  As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing 
war on terrorism, the Unified Command Plan changed as well as the new defense strategy 
articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.  The new Unified Command Plan 
became effective October 1, 2002.  Major revisions that became effective on October 1, 
2002, include: 
x U.S. Northern Command was established to defend the U.S and provide 
military support to civil authorities. 
x U.S. Joint Forces Command focus shifted to transforming U.S. military forces 
while their geographic responsibilities shifted to the U.S. Northern and 
European Commands.  
x U.S. Space and Strategic Commands were merged to form an expanded U.S. 
Strategic Command. 
  
Effective October 24, 2002, by direction of SECDEF Rumsfeld, the Combatant 
Commander’s title Commander in Chief was changed to Commander as only the 
President could claim the Commander in Chief title. 
Today there are currently the following nine UCCs: 
x U.S. Central Command21 (MacDill Air Force Base, FL) is the unified 
command responsible for U.S. security interests in 25 nations that stretch from 
the Horn of Africa through the Arabian Gulf into Central Asia.    
x U.S. European Command22 (Stuttgart, Germany) is to support and advance 
U.S. interests and policies throughout their assigned Area of Responsibility 
(AOR).  This unified commander also serves as the Supreme Allied 
Commander (SAC) Europe.    
x U.S. Joint Forces Command23 (Norfolk, VA.) forms a hybrid—functional and 
geographic—command, which creates a unique mission.  They are the chief 
advocate for Jointness and leaders of military transformation.  This unified 
commander also serves as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SAC 
Transformation (SACT).   
                                                 
21 U.S. CENTCOM home page, http://www.centcom.mil/home/ 
22 U.S. EUCOM home page, http://www.eucom.mil/home/ 
23 U.S. JFCOM home page, http://www.jfcom.mil/home/ 
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x U.S. Pacific Command24 (Camp H.M. Smith, HI) enhances security and 
promotes peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region.   
x U.S. Southern Command25 (Miami, FL) shapes the environment within their 
AOR by conducting military-to-military engagement and counterdrug 
activities throughout the theater.   
x U.S. Northern Command26 (Peterson Air Force Base, FL) is responsible for 
homeland defense/security.  This unified commander also serves as the 
commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).   
x U.S. Special Operations Command27 (MacDill Air Force Base, FL) is 
responsible for providing combat-ready special operations forces to 
geographic combatant commands (COCOM) in support of U.S. national 
security interests. 
x U.S. Strategic Command28 (Offutt Air Force Base, NE) is to deter military 
attack on the U.S. and its allies, and should deterrence fail, employ forces so 
as to achieve national objectives.   
x U.S. Transportation Command (Scott Air Force Base, IL) is the single 
manager of the U.S. global defense transportation system.   
 
For the first time, the entire surface of the world is divided among the various 
Unified Commands. 
                                                 
24 U.S. PACOM home page, http://www.pacom.mil/home/ 
25 U.S. SOUTHCOM home page, http://www.southcom.mil/home/ 
26 U.S. NORTHCOM home page, http://www.northcom.mil/home/ 
27 U.S. SOCOM home page, http://www.socom.mil/home/ 
28 U.S. STRATCOM home page, http://www.stratcom.mil/home/ 
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Figure 10.   UCC’s Area of Responsibility 
                    (Source: From http://www.army.mil/organization) 
2. The Joint Commander 
The Commander of the COCOM has the authority to assign forces, including 
directive authority for logistics.  This gives him or her29 ability to shift support resources 
within the theater.  In a contingency environment, the logistics authority of the COCOM 
Commanding General (CG) enables him to use all capabilities of all forces assigned to 
his command as necessary for the accomplishment of the mission.  This authority 
includes contracting support and allows him to utilize his contracting resources in a 
manner he feels most appropriate for the situation.  
There are a number of ways in which he can direct contracting support be 
provided, ranging from a consolidated, centrally managed Joint contracting activity 
(managed by a single Service), to contracting support being provided separately by each 
Service.  In Iraq, CENTCOM has a Joint Contracting Command, the JCC-I, in theater.  
                                                 
29 While the research group recognizes that non-combat or civilian positions may be filled by qualified 
men or women, the team unanimously decided to use the masculine pronoun for ease of readability.  
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Regardless of the option used, the COCOM CG or a Commander, Joint Task Force 
(CJTF) determines how contracting support is organized and structured within the theater 
of operations. 
3. The Joint Staff 
The Joint Staff assists the Joint Commander in accomplishing his responsibilities.  
A truly "Joint Staff" is composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from the 
Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.   
 
Figure 11.   Organization of Joint Staff30 
                (Source: From JCS website, http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/) 
4. Inter/Intra Service Relationships 
Within the Army, contracting support is generally a straightforward process of 
identifying requirements, obtaining funding and contracting for supplies and services.  
Numerous Army and DoD contracting organizations provide contracting support for 
deployed forces.  
                                                 
30 In this figure, the acronym C4CS stands for Command, Control, Communications and Computers 
Systems.  
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In a Joint environment, the process and objectives remain essentially the same.  
The contracting organizations may have a different approach; however, they still seek to 
obtain supplies and services as quickly as possible.  In a Joint or Multinational 
environment, it is very possible that the contracting assets of another Service will be 
providing the contracting support.  If not designated the lead Service for contracting 
support, the other Services, Defense Agencies and Military Traffic Management 
Command (MTMC) personnel must still work together within the framework of the 
operation order’s (OPORD) contracting appendix to support the Joint Force 
Commander’s (JFC) mission.  
E. THE ACQUISITION TEAM 
Contracting support for an operation is not the sole responsibility of the 
contracting organizations in theater.  To have successful contracting support, the 
responsibility needs to be shared by various participants.  Each participant is part of the 
acquisition team and plays an important role in making the process work (Figure 12).  















Figure 12.   The Acquisition Team31 
 
Acquisition team members include: 
1. The Commander 
The commander is an essential part of the contracting support process and he or 
she32 is responsible for contracting support within the area of operation.  He ensures 
contracting polices and guidance along with any plans are developed and fully integrated 
into the overall operations planning and execution.  In addition, he establishes priorities 
                                                 
31 Based on the research and data collected and synthesized, the project team created this graphic 
conception of the Acquisition Team.   
32 While the research group recognizes that non-combat or civilian positions may be filled by qualified 





























































for using contracting and allocates the available resources.  As the commander, he is 
ultimately responsible for the contractor personnel33 working in the area of operation. 
2. The Comptroller 
The comptroller is responsible for preparing and maintaining the Command’s 
budget.  As part of his duties, the comptroller certifies the funds before they are obligated 
for purchase requests.  Even though it is the CO who obligates the U.S. Government, the 
comptroller must first approve and provide a written certification of funds availability for 
locally purchased goods and services.  Because of the relationship between CO and 
comptroller, they are usually co-located in order to expedite purchase request processing. 
3. Staff Proponent 
The staff proponents are responsible for contracting support requirements within 
their functional areas.  The staff proponents provide the technical expertise and oversight 
of requirements under their purview.  In addition, they are responsible for approving any 
purchasing requests before submission to their specific contracting element.  
4. Requiring Activity 
In general, the requiring activity is the unit, activity or organization that identifies 
exactly what is needed, and perhaps more importantly, when it is needed.  This is 
accomplished via development of a purchase request and statement of work (SOW).  The 
SOW is a description of the need.  The requiring activity must also obtain a certification 
of funds from the comptroller and an estimation of the cost. 
Once a requirement has been properly contracted, the requiring activity will 
receive the supplies and services.  It is up to the requiring activity to make sure they have 
received what they requested.  If required, the requiring activity may be asked to provide 
personnel to the CO to serve as a Contracting Officer Representative (COR). 
 
 
                                                 
33 Defense contractor personnel and their subcontractors are oftentimes referred to as Contractors on 
the Battlefield (COB), Contractors Accompanying the Force (CAF), or Contractors Deploying (CDF) with 
the Force.  Verbiage in latest draft DoD Direction/Instruction refers to these personnel as Contingency 
Contractor Personnel During Contingency Operations while DFARS Case No. 2003-D087 references 
Contractor Personnel Supporting a Force Deployed Outside the U.S.   
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5. Contracting Officer 
As stated previously, COs are the only individuals who can legally obligate the 
U.S. Government financially above the micro-purchase threshold.  COs have a warrant, 
and they should be trained and certified so they can acquire the requested supplies and 
services.  The CO is also held responsible for complying with the laws and regulations of 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) and Service supplements to the FAR.   
6. Contingency Contracting Officer 
First and foremost, the Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) is a CO.  In most 
cases, the CCO may also have received special training to prepare for deployment into a 
contingency contracting environment.  Contingencies are usually some type of non-
expected emergency, a major theater war (MTW) (e.g. Iraq), small-scale contingencies 
(Somali), peacekeeping (Bosnia), disaster relief (Asian Tsunami), and humanitarian relief 
(Haiti).   
During the contingency, the CCO may face physical danger.  Depending on the 
type of contingency, the CCO could be operating under an environment of extreme 
mission urgency, and therefore, could be working long hours.  It is a historical fact that 
CCOs often deploy on short notice and by circumstance will have to operate in a location 
that they know very little about.  Once on the ground, the CCO must quickly begin 
dealing with contractors who probably have little or no knowledge of U.S. Government 
contracting practices.  The office for a CCO, especially in an immature environment, may 
not be as well equipped as their home offices.   
7. Judge Advocate General  
The Judge Advocate General (JAG) serves as the legal support for the CO’s 
contracting options.  It is important that all contract actions be done legally.  Throughout 
the contracting process, the JAG can provide contract law advice to the CO. 
8. Finance Officer 
The finance officer is responsible for ensuring that payment for all contracted 
supplies and services is accurate and on-time.  This is a critical part of the contracting 
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process.  Finance officers have another important function; they must train, support, and 
supervise the paying agents (see below).  Paying agents pay the contractors/vendors for 
the goods and services that are provided.  Under most situations, the CO will not be the 
one disbursing funds.  The finance elements perform this function.  However, if there is 
no finance or paying agents in theater, then the CO will have to perform this function. 
9. Paying Agents 
Paying agents were formally referred to as Class “A” disbursing agents.  The 
paying agents are appointed by the finance element or officer to make cash payments to 
vendors for supplies and services that the CO acquired.  These agents have no contracting 
authority, and they perform their duties as specified in their appointment orders.  The 
amount of funds that the paying agent may disburse is set by the finance element.  
Appointments are usually limited to commissioned officers, warrant officers, and senior 
NCOs.  An individual cannot simultaneously serve as both a paying agent and an 
ordering officer (OO).    
10. Ordering Officer  
Like COs, OOs can be appointed using FAR 1.603-3: [CO] Appointment as a 
guide.  The OO is a person authorized to make purchases up to a specific limit, which is 
usually the micro-purchase threshold.  Under normal circumstances, the micro-purchase 
threshold is $2,500 (supplies/services)/$2,000 (construction), but the special emergency 
procurement authority increases the dollar amount for supplies/services to $15,000 inside 
the U.S. (CONUS) and $25,000 outside the U.S. (OCONUS).34  OOs are normally 
nominated by their particular command and appointed by the chief of the theater/mission 
contracting element.  The OO uses many methods to purchase goods and services.  OOs 
may use imprest funds, blanket purchase agreements (BPA), SF44 purchases, or the U.S. 
Government credit card.  As with the paying agents, the appointments for OOs are 




                                                 
34 Final Rule, FAR Case 2003-022, effective date January 19, 2005. 
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11. Receiving Official 
The receiving official is normally from the supply activity or the unit requiring 
the support.  Their responsibilities include material receipt documentation, inspection and 
distribution of procured goods.  The receiving official has to be identified to the CO when 
the request is originally made.  After the receiving official accepts the contractor’s 
(vendor’s) goods or services the receiving official must forward a receiving report to the 
CO.  This is done to verify the delivery of goods or services.  The CO will have to review 
the receiving reports, make sure they are valid, and authorize payment to the vendor. 
12. Contracting Officer Representative 
Detailed information about the COR can be found in DFARS 201.6: Contracting 
Authority and Responsibilities and in each Service’s FAR supplement.  The COR is 
designated by the command and will normally be a member of the requiring activity.  
CORs are appointed by the CO to act as a representative in the administration or 
monitoring of the technical aspects of a contract.  CORs have appointment orders that 
outline the duties they are authorized to perform.   
The COR has no authority to direct any type of changes to the contract that may 
affect delivery, price, quantity, quality, or other terms and conditions of the contract.  The 
COR’s responsibility is to monitor and enforce the contract as it is written.  In addition, 
the COR may document the receipt of goods and services so that the contractor may 
receive payment.  The CO must terminate the COR’s authority at the conclusion of the 
contract.  
13. Property Book Officer  
The property book officer’s (PBO) main duty is to maintain accountability of U.S. 
Government property.  This is done by recording information in the property book.  Any 
number of individuals may serve as the PBO including commissioned officers, warrant 
officers, NCOs or qualified DoD civilians.   
14. Government-Wide Commercial Purchase Card Holders  
The Government-Wide Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC) can be used to 
purchase supplies and goods up to a specific dollar value.  FAR 13.301: Government 
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Commercial Purchase Card states that the GCPC can be used for the purchase of supplies 
and services up to the micro-purchase threshold limit.  For construction the limit is 
$2,000.  It can be used by the CCO, but one must be aware that vendor acceptance of the 
GCPC will vary outside of the U.S.  The CCO needs to know when it can and cannot be 
used.  The holders of GCPC are those people designated by the command to make 
purchases.  The purchases are similar to those made by OOs.  They are governed by the 
contracting rules and established limits on the value of supplies and services that can be 
procured using the GCPC.  When in theater, the HCA/PARC determines who can be a 
cardholder although the CCO and OO normally perform this function. 
F. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENTS 
The environment in which contracting elements operate will vary with the nature 
and scope of the mission being supported.  Normally the designated lead Service, with 
executive agency responsibilities to plan and administer contracting, will establish a Joint 
contracting structure, which includes all deployed contracting assets.  While management 
and control of contracting functions and authority is centralized, execution of the mission 
is decentralized as much as possible so that the approved contracting requirements at all 
levels can be promptly satisfied.  Local vendor base considerations often drive this 
decision.  A limited vendor base, or other considerations, may require partial or total 
consolidation of contingency contracting personnel.  
1. Multinational Environment 
a. Overview 
The U.S. has historically participated in military operations with allied 
nations to accomplish its missions. This trend continues, but in recent years, with 
operations like Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) in Bosnia and Operation Restore Hope in 
Somalia, integration of multinational forces is occurring at a much lower command level 
than in the past.  Multinational operations are now being conducted at the operational and 
even tactical levels. 
Today contingency operations almost always involve not only a single 
Service’s forces, but also those of the other Services and our allies.   Because of the 
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variety of forces involved, contracting support assumes an entirely different character 
than it has when only a single Service’s forces are involved.  Contracting elements 
become more diverse and multidimensional when operating in a Joint or multinational 
environment; however, the overriding principle that should govern contracting support in 
such an environment is consolidation of contracting assets to achieve maximum 
operational efficiency and economy.  This principle is not followed. 
Normally the senior contracting official from the designated lead Service 
publishes the theater or Joint force contracting support plan as an appendix to the 
logistics annex to the OPORD and OPLAN.  This plan governs the contracting structure, 
locations, command relationships, responsibilities, and any restrictions such as 
commodities reserved for procurement by theater contracting. 
In theory, contracting support remains a national responsibility during 
multinational operations, with each participating nation being responsible for contracting 
support for its own forces.  In practice, U.S. forces often provide unique support to other 
participating nations or contract in nations with business practices that differ markedly 
from those in the U.S.  Close liaison between U.S. contracting personnel, civil affairs, 
legal and local embassy officials is critical to procuring required goods and services in 
compliance with U.S. laws and regulations and the local customs and business practices. 
b. Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreements  
Providing or arranging for the logistic support of its forces in a 
multinational operation is the responsibility of each participating nation; however, many 
nations do not have the capability to fully support their deployed forces.  To assist such 
nations, as well as to achieve economies of scale and increased efficiency from the 
vendor base, several support options are available.  These options include acquisition and 
cross-service agreements (ACSA), lead nation designation or pooling of resources.  
Establishment of an overall logistic support coordinator during the planning phase will 
facilitate development of such arrangements.  
JP 4.0 defines ACSA as flexible bilateral agreements that may be used to 
obtain Host Nation Support (HNS) or support from other coalition partners.  Combatant 
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Commanders have an alternative with an ACSA -- a potentially more efficient source of 
logistics support to U.S. forces during joint exercises, deployments and contingency 
operations.  ACSAs were successfully employed during such deployments as Operations 
Desert Storm, Restore Hope and Joint Endeavor.  The availability of ACSAs and the 
capability of the Host Nation to provide reliable levels of support are factors the joint 
contracting community will need to consider when planning to contract for supplies and 
services in a contingency environment.   
2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO has its procurement regulations in the Administrative Directive (AD) 60-
70.  AD 60-70 is very similar to the FAR in that it is based upon fair and open 
competition for all procurements.  It must be stressed that although NATO procurement 
is similar, it is not identical to U.S. contracting procedures and regulations.   
NATO employs trained COs and specialists.  Basic controls for approval and 
funding of purchase requests are required.  The field ordering officers and member 
country COs may place delivery orders against existing contracts.  The NATO 
Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) is the executive agent for NATO 
procurement.  NAMSA maintains offices throughout Europe. 
OJE in Bosnia provides an excellent example of NATO procurement policy.  In 
this situation, NATO is the lead agency, and NAMSA is the executive agency for 
procurement.  NAMSA was commanded by a U.S. Naval officer from the Naval 
Regional Contracting Center (NRCC), Naples, Italy, and it was staffed by various 
NAMSA employees, military officers, NCOs, and civilians from each of the participating 
NATO countries.  
For OJE there were three particular challenges within NATO contracting.  First, 
NATO procurement regulations limit purchases to vendors from only NATO member 
countries.  Because Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary were not NATO members (even 
though Hungary now is a NATO member), this problem was resolved through waivers.  
Second, NATO participating countries were reluctant to pool their funds in advance.  
This ultimately limited the ability of NAMSA to achieve contracting leverage and 
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economic order quantity discounts.  Third, NATO contract award and sole source 
approvals are retained at a higher level than under the FAR.  This limited the 
responsiveness of NAMSA to commanders on the ground.  The good news for U.S. COs 
and NATO members is that the above issues were resolved in June 1997.  Better yet, 
NATO contracting has been streamlined to allow purchasing within the OJE AOR and 
economy of scale procurements have developed.   
G. CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAMS 
1. Overview 
During the course of this research, the project group was introduced to four global 
logistics support contracts that the Military Services use to provide deployed forces with 
a wide range of logistics services, including operating dining facilities and providing 
housing, in more than half a dozen countries including Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan.  
Used properly, these contract vehicles emerge as important tools for the military’s use of 
private contractors to support deployed forces.  However, the General Accounting Office 
(now the Government Accountability Office (GAO)) found mixed results35 under these 
contracts between August 2003 and June 2004.   
The following looks briefly across three of the four logistics civil augmentation 
contracts: (1) LOGCAP, (2) AFCAP, and (3) CONCAP.  The U.S. Army, Europe’s 
Balkan Support Contract (BSC) is not reviewed in this section.  It is discussed in a later 
chapter in relation to the DCMA exit criteria. 
2. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program  
The Army’s LOGCAP36 is a special contingency program to maintain worldwide 
contract on a multiple-region basis that is managed and administered by the Army 
Materiel Command (AMC).  Through the LOGCAP contract vehicle, the Army is able to 
contract quickly for combat support and combat service support (CSS) needed in a 
contingency. 
                                                 
35 Walker, David M., Comptroller General of the U.S., Testimony before the Committee on 
Government Reform, House of Representatives: United States General Accounting Office 
36   http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/logcap.htm 
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Although LOGCAP was established toward the end of 1985, it was not actually 
used until 1988, when the Army Corps of Engineers was tasked to contract for a 
management plan to construct and maintain two petroleum pipeline systems to support 
contingency operations in Southwest Asia.  The first umbrella contract was awarded to 
Brown and Root Services (now Halliburton Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR)) in August 
1992.  It was activated again the following December to support all U.S. and United 
Nations (UN) forces in Somalia.  Since its inception, LOGCAP has been implemented in 
no less than a dozen foreign countries around the world. 
LOGCAP contractors are chosen through a competitive process to plan for and, 
when tasked, provide needed construction and services worldwide.  Normally the 
contract is in effect for an initial period of performance with option clauses that may be 
invoked for additional years of performance.  The contract vehicle is generic and 
worldwide in scope.  Awardees must be prepared to support U.S. forces deployed to both 
developed and underdeveloped countries, and must align efforts with the Services’ 
operational and country-specific plans.  The contractor is required to develop and 
maintain a database of available equipment, supplies and services to carry out those 
plans.  The contractor’s database must support five broad categories of support: facilities, 
supplies, services, maintenance and transportation.  The scope of work to be performed is 
provided by the supported commander, and support must be tailored to each concept of 
operations. 
DynCorp International was the next successful recipient of the LOGCAP contract 
for performance from early 1997 to February 2002.  The U.S. Government Project 
Manager, in coordination with AMC’s Operations Support Command, began the 
competitive process of awarding a new contract.  LOGCAP III was awarded to 
Halliburton KBR.  The base period of performance is one year with nine option years.  
Halliburton KBR must be able to provide specific services in support of two 
simultaneous contingencies in widely separated geographical areas.  The local 
commander must determine the type of services required and the scope or level of 
support needed in each contingency.  Table 2 lists typical capabilities available through 
the LOGCAP contract vehicle.  
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Table 2.   LOGCAP Capabilities 
(Source: From AMC PAM 70-30, http://www.amc.army.mil/amc/ci/pubs/p700_30.pdf) 
LOGCAP CAPABILITIES 
Supply Operations Field Services Other Operations & Services 
Class I (Rations & Water) Laundry & Bath Maintenance  
Class II (Organizational 
Clothing, Equipment & 
Administrative Supplies) 
Clothing Exchange & Repair Transportation 
Class III (POL37-Bulk & 
Package) Food Service Medical Services 
Class IV (Construction 
Materials) Mortuary Affairs Engineering & Construction 
Class V (Ammunition) Sanitation Signal 
Class VI (Personal Demand 
Items) Billeting Retrograde 
Class VII (Major End Items) Facilities Management Power Generation & Distribution 
Class VIII (Medical Supplies) Morale, Welfare & Recreation STAMIS38 Operations 
Class IX (Repair Parts) Information Management Physical Security 
 Personnel Support Force Provider Module Operation 
  Legal Services 
  Weapons Systems Training 
 
3. Air Force Contract Augmentation Program  
AFCAP was created to provide military commanders with a worldwide “force 
multiplier” option to augment or relieve their forces involved in military operations other 
than war (MOOTW) environments.  The initial program was designed with the concept 
that military units would provide the initial response to an event and then call upon the 
AFCAP for ongoing support, as needed.  Accordingly, the contract is structured to 
provide a full range of civil engineering, logistics, and services functions; however, 
Mortuary Affairs and Field Exchange are not included.  The primary focus of AFCAP is 
                                                 
37 Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) 
38 Standard Army Management Information System (STAMIS) 
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on contingency support with minimal response time and minimal bureaucratic 
considerations.  Although initially designed for use by the Air Force, the program is open 
to the other Services, Federal and State government agencies. 
The first AFCAP39 contract was awarded to Readiness Management Support 
(RMS) in February 1997.  RMS also won the re-competition five years later (February 
2002).  The contract includes a base period of performance of one year with seven option 
years.  RMS’ current contract is structured to provide worldwide support.  A small 
planning cell is maintained, which is able to call upon the global experience, expertise, 
and personnel of its parent company, IAP World Services, and each of its primary 
subcontractors.  Table 3 lists typical capabilities available through the AFCAP contract 
vehicle.  
Table 3.   AFCAP Capabilities 
(Source: From RMS website, http://www.afcap.com/capabilities/capabilities02.html) 
AFCAP CAPABILITIES 
Deployed Management Deployed Services Infrastructure Support 
Environmental Airfield Support Ancillary Capabilities 
Restoration Emergency Support Services Morale, Welfare, Recreation & Services 
Reconstitution Materiel Support General 
 
4. Construction Capabilities  
The Navy’s CAP, which was started to enhance the NAVFAC’s ability to respond 
to global contingencies, is known as CONCAP.  This program is designed to supplement 
the capabilities of local commanders and regional resources.   
This contract vehicle provides for indefinite deliveries and quantities for design, 
construction, and services to support the Navy over a wide range of declared and 
undeclared contingencies.  Halliburton KBR holds the current CONCAP contract, which 
                                                 





was awarded in July 2004.  This contract vehicle includes a base period of performance 
of one year with four option years, with a not-to-exceed limit of $500 million.  A broad 
range of both vertical and horizontal construction scenarios, such as those called out in 
Table 4, may be required under this contract.  Time parameters for setting up quick 
behind the lines facility support for troops are included in the contract.  
Table 4.   CONCAP Capabilities 
(Source: From CONCAP Briefing) 
CONCAP CAPABILITIES 
Horizontal/Vertical Construction Specialty Construction/Engineering 
Runways/Roads/Piers Aerial Photography 
Housing Repairs Soils Engineering & Surveys 
Bridges/Causeways Operation of Power Generation, Concrete & Asphalt Plants 
Demo/Cleanup Petroleum, Oils & Lubricants Facilities 
Ammunition Storage Facilities Environmental Restoration 
Berthing/Messing Facilities Dredging 
Depots/Warehouses Project Planning 
Clinics & Field Hospitals  
Operation/Maintenance Facilities  
Communication Facilities  
 
5. Conclusion 
While all three of these CAPs support Joint U.S. operations worldwide, it should 
be noted that LOGCAP, AFCAP and CONCAP are all cost plus award fee contracts.  
This contract type may be very expensive if it is not properly structured and 
administered.  Even though CAPs prevent the dilution of military forces that would occur 
if the military had to provide the required services and support, these contracts should 
only be used when it is not appropriate for military personnel to provide the needed 
services and functions.  Commanders must remain vigilant in the use of these programs 
because contract costs can easily get out of control, especially when changes or additions 
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are made late in the execution phase.  In addition, they are subject to Congressional and 
media scrutiny.  Despite the potentially high costs and visibility, these CAPs often are the 
only means of quickly acquiring the skilled people and services needed to support our 
deployed forces.   
H. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 
1. Issues 
Upon review and analysis, the following two distinct issues surfaced with respect 
to the Services’ and DCMA’s diverse contracting:   
x The Services’ individual approaches for the accession of COs (and contracting 
specialists) is inconsistent and creates disparities between the breadth and 
depth of contracting knowledge and experience found between similar ranks 
or in the Military Acquisition Corps.   
x DCMA’s ad-hoc approach to staffing CCAS support teams does not lend itself 
to predictable planning and execution of its CSA role.   
The following sections provide further explanation and analysis  
2. Filling the Acquisition Pipeline 
During an interview with the research group in September 2004, a senior official 
with Army Contracting Agency (ACA) in Washington, D.C. discussed some numbers 
(Table 5) for each of the Services’ contracting corps and asked, “Is that enough?”  In a 
subsequent interview five months later this same official asked, “Is it the mission of the 
Army to support non-military (contracting) missions such as nation building?”  Given 
today’s post Cold War realities, the increasing numbers of failed or failing states,40 the 
widening gap between Core41 and Non-Integrating Gap countries and the increasing 
number of terrorist events around the world, it is difficult to simply provide a positive or 
negative response to the questions posed. 
                                                 
40 Former eastern bloc states that were supported by the former Soviet Union are facing economic and 
political uncertainty; genocide, ethnic cleansing and AIDS are ravaging the African continent; the drug 
trade is crippling the South America; terrorists’ activity threatens lasting peace in the Mid-East, etc. 
41 Thomas P. M. Barnett is his new book The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-




The following table depicts service end strengths and respective acquisition corps 
figures as of September 30, 2005. 
 
Table 5.   Relative Percentage of Service Members Performing Contract Activities42 






USAF 2300 359,700 0.639 
USN46 24 365,900 0.006 
USMC 126 175,000 0.072 
  
Based upon the above data, it appears that the Air Force has the structure to 
support a large contracting organization.  Their contracting career field, unlike other 
Services, can take recruits directly out of basic training and like the other Services, their 
enlisted members (in the grades of E-4 through E-7) can change to a contracting MOS at 
mid-career.  This provides the Air Force a deep applicant pool from which to fill their 
acquisition pipeline. 
It appears as if the Army and Marine Corps lack the correct mix of personnel and 
experience levels in their contracting field to support the increasing amount of 
contingencies.  Additionally, as our forces decrease and our requirements for outsourcing 
increases, it is highly likely that the Army and Marine Corps will require additional 
contracting personnel to handle the increased contracting workload.   
                                                 
42 Based on the research and data collected and synthesized, the project team created this table to 
compare relative percent of contracting billets to authorized end strength.   
43 End strengths for active forces obtained from Section 401 of the Ronald W. Reagan National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.    
44 Relative percentage based on average of range provided. 
45 Additional end strength authorization “…subject to the condition that costs of active duty personnel 
of the Army in excess of 482,400 shall be paid out of funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
2005 for contingent emergency reserve fund or as an emergency supplemental appropriation.” 
46 This percentage is misleading since only deployed COs were included in the equation.  In reality, 
Supply Officers and other billets performing the contracting function should also be used; however, the 
immediate analysis was based on the interviewee’s question.  
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The Marine Corps currently has 20 regularly staffed contracting billets USMC 
wide.  Ongoing operations highlight the importance of the contingency contracting 
capability for the Marine Corps.  Currently this small community of officers is supporting 
a critical capability.  As the operational tempo increases and COs are pulled to do 
contingency contracting, their current stateside billets are often “gapped.”  Recently the 
Marine Corps announced, as agreed upon by a Marine Requirements Oversight Council47 
(MROC), an approved “plus-up” of eight additional CO billets that will be phased in over 
the next few years.  These additional personnel should prove adequate to provide the 
level of support required in today’s challenging environment.   
When Services deploy into a Joint environment and personnel are required from 
the various services to stand up a “contracting cell,” a requirement from the Army or 
Marine Corps typically addresses a specific rank, but rank does not necessarily equate to 
experience.  A requirement for an officer of a certain rank from the Air Force often does 
not mesh with their structure.  More often than not an enlisted person (from the Air 
Force) can perform a superior job to the “required” officer rank.  As stated previously, 
disconnects between rank and experience often lead to problems when Services interact 
in a Joint environment.  In the Army and Marine Corps the majority of COs are accessed 
into the contracting field when they are senior company grade/junior field grade officers.  
They usually have little or no field level contracting experience.  This is in significant 
contrast to Air Force officers who directly embark upon an acquisition career when they 
enter the Service.  Where a problem may potentially exist are instances where a rank 
requirement is meant to maintain the proper peer-based working relationships within an 
office.  
Since the end of the Cold War, Services and Defense Agencies alike have seen 
their end strength authorizations spiral downward.  The Services’ natural response was to 
protect their “real” core competency—war fighting (teeth).  The logistics support “tail” 
                                                 
47 Headquarters, USMC draft briefing: MOS 9656 Contracting Officer, p. 4.  As part of the 
restructuring effort already underway, the Marines plan to review and realign billet distribution to focus 
military personnel resources to support the contingency contracting mission.  Today’s wide distribution 
makes it difficult to assemble and field contingency contracting teams.  One proposal under consideration 
is to create “cells” aligned with the MEFs.   
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was cut.  Unfortunately, this translates to lost organic logistic capability.  In many 
instances, CAPs were developed to supplement this lost competency.  Over the same time 
frame, the U.S. has deployed troops to over 150 locations worldwide mainly in the 
Caribbean Rim, most of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East 
and Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast Asia as well.  According to Barnett, “If we 
were to draw a line a line around the majority of those military interventions, we have 
basically mapped the Non-Integrating Gap.”48  Based on these events, it is unlikely that 
less than one percent of the authorized total end strength is sufficient to realistically 
address the DoD’s contracting needs.  Exponential growth of DoD’s contracting needs 
can be anticipated as long as they continue to successfully lobby for and win nation 
building missions, which have historically been performed by the Department of State 
(DoS) or other inter-agency entities, such as the (Iraq) Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).   
In order to adequately prepare for this growth, the Services may want to adopt a 
hybrid approach to ensuring that the acquisition pipeline remains full.  The hybrid 
approach would be based on the USA’s and USAF’s current individual approaches.  
Much like the Air Force does today, enlisted accessions and a predetermined percentage 
of the officer accessions would enter the acquisition career field upon 
enlistment/commission.  This would ensure that each Service has a core cadre of 
contracting specialists and COs with a broad range of experience and in-depth knowledge 
of contracting issues, policies, regulations and best practices.  However, it is possible that 
these career acquisition members may lose touch with the daily, real-world concerns of 
the warfighter.   
In an effort to mitigate this risk, much like the Army does today, additional CO 
billets would be filled with mid- or junior grade officers from operational MOSs. In 
addition, enlisted members in the grades of E-4 through E-7 can also affect a mid-career 
                                                 
48 Esquire (March 2003) Volume 139, Issue 3.  The Pentagon’s New Map, p. 2  
     Thomas P. M. Barnett is his new book The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-
First Century divides the world into two categories based on a country’s degree of “connectedness”—Core 
and Non-Integrating Gap. 
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change from other MOSs to the contracting MOS.  Mid-career inductees into the 
contracting career field could be paired with “seasoned” contract specialists and COs 
through a mentoring program.  Once accessed into the acquisition career field, these 
contract specialists and COs would receive contracting education, training and experience 
eventually earning their contracting warrants.  Once certified in the contracting career 
field, they will remain in the acquisition corps for the remainder of their military career.  
If this approach is adopted, the Services would need to ensure that continued 
promotion opportunities exist for those entering the contracting career field at a mid-
career point.  This hybrid approach could provide the Services a deep applicant pool from 
which to fill their acquisition pipeline.    
3. DCMA CCAS Support Team Assignment Model 
a. Overview 
Interviews with senior DCMA officials at the COCOM, DCMAI and 
Headquarters’ Combat Support Center (CSC) revealed that contingency contracting 
services account for approximately five to seven percent of DCMA’s current workload.  
The remaining 95 percent of workload is attributed to major program support.  DCMA 
directly contributes to the military readiness of the U.S. and its Allies, and helps preserve 
the nation's freedom through its CSA role.  DCMA provides resources to support 
contingency operations as identified by the COCOM and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) and tasked through the USD(AT&L).  While the DCMA Chief of Staff is 
responsible for leading integration of the CCAS support operations instruction, the CSC 
is responsible for day to day contingency operations support.    
Over the years, the nature, length and frequency of these support 
requirements have increased, yet DCMA continues to manage personnel selection and 
assembling, training and deploying teams from on-hand assets.  DCMA currently staffs 
these contingency contracting requirements on an ad hoc basis with no permanent 
resources allocated to this on-going CSA mission.  While this approach has worked in the 
past for relatively small scale contingencies such as Haiti, major efforts like those 
underway in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines present a huge drain on 
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resources.  Until recently active duty military and volunteer Reserve and civilian 
employees have risen to meet every challenge.   
From interview responses with senior DCMA employees, it was learned 
that personnel selected for deployment today may be either DCMA or other Military 
personnel (Active and Reserve), emergency essential (EE) personnel or eligible civilian 
volunteers.  Regardless of their status, deployment eligible personnel must meet pre-
deployment, deployment and post-deployment requirements prior to being deployed 
including, but not limited to: 
x Certified Level I, II or III (as appropriate) in accordance with the DAWIA49 
x CCAS Basic Contingency Operations Training (BCOT) 
x CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) Processing 
x Administrative 
x Medical 
x Basic skills and Military weapons qualification 
Typical deployments are 179 days, which includes the entire period from 
home station departure to return to home station.  Personnel are available on the CCAS 
roster based on their current Permanent Change of Station (PCS) tour arrival date, the 
date they accept an EE position or their volunteer date.   Generally, personnel will not be 
selected for deployment within 90 days of arriving to the Agency.  Personnel will deploy 
as required; however, the Agency tries to ensure that no less than 12 month increments 
exist between deployments.  Of course, this caveat is subject to personnel availability.  
Personnel are not to be selected for deployment if the projected deployment return date 
places them within 30 days of PCS or six months of retirement or other separation.  
Personnel may request, through their respective chains of command, to be deployed more 
frequently with less time between deployments.  These volunteers may request a specific 
assignment; however, actual placement may be based on Agency needs.  Deployment 
roster positions are reviewed and validated quarterly, or as required, and identify 
minimum resource requirements based on operations planning and execution. 
                                                 
49 Certifications are based on formal education and levels of experience in 14 defined career fields. 
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DCMA uses an internally developed Microsoft Access database to track 
all individuals—Military (Active and Reserve) EE personnel, and civilian volunteers—
eligible for deployment.  This database, which is continuously updated, allows the CSC 
to query and build consistently accurate deployment rosters.  When it is time to 
review/validate deployment roster positions each quarter, new contingency requirements 
are identified or existing requirements are changed, a database query is initiated to 
determine which individuals are eligible for deployment.  Contingency contracting 
support demands are tracked using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  A manual “rack and 
stack” process is used to match personnel from the eligibility list with the identified 
contingency contracting support requirements.  Every 15 days, DCMA validates the 
current deployment roster and follow-on rotations by issuing a new Fragmentation 
Order50 (FRAGO).   
b. The Limitre Personnel Assignment Model51 
Utilizing data provided by the DCMA, three NPS Business Modeling 
students decided to seek a resolution to this issue by developing the Limitre Personnel 
Assignment Model (LPAM).  The standard Microsoft Excel Solver uses a basic 
implementation of the primal Simplex method to solve linear programming (LP) 
problems.  However, this method is limited to 200 decision variables.  This constraint 
mandated that they “chunk”52 the data to build a model which Solver could solve.  The 
steps involved with shaping the data to facilitate chunking are described below:  
i. Data Standardization:  In order to evaluate personnel and 
billets, Limitre had to standardize the data between the Personnel Roster spreadsheet and 
the Billet Roster spreadsheet provided by DCMA.  For instance, one spreadsheet had 05 
                                                 
50 The Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks (http://smct.armystudyguide.com/skill_levels_2-4/071-326-
5502.htm) states that “The FRAGO provides timely changes of existing orders to subordinate and 
supporting commanders while providing notification to higher and adjacent commands.  A FRAGO is 
either oral or written and addresses only those parts of the original OPORD that have changed.  The 
FRAGO differs from the OPORD only in the degree of detail provided.” 
51 In May 2005, the LPAM was shared with DCMA CSC.  Limitre Consulting may pursue further 
development of their model during their 4th and 5th academic quarters (July – December 2005).       
52 When the number of decision variable exceeds the parameters of the Solver software, developers 
must “chunk” or group data so that the number of decision variables is reduced.  
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and one had O5.  Also, the team had to break down and rearrange several data elements 
to sort on additional unique variables. 
ii. Data Prioritization:  Upon reviewing the desired attributes of 
each billet, the team determined that five differentiating data elements exist.  Since 
position (career field), military/civilian, rank, DAWIA certification, and time represent 
qualitative characteristics, the data needed to be changed to a quantitative format for both 
personnel and billets.     
POSITION FIT 
         FACE 
       
 







Data prioritization resulted in a composite code for each person and billet.  Congruence 
or “best fit” between faces (personnel available) and spaces (open billets) was determined 
by subtracting the composite codes.  A difference of zero meant that a perfect fit was 
achieved when matching an available asset with an open billet.        
iii. Maximum Deployment Strategy:  In order to scale the time 
remaining variable Limitre assigned values to the number of months remaining.  
Honoring DCMA’s prerogative that no one deploys during the first or last three months 
of their tour, the team assigned a value of 700,000 to those time periods.  DCMA deploys 
personnel for six month tours and requires a minimum of 12 months between 
deployments.  Within a 36-month tour, an employee will deploy no more than twice 
unless they volunteer to do so more often.  Therefore, a person that had between 27 and 
33 months remaining received a value of 1 to denote the opportunity of two deployments 
within their DCMA tour.   
Job DAWIA M/C Rank Time 
Job Priority DAWIA M/C Rank 
1. Job Function (10000-90000)
2. DAWIA Certification Level (1000-3000)
3. Military/Civilian (100-300) 
4. Rank (10-60)
5. Time Remaining on Board (1-6;700000)
8 3 3 14 8 3 3 53
Face Composite Code Space Composite Code
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iv. Rank Chunking:   Limitre knew that Solver had a maximum 
matrix size of 12 x 15.  Therefore, they had to chunk their data into understandable and 
useable chunks to optimize the assignments.  By using the list data function, they 
established twelve categories based on the number of billets and the number of personnel 
competing for those billets.  Each chunk has its own Solver solution and the solutions are 
reported to the Deployment Roster (output).  The Limitre model is based on the 
assignment model; however, to solve their assignment model, they needed to construct 
three matrices: 
 
x Matrix 1:  Matrix 1 represents the absolute value of the difference between the 
composite codes.   
x Matrix 2:  Matrix 2 represents Solver’s solution set.  These are the cells that 
can change in accordance with the objective function.  In the end, Solver 
assigns a person to a billet.  Solver uses a 1 to denote an assignment and a 0 to 
denote no assignment. 
x Matrix 3:  Matrix 3 is the product of Matrix 1 and Matrix 2.  The value of the 
Matrix 1 block is multiplied by the value of the Matrix 2 block. 
 
The Limitre model is a minimization model.  Its objective function is set to minimize the 
summation of columns in Matrix 3.  Due to the duplicative nature of the data, numerous 
optimal solutions exist, which is acceptable since the objective is to optimize congruence 
3336 2730 2124 18 1215 9 6 3 0
XX X X
Maximum = 2 deployments per 36 month tour
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 7 7 71 1
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between faces and spaces.   The final product is an electronically generated deployment 
roster that displays the employee’s name, rank and their assigned deployment site.       
c. Lessons Learned 
Several lessons were learned from Limitre’s analysis.  First and foremost, 
it is much more difficult to go from concept to a working functional model than 
originally envisioned.  Solver’s limitations coupled with the large amounts of raw data 
and dynamic nature of DCMA’s CCAS mission led to unique data challenges.  The 
volume of the data was overwhelming at times.  Based on these challenges, Limitre 
structured a model based on chunks of data with iterative, nested IF, THEN statements.   
Limitre learned that their model must provide valuable solutions to 
potentially real problems and be exportable to DCMA management.  The LPAM is 
designed to make personnel assignments; however, it does so in “starts and stops” by 
career field.  This feature is necessary to work around Solver’s limitations, but will also 
allow DCMA to conduct “what if” scenarios by position.  For example, a change in a 
Level III ACO billet does not need to impact all team assignments, just Level III ACOs.   
d. Areas for Follow-on Analysis 
The LPAM project developers would like to pursue flexibility for adding 
and deleting billets and/or personnel as well as executing surgical additions/deletions to 
accommodate emergency changes.  For example, if a person was scheduled to go to 
Baghdad and fell and broke their hip, then they would like to be able to easily find a new 
solution for that one billet without disturbing the other matches.   
If time permitted, Limitre would like to improve the user interfaces to 
make solving for positions more intuitive and include a “glossy front end” that would 
have resulted in a more user-friendly tool.   
A more straightforward, streamlined model could be pursued if a more 
powerful LP software tool was made available.  If DCMA decides to pursue an LP model 
to solve their assignment problem, a software investment would be required since the 
standard Microsoft Excel Solver is limited to 200 decision variables.  For example, the 
MOSEK Solver includes a state-of-the-art primal and dual Simplex method that also 
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exploits sparsity and uses advanced strategies for matrix updating and refactorization.  It 
handles problems of unlimited size, and has been tested on LP problems of over a million 
decision variables.   
If Limitre is able to successfully pursue the areas for follow-on analysis 
described above and develop a quicker, more user friendly model, then adoption of the 
LPAM upgrade should provide DCMA a structured approach to staffing CCAS support 
teams that lends itself to predictable planning and execution of its CSA role.   
I. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY  
In a time of declining budgets and shrinking personnel, the Services and DCMA 
must periodically access new personnel into their respective organizations to ensure that 
they remain relevant to support the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). Without the 
infusion of new personnel, their level of support to the warfighter could be severely 
hindered and the DoD’s transformation could be stalled. 
The Services and DCMA are making strides but there is still work to be done. 
They need to continue to fill the acquisition and contracting personnel pipeline with long 
term solutions rather than quick fixes. Based on this research, they need to increase their 
end strength by actively recruiting and accessing contracting personnel through various 
vehicles to ensure that there are appropriate numbers of trained and competent personnel 
to conduct contingency contracting. 
Additionally, the research team observed that contingency contracting is a very 
detailed and coordinated effort that spans not just one Service but requires the efforts of 
many individuals who may affect the outcome of the entire operation. Programs such as 
CAP are geared to provide immediate relief vice long term support due to their potential 
high cost. The research group strongly recommends that DoD conduct a cost benefit 
analysis to determine if these programs truly provided cost effective savings for DoD and 
ultimately the U.S. taxpayer. 
As discussed previously, the hybrid accession model should provide the Services 
the flexibility they require to ensure their acquisition pipeline remains full.  LPAM 
provides DCMA the flexibility to rapidly model multiple contingency contracting “what 
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if” scenarios and project current and future resource requirements based on these 
scenarios.   A long term commitment is required to improve the DoD’s contingency 
contracting organizations. 
The next chapter will compare the approaches used by two COCOMs to plan, 
integrate and execute their contingency contracting missions.  Issues stemming from 
these processes are explored and recommended solutions are proposed. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO COMBATANT 
COMMANDS 
A. OVERVIEW  
Planning for contingency contracting is a complex process.  When the planning 
process is not robust enough, problems may surface.  This chapter focuses on two 
Combatant Commands’ (COCOMs’) distinctive approaches to this key process, and their 
respective issues and lessons learned.  In conducting the research, the group decided that 
the best approach to gather information would be through face-to-face interviews with the 
personnel tasked to conduct contingency contracting at the Joint Staff level in the United 
States (U.S.) Pacific Command (PACOM) and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).  
The researchers were interested in determining if the Contingency Contracting Officers 
(CCO) in both organizations had similar education, training, and Joint experiences and if 
both employed Contingency Contracting Support Plans (CCSPs) to guide their efforts.   
The first part of this chapter provides the reader with information about the 
different COCOM Areas of Responsibility (AOR).  The second part highlights the 
internal problems each COCOM deals with when contingency contracting operations are 
conducted with specific emphasis on planning, communication, integration, and 
execution.  The final section proposes a suggestion on how the Department of Defense 
(DoD) could possibly improve contingency contracting among the Services.     
B. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
In order to fully understand how contingency contracting operations work, it is 
essential to grasp how information flows from the Joint Staff through the COCOM before 
ultimately reaching the CCO in theater.  The research team explored various doctrinal 
publications to become familiar with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Joint 
Operation Planning Execution System (JOPES), Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System 
(JULLS), Time-Phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), and CCSP.  To identify if the 
CCO was truly prepared to enter a contingency, the group analyzed whether the COCOM 
had the right people at the right time with the right education to perform contingency 
contracting.   
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A bigger issue of interest to the research team was to determine if the CCSP is 
robust enough to effectively guide a CCO’s actions.  If not, the research team hoped to 
identify issues and recommend possible solutions.  Of special interest was the 
incorporation of the CCSP into the COCOM Operation Plan (OPLAN), Concept Plans 
(CONPLAN) and Operation Order (OPORD).  To gain this information, the group 
interviewed senior representatives from each COCOM and Service Contracting 
Components to understand how PACOM and CENTCOM were organized and structured 
and if the contracting officers (CO) had the right education.  
As the research team conducted the research, the group realized that there were 
several Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) related issues.  For example, the 
research team discovered that DCMA did not have a full-time liaison officer (LNO) 
assigned to PACOM, and there were problems with DCMA contingency contracting 




PACOM Headquarters is located at Camp Smith, Hawaii.  Their Area of 
Responsibility (AOR) encompasses more than 50 percent of earth's surface, for a total of 
approximately 105 million square miles (nearly 169 million square kilometers) (Figure 
13).  It covers a total of 43 countries, 20 foreign territories and possessions, and includes 
10 U.S. territories.  In addition, within the AOR, six of the world’s largest armed forces 
exist: (1) People’s Republic of China, (2) U.S., (3) Russia, (4) India, (5) North Korea, and 
(6) South Korea.53   
                                                 




Figure 13.   U.S. PACOM AOR   
               (Source: From http://www.pacom.mil/about/aor.shtml) 
 
PACOM is organized into staff elements similar to that of the Joint Staff.  The 
PACOM J4 is further organized into sub-elements, with a division called the J42, 
Logistics Support.  It is within that division that the J424, Sustainment and Logistics 
Branch creates the PACOM CCSP.  Their organizational chart, depicted below, illustrates 
that no CCO billet is included in the branch.  This finding shows that the division is not 
optimally structured for planning contingency contracting operations.   
Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) expressed frustration that PACOM did 
not have a person in the J4 coordinating contingency contracting.  According to a senior 
representative, this void created a situation where the Services begin competing for 
scarce resources.  This leads to increased prices on some critical supplies.   





















Figure 14.   PACOM J42 Logistics Organization Chart 
                         (Source: From http://www.pacom.mil/staff/staff-J4.shtml) 
 
2. CENTCOM 
CENTCOM Headquarters is located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, 
Florida.  Like PACOM, it is one of the nine Unified Combatant Commands (UCC) 
assigned operational control of U.S. combat forces.  CENTCOM’s AOR includes 27 
nations which are economically and culturally diverse (Figure 15).  These nations are 
located throughout the Horn of Africa, South and Central Asia, Northern Red Sea 
regions, the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq.  To compare this to the U.S., the entire AOR is 
larger than the continental U.S. (CONUS).  The AOR stretches more than 3,600 miles 
north to south and 3,100 miles east to west.  It includes mountain ranges that have 
elevations of over 24,000 feet, to desert areas below sea level, and temperatures ranging 
from 130 degrees to below freezing. 
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Figure 15.   CENTCOM AOR 
                          (Source: From http://www.centcom.mil/aboutus/aor.htm) 
 
The CENTCOM Contracting Branch is newly established within the CENTCOM 
J4, Director of Logistics staff section.  The branch has a total of three Officers and one 
Noncommissioned Officer (NCO).  The Branch Chief is an Air Force 0-5, and the branch 
also includes an Army 0-5, an Air Force 0-4, and an Air Force E-6 (Figure 16) for 
depiction of this new organization.  All contracting personnel have achieved at least 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level II certification in 
contracting.     
The CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch’s mission is twofold: (1) develop the 
CENTCOM AOR contracting policy and (2) monitor and synchronize the AOR 
contracting support.  The J4 Contracting Branch’s focus areas are: 
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x “Establish and facilitate clear lines of command and control for AOR 
contracting. 
x Establish AOR reporting requirements/process for securing visibility into 
AOR contractor, numbers of contract dollar amounts, etc. 
x Coordinate, direct and control contracting support within the CENTCOM 
AOR.”54  
    
 
     
Figure 16.   CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch 
                      (Source: From CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch Roadshow Brief) 
 
In response to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) lessons learned, CENTCOM 
established the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I) (Figure 17).  The JCC-I is 
serving as a Joint theater logistics support command.  Its purpose is to (1) achieve, 
through unity of effort, economies of scale that exemplify best business practices; (2) 
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establish common procedures for other Service Component contracting offices; (3) 
establish theater CO warrant procedures; (4) establish a Joint Logistics Procurement 
Support Board (JLPSB); and (5) serve as a model for commerce in Iraq and a catalyst for 
economic growth.      
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Figure 17.   Contracting Organizations in U.S. CENTCOM AOR 
                             (Source: From CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch) 
 
D. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 
1. Issues 
Several issues were identified that reflect unfavorably on the current contingency 
contracting policy, guidance and doctrine.  Not all the issues were found in both 
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commands.  The following are overarching observations pertinent to both COCOMs.  
The next section will present specific observations noted at each COCOM. 
x There is a lack of sufficient personnel with the appropriate education, training 
and experience to conduct contingency contracting at both the strategic and 
operational level, 
x OPLANs do not adequately address contracting, and in some cases, even the 
Annex D (Logistics) did not have sufficient contracting information, 
x OPLANs and CCSPs lack detailed information as to what DCMA needs to do 
to support contingencies, and 
x COCOM J4 contracting section is not robust enough to conduct contingency 
contracting operations. 
2.   PACOM J4 Contingency Contracting Observations 
a.  Lack of Appropriate Personnel 
PACOM apparently lacks the people to conduct contingency contracting 
in the PACOM J4 office.  Once PACOM receives a tasker from the Joint Staff, the 
PACOM J424 Sustainment and International Logistics Branch is supposed to create the 
CCSP for the AOR.  Currently, there is not a dedicated person or persons available who 
have been trained to do this.  Once the J424 Branch designates one of the Service 
Components to be the “… executive agent and lead contracting service for coordinating 
contingency contracting planning and support,”55 it has total responsibility during the 
execution of the OPLAN or CONPLAN.  The research team observed that once the 
executive agent (EA)56 has been assigned, the PACOM J4 does not get involved unless 
the EA has problems conducting the operation.     
PACOM J4 should add a contingency contracting billet or branch to the 
J42 Logistics Support Division.  At a minimum, the J4 should have at least one CCO 
assigned to its organization.  This would fill the void by having someone assigned to 
produce the J4 CCSP resulting in critical information being transferred to the Service 
Components.  Moreover, this person is necessary so that the J4 has a knowledgeable, 
experienced and trained contracting professional who would be responsible for reviewing 
                                                 
55  Pacific Command Appendix 9 of CONPLAN XX, section #2 Concept of Operations. 
56 PACOM’s use of the term Executive Agent is in conflict with the doctrinal term.  Only the 
Secretary of Defense may appoint an Executive Agent (refer back Chapter I).   
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subordinate organizations’ CCSPs, OPLANs, OPORDs, and CONPLANs to ensure 
potential contingency contracting issues are identified and addressed.   The level of 
review would be consistent with the PACOM training event, exercise or contingency.   
b.  Inefficient Organizational Structure 
PACOM does not currently have the organizational structure in place to 
conduct and manage contingency contracting.  This issue is closely related to the 
previous issue.  The lack of a CCO or contracting cell means the PACOM J4 has to rely 
on the Service Components to develop the plan instead of PACOM creating a robust 
CCSP based on key stakeholder’s inputs.  There is a void in terms of having an 
organization at PACOM that meets with each Service’s contingency contracting 
representative to talk about relevant issues and to work out any problems that the 
PACOM-assigned EA may have in executing the mission.  Requesting additional billets 
and creating a contingency contracting cell would be a step in the right direction.  This 
would ensure the ultimate responsibility of developing the CCSP and reviewing the 
Service Components’ CCSP is at the appropriate level (the COCOM), and not the Service 
Component.     
 c. Lack of Personnel with Optimum Skills and Experience 
 The lack of personnel who can easily assume the job as a PACOM J4 
CCO has made PACOM more reliable on the designated EA for management and 
execution of contingency contracting operations.  The ideal person to fill the billet would 
need to have sufficient Defense Acquisition University (DAU) contracting education, be 
a senior company grade or mid-grade officer with at least eight to ten years experience, 
be knowledgeable of the military and be less likely to retire at this point of his or her57 
career.   
The potential candidate needs to have the right experience to truly provide 
value to PACOM.  This would include contracting command experience where the 
candidate would have been a CO or CCO and worked with other Services (e.g. a Joint 
Contracting Command).  This person would then understand the role and missions of 
                                                 
57 While the research group recognizes that non-combat or civilian positions may be filled by qualified 
men or women, the team unanimously decided to use the masculine pronoun for ease of readability.  
 84
contracting in a Joint contingency operation.  At a minimum, the person who is selected 
to fill this billet should be DAWIA Level II certified in the contracting career field; 
however, a Level III certification is preferable.  In addition, he should have completed 
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) or be Joint Professional Military Education 
(JPME) Phase I certified.  The right rank would be at least a senior 0-3 or junior 0-4, or 
civilian equivalent.   
d. CCSP Lacked Clear Information 
The CCSP the group reviewed during the PACOM trip lacked clear 
information as to exactly what duties the CCO was to perform during the contingency.  
The CCSP is critical to the success of the contingency contracting mission.  It describes 
the contracting actions that need to be accomplished in an operation, exercise or training 
environment.  PACOM’s CCSP was in Appendix 9 to Annex D.  It consisted of the 
following one line which identified an EA and provided top-level guidance: “[HQ 
PACAF] coordinates joint service contingency contracting planning for this 
CONPLAN.”58  Making the CCSP more detailed may assist the PACOM staff and 
Service Components in the execution of their assigned contingency contracting missions.  
Detailed information such as that found in Field Manual (FM) 100-10-2’s Appendix D: 
Sample Contracting Support Plan should be considered.   Guidance should specify what 
each Service Component contracting office does to support the operation.  This would 
clarify subordinates’ roles and responsibilities.59  In addition, this would add robustness 
to PACOM’s CCSP.    
e. Lack of Service Representatives in a Contingency Cell/Branch   
Even though each Service is represented in sub-branches, the PACOM 
J424 Sustainment Branch still lacks a contingency contracting cell comprised of each 
Service Component.  Therefore, it fails to have a truly Joint vision when it comes to 
contingency contracting in theater.  If there was at least one representative per Service, 
then all would be able to ensure contingency contracting, and contracting in general, are 
                                                 
58 PACOM Appendix 9 to Annex D to USPACOM CONPLAN XXXX-04, paragraph 3b. 
59 U.S. Army FM 100-10-2, Contracting Support on the Battlefield, Appendix D Sample Contracting 
Support Plan, pages D-4 to D-5. August 4, 1999. 
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performed correctly.  The research team’s recommendation is that PACOM modify the 
organization and structure the PACOM J42 division.  To easily facilitate Joint 
contingency contracting operations, there should be a requirement that the Service 
Components provide COs to work in a contingency contracting cell/branch.   
f. Lack of a Theater Level Contracting Board 
Up until January 2002, PACOM performed this function through an 
organization called the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Logistic Procurement Support 
Board (CLPSB).  The CLPSB served to provide assistance on contracting matters and 
operations within PACOM.  The PACOM Contingency Contracting Officer Working 
Group (PCCOWG) was made up of representatives from PACOM Service Components, 
subordinate UCCs and other contracting team members including: U.S. Army Pacific 
(USARPAC); U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT); U.S. Pacific Air Force (PACAF); 
MARFORPAC; U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC); U.S. Forces, 
Japan (USFJ); U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK); Alaskan Command (ALCOM); DCMA; and 
the Army Corps of Engineers.  Members consisted of senior enlisted, O-4s, O-5s, and 
GS-12 to GS-14 civilians.60     
One of the major reasons the PCCOWG was formed was to ensure 
“…service components are not bidding against each other for the same commodity or 
service…”61  The PCCOWG also had the ability to leverage all the Services’ contracting 
manpower in PACOM so the work load could be equitably divided.  Another aspect of 
the PCCOWG was that it coordinated the assignment of military CCOs.  In this way, the 
organization was able to ensure that the right CCOs with the right experience were 
properly utilized. 
The PCCOWG became the PACOM Commander’s contract 
clearinghouse.  According to the charter, the PCCOWG included: 
x “Develop a Joint service standardized Deployable Contracting System, 
x Develop and maintain a contingency contracting source database, 
                                                 
60 LTC Minear, Steven J.  Contingency Contracting in the Pacific Command, p. 2. 
61 Ibid, p. 1. 
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x Coordinate contingency contracting warrants (authorizations to award 
contracts), and 
x Coordinate and recommend contingency contracting assignments.”62        
The PCCOWG spurred an innovative policy that ensured warrants from all 
Service Components were accepted and recognized by all other Services.  It is interesting 
to note that the warrant issue was a problem when the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) was still in charge of Iraq during the U.S. occupation from 2003 to 2004.  While in 
theater, CCOs would have to wait for their new warrants to be issued from U.S. Army 
Central Command (ARCENT) which was located at Fort McPherson, GA.  A reciprocal 
agreement for warrant recognition, such as that established by the PCCOWG years ago, 
would enable CCOs in Joint contracting cells to begin work more expeditiously and 
avoid the unnecessary time delay associated with reprocessing each CCO warrant after 
arrival in theater.63 
The PCCOWG was also used to address the assignment of Procurement 
Instrument Identification Numbers (PIINs).  PIINs are the alphanumeric method of 
identifying contract actions.  During training exercises or actual missions, only one set of 
PIINs are used at a time.  This allowed different CCOs to continue using existing 
contracts and PIINs as the CCOs rotated to support the exercise or mission.  Having only 
one set of PIINs proves important in a Joint contingency contracting operation as it helps 
prevent duplication and subsequent payment problems.   
g.  Insufficient Manning 
As stated previously, PACOM recently experienced a 15 percent staff 
reduction.  This results in PACOM not having the same amount of billets available as 
CENTCOM does for contingency contracting management and administration.  In 
addition, with the highly visible Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), attention seems to 
have shifted to CENTCOM’s AOR in terms of national priority.  This has caused 
PACOM to do more with less.  Additionally, some of PACOM’s subordinate commands, 
                                                 
62 Ibid, p.3. 
63 Ibid, p.3. 
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(e.g. the 25th Infantry Division in USARPAC), have been tasked to support operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq which is CENTCOM’s AOR. 
Each Service needs to evaluate the PACOM billets it has to support 
contingency contracting to ensure it is adequate.  Also, if PACOM feels it needs more 
people to conduct contingency contracting or manage it at the COCOM level, PACOM 
should request new positions through Service channels. 
h. J4 Staff Officers Lack Contingency Contracting Education   
At the time of the group’s visit in January 2005, no one in the PACOM 
J424 Branch had attended the DAU course CON 234, Contingency Contracting.  If the 
Services are not going to send DAWIA Level II contracting certified officers to fill 
PACOM J4 jobs, an alternative would be to send those people who will work 
contingency contracting issues to CON 234.  This way someone will have some basic 
knowledge on how to conduct contingency contracting and what the CCSP should 
contain.  Services can identify people for the job and program the CON 234 course into 
their schedule as part of a Permanent Change of Station move to PACOM.   
3. PACOM Service Components and Agencies  
While conducting research on PACOM contingency contracting, the research 
team interviewed representatives from PACOM’s major subordinate Commands 
(USARPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, and MARFORPAC) to gain some insight on some 
Service related issues.  Unfortunately, due to time constraints the group was not able to 
do the same for CENTCOM since its Service Components are not co-located.  Below is a 
synopsis of the PACOM’s Service Component and Agency issues with contingency 
contracting. 
a. USARPAC   
The research team spoke with senior representatives from Army 
Contracting Agency (ACA), Regional Contracting Office (RCO) Hawaii.  At the time of 
the group’s visit, some personnel expressed concerns about the structure/organization of 
the contingency contracting office.  During the visit in January 2005, the Chief, 
Contingency Contracting Division, was assigned to the 25th Infantry Division (ID) 
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(Light) and attached to the RCO.  The matrix structure caused some conflict due to the 
differences between the contracting and operational chains of command.  In addition, this 
would sometimes result in the added frustration when these officers received their 
evaluation reports.   
During normal operations, the CCO would be providing garrison contract 
support and would work at Fort Shafter, HI.  When the 25th ID conducted training, the 
CCO would go to Schofield Barracks and work there.  The group must note for the 
readers, there is quite a distance between Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter.  So, unless 
the CCO was needed to provide support during a training or deployment, he would not be 
seen by his performance evaluators (e.g. rater or senior rater).  This structure needs to be 
changed so that the CCO is assigned to the RCO.  The Chief of the RCO needs to be the 
one who decides which CCO should provide matrix support to a particular operational 
unit.  The goal should be to provide the warfighter with an educated, experienced and 
qualified CCO, and not to fill a requirement with a “warm body.”  
b. PACFLT   
The research team spoke with a senior representative in Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command Pacific (NAVFACPAC).  For contingency contracting 
requirements, the Navy relies on existing Navy Region Contracting Centers (NRCC) 
“husbanding” contracts.  This representative expressed concern that the Navy did not 
have a true acquisition corps.  Also, in NAVFACPAC, enlisted troops are not authorized 
warrants, which could possibly degrade contracting operations. 
During the interview, the senior NAVFACPAC representative was very 
supportive of reinstituting a PCCOWG or PCCOWG-type organization.  He admitted that 
there was somewhat of a gap in terms of PACOM contingency contracting when it came 
to planning and communicating.  In general, he felt the Navy had disruptive competition 
between the NAVFAC and the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP).  According 
to this representative, the current Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between NAVSUP 
and NAVPAC is very confusing and ambiguous.64  For example, the MOA states: 
                                                 
64 Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems Command, Transmittal Memorandum of 
Agreement Between NAVSUP and NAVFAC, May 5, 1997. 
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For those functions not under the purview of either NAVFAC or 
NAVSUP, the parties agree that the Command whose mission it is to 
procure such functions shall have first right of refusal with respect to 
contracting for such functions. 
Because of this memorandum, different Commands could possibly “shop around” to try 
to get the cheapest price.  
c. PACAF   
The group interviewed a senior enlisted contingency contracting manager 
at PACAF who was heavily involved in the management of the Air Expeditionary Force 
(AEF) concept of operations.  As a quick review, the AEF uses a 20-month cycle during 
which a four-month deployment period exists.  Before the four-month deployment period 
begins, the Airman undergoes two months of tailored training in preparation for the 
upcoming mission.  When the person is not in a deployed status, he performs normal 
duties and assignments.   
During the conversation, the PACAF representative indicated there was a 
coordination issue with PACOM’s contingency contracting planning, communicating, 
and execution process.  He indicated that establishing or recreating a PCCOWG-type 
organization would be of great help.   
PACAF has experienced problems in the “rank versus capabilities” issue 
when it comes to participation in PACOM-specific training exercises.  For instance, it has 
been observed when PACAF sends a senior enlisted Airman as their representative for 
planning meetings, some Services seem to prefer an officer participate instead.  This 
leads to a perception that rank is more important than capabilities, experience and 
education.   
Unlike the other Services, the Air Force has more enlisted members who 
have received DAWIA contracting certifications.  The enlisted members are usually more 
experienced having served in a contingency contracting environment; as a result, PACAF 
sends them to meetings and authorizes CO warrants.  What needs to be explored are the 
cultural issues and problems that exist between enlisted and officers.  The EA or PACOM 
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J4 needs to identify their desired participants in terms of desired capability, education and 
training versus expressing needs via rank.   
d. MARFORPAC   
MARFORPAC serves as the Marine Corps Component Headquarters for 
PACOM and CENTCOM.  Marine Corps Central Command (MARCENT) supports 
CENTCOM.  During the interview with the Chief of the Multinational Logistics Branch, 
MARFORPAC’s current structure was reviewed (Figure 18).  The research team 
observed that the organization lacked a full-time active duty CCO.  This deficiency 
manifests itself whenever MARFORPAC is tasked to send a participant to support 
training exercises or support the GWOT by deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan.  The CCO 
billet is only filled on an as-needed basis; to achieve mission efficiencies, this billet 
should always be activated.  Qualifications were another issue.  The Multinational 
Logistics Branch does not have anyone with DAWIA contracting certifications.  This 
lack of an experienced and educated person with the proper certifications can result in a 
reduced ability to adequately write/review OPLANs, OPORDs, Annex D and the CCSP 
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Figure 18.   Multinational Logistics Branch Organizational Chart65 
 
                                                 
65 Created by the research team based on researched data collected/analyzed. 
 91
4. CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch 
a. Lead Component for Logistics and Contracting 
The CENTCOM Contracting Branch has established a Lead Component 
for Logistics and Contracting (LCLC) for each country in theater.  The Contracting 
Branch decided to coin the term LCLC instead of EA to avoid confusion with the official 
term EA used by the SECDEF and Joint Staff.  The LCLC is:  
…a component assigned responsibility by USCENTCOM as the lead for 
coordinating joint logistics and contracting common item and common 
service support or other administrative and support functions.  Individual 
OPLAN/CONPLANs or OPORDs published by USCENTCOM address 
specific support responsibilities.  The lead component ensures efforts are 
coordinated through the theater security POC.66 
b. CENTCOM Regulation (CCR) 700-2 
CENTCOM created CCR 700-2: Outsourcing Logistical Support: Host 
Nation Support (HNS), Other Nation Support (ONS), Contracting and Civil 
Augmentation Programs (CAP) on August 15, 2004.  While 700-2 has many objectives, 
its purpose is to “optimize efficiency for all customers, make effective use of available 
resources/people, organize contracting support for contingencies, serve as effective force 
multiplier and provide (conceptually) for centralized coordination/decentralized 
execution to enhance war fighting capabilities.”67 
It is the research team’s opinion that the CCR 700-2 is a great step in the 
right direction to understand what the CCO must do in CENTCOM’s AOR.  In addition 
to the objectives stated above, the purpose of the regulation is to have a document that 
establishes and provides guidance on outsourcing logistical support that will be used to 
support U.S. forces.  Since this is a CENTCOM regulation, it applies to those designated 
units, Service Components, and DoD Agencies that require or need to have contracted 
support within CENTCOM’s AOR.  
                                                 
66 J4 Branch brief, p.7. 
67 CENTCOM Joint Staff, J4 Contracting Branch brief, p. 3. 
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The CCR’s outsourcing goal for contracting support is to improve the 
AOR’s supportability so that the supported units’ operational risk is reduced.  To 
accomplish this, CENTCOM has planned to leverage the HNS, ONS, contingency 
contracting and CAP.  This is also the order of preference CENTCOM wants the COs to 
follow.  
c. CENTCOM Contingency Contracting Observations  
The following are issues and lessons learned from the fact finding 
interview session with the CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch. 
(i) Joint Theater Logistics.  The Joint Force Commander (JFC) 
has responsibility for theater level logistics.  CENTCOM lacks a subordinate commander 
or organization that is charged with executing theater logistics.  This presents a conflict in 
that the JFC needs control over all Joint logistics, but there is no doctrinal requirement for 
a theater level logistics commander.  The theater logistics commander should have 
responsibility for theater distribution (logistics planning), medical, munitions, services 
(post office and mortuary affairs), contracting (HNS), and infrastructure (civil 
engineering).  A solution would be to develop doctrine to support this requirement 
followed by the creation of an organization that can perform some of the functions 
previously mentioned. 
(ii)   Early problems in OIF Joint theater contracting and 
contracts management.  First, it appeared that there was a gap in the ability to capture the 
visibility of all the contractors and contracts that are in theater.  There was not a 
consolidated theater- level reception center where all the contractors would report so that 
all could be identified and their data captured in a database.  There is a lot of competition 
for limited resources which creates scarcity, and it is very inefficient for DoD Services 
and Agencies to “out bid” each other for services or products.  Because of this 
competition, DoD was not able to take advantage of economic order quantities to get 
lower prices.  CAPs are a quick fix to many problems.  The group cautions that 
organizations need to ensure a shift to a sustainment contract occurs sooner rather than 
later since CAPs are usually very costly. 
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The research team recommends that all the Services in theater have a good 
understanding of how to conduct contingency contracting.  This requires review of 
pertinent Federal, DoD, and Service specific procedures, policy and doctrine.  The role 
and responsibility of a Joint reception center in the JCC-I must be defined to ensure 
compliance with CENTCOM AOR procedures.  In addition, all contractors need to in-
process through the JCC-I so visibility can be established and all contracting actions are 
filtered through the JCC-I.    
d. Contracting Command & Control During OIF/OEF   
It was observed that the initial contracting organizational structure was not 
adequate for OIF.  The ACA placed the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting 
(PARC) in Kuwait.  Unfortunately, this was not where the Combined Joint Task Force 
Commander was located.  This resulted in a duplication of contracts and created 
competition between U.S. entities.   
The JFC needs to have the PARC co-located with them so the PARC can 
provide the correct oversight of the contract support mission.  The PARC was moved 
further forward into the JCC-I to facilitate contracting actions.  Admittedly, this should 
have been decided in the planning process.      
e. Contractor Management During OIF/OEF 
There was a lack of situational awareness regarding the extremely high 
numbers of contractors on the battlefield and understanding the enormity of its impact on 
the security/support requirements for the fielded forces.  During planning, the scope and 
breadth of the contractor support that would be required in theater was not thoroughly 
explored.  For example, there was a major problem when it came to giving weapons to 
contractors.  The problem was exacerbated because the process was not consistent and 
would change with each new request.  In addition, the terms under which the contractors 
were authorized to possess a weapon were not clear.  DoD needs to create clear, concise 
policy and guidance that governs issues affecting contractors deploying with the force.   
Another problem with contractor management occurred when it came to 
the deployment of contractors into the battlefield.  It should have been regarded with the 
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same attention to detail as the deployment of troops into theater.  One of the first steps is 
the arrival at the CONUS Replacement Centers (CRCs) prior to the arrival in the AOR.  
This would be followed by the monitoring of the contractors’ arrival through a Joint 
operation reception center.         
Clear guidance needs to be issued that addresses all issues in terms of 
contractor deployment.  As of today, there are two Joint Staff documents, DoD Directive 
(DoDD) 1400.31 and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3020.37, that address this issue.  In 
addition, there are two draft documents (DoDD and DoDI) and a Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) case, 2003-D087 pending promulgation.  
The Joint Staff, COCOM, and Services have provided input on the language of this 
policy.  Once the guidance has been given to CENTCOM, it is then passed to the LCLC.  
The LCLC could then ensure each contract let within the CENTCOM AOR follows the 
approved DoD guidelines.  The result would be all of the appropriate clauses would be 
properly incorporated in existing and new contracts. 
f. Contractor Officer Deployment in OIF/OEF.  
At the onset of OIF/OEF, the Services did not have joint visibility of 
where other Services were deploying COs.  There was little coordination of effort with no 
one clearinghouse tracking a CO’s mission.  One suggestion is to have a periodic review 
of each Service’s contracting plan.  At the review, each Service could ensure there was 
the proper skill and grade match for the positions that are required. 
The research team believes this review is a responsibility of a theater-level 
contracting command.  CENTCOM needs to ensure that the JCC-I, which was stood up 
in October 2004, fulfills this need.  As CENTCOM continues to support the GWOT, a 
decision needs to be made as to how the JCC-I will evolve.  The group believes the JCC-I 
should ensure all Services have representatives who meet and review the status of their 
COs in the AOR to ensure the right mixes of people are doing the right jobs.  
Concurrence from the Joint Staff and CENTCOM would give the JCC-I the support it 
needs to make this happen.  In addition, the issue of a theater logistical support command 
and the relationship to the JCC-I needs to be explored by the CENTCOM J4. 
5. CENTCOM J4 Plans 
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The CENTCOM J4 Plans office is one of the participants in the CENTCOM 
planning process (Figure 19).  The Plans office consolidates all J4 inputs into the 
CENTCOM OPLAN, CONPLAN or OPORD.  J4 Plans has overall responsibility for 
Annex D (Logistics), Annex L (Environment Considerations) and Annex P (HNS).  On 
the contingency contracting side, the collected information is found in the Appendix 9 
(CCSP) to Annex D (Logistics).    
The research team’s observations are that the J4 Plans officer ensures all 
contingency contracting issues are addressed.  He will task the Contracting Branch to 
submit input to any OPLANs, CONPLANs or OPORDs.  By doing so, the proper people 
(Contracting Branch) are inserting information to enable the CCSP to be written.  This 
approach provides the opportunity to plan for, communicate, integrate and execute better 







Figure 19.   CENTCOM Joint Planning Summary 
(Source: From CENTCOM J4 Plans Brief) 
CENTCOM has a robust planning process, and there are several meetings held to 
execute the Joint Planning Summary and facilitate adaptive planning.  For example, the 
Joint Planning Group (JPG) is a CENTCOM directorate-level group that meets every two 
weeks.  The members are directors, the Deputy CENTCOM Commander, and the 
CENTCOM Chief of Staff (O-6 and above).  The Operations Planning Element (OPE) 
meets three times a week (members are O-4s and O-5s).  The Operations Planning Team 
meets once a week, dependent on the task at the time (members are O-3s to O-5s).  Last, 
there is a Coalition Planning Group (CPG).  Membership is comprised of countries who 
make up the Global Counter Terrorism Force (GCTF) and the Multi-Coalition Force-Iraq 
(MCF-I).   
The research team was shown an unclassified CENTCOM CCSP during the visit 
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group observed that the CENTCOM CCSP is much more detailed in terms of the 
purpose, role, guidance and expectations of all the relevant contingency contracting 
stakeholders.  In the research team’s opinion, the guidance actually seemed like it would 
be helpful for the Service Component commands to use in formulating policies and 
procedures for contracting in the CENTCOM AOR.  
The researchers asked CENTCOM about JULLS and TPFDD.  The research team 
discovered that J4 does not always use the JULLS.  CENTCOM does document the 
lessons learned from both OIF/OEF.  Instead of using the TPFDD, the group observed 
that CENTCOM used a Request for Forces (RFF).  Simply stated, when CENTCOM 
needs forces, it sends the RFF to the Joint Staff to request support.  If the Joint Staff can 
not get forces from CONUS, then the RFF goes to outside continental U.S. (OCONUS) 
commands such as the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) or PACOM. 
E. THE JOINT CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING COMMAND  
1. Establishing the Need 
As the research team was conducting research, the group discovered that 
CENTCOM stood up a variation of the JCCC in its AOR called the JCC-I.  This is a great 
step in the right direction; however, there is no such organization in PACOM at this time, 
nor is there an organization responsible for synchronizing the entire Joint contingency 
contracting actions for DoD.  The contracting organizations in theater are currently 
addressing some of these issues, but there is still a gap between the Joint Staff, COCOM 
and Service Component when it comes to the execution of the CCSP.  The research team 
envisions that a JCCC would be located in CONUS and would assist in planning 
operations before a COCOM’s forces deploy for a contingency.   
2. Background 
The group believes the current organization for contingency contracting is not 
robust enough to address the intricacies of today’s complex contracting world.  One of 
the main reasons for this lack of robustness is the cavalier approach some planners apply 
to contracting.  It is not due to neglect, but to a lack of fundamental knowledge about this 
vital resource.  The Military Services become nervous as the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) determines which one will serve as the EA.  This designation is important 
 98
because as the old adage goes, “he who holds the gold makes the rules,” meaning that 
Service is in charge and the remaining Services must follow their lead.  Second, not 
having the proper structure to integrate contingency contracting means there is a 
misalignment of contracting plans and OPLAN via the Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN).68 
When this happens there are many real world repercussions.  For example, during 
OIF, the omission of the CCSP, which ensures that contracting plans receive the correct 
emphasis in all logistics planning, created problems with the LOGPLAN.  Specifically, 
the long logistics lines from Kuwait into Iraq put a huge strain on the line haul assets 
used causing us to continually stop for a “tactical pause” to allow the logistics structure to 
catch up to the ground forces.  It was noted that a “better alignment of the LOGPLAN 
with the CCSP could have increased line haul assets through the contracting of additional 
lift capabilities to augment  HNS and theater vehicles.”69 
Another example deals with the shortage of supplies.  According to some OIF 
planners, there were not enough Class II (clothing and equipment), Class III (petroleum, 
oil, lubricants), and Class IX (repair parts and components) items.  These categories of 
supplies were apparently overlooked, and the result was that mission accomplishment 
was possibly jeopardized.  The CCOs had to react quickly and contract for these items, 
but the shortage could have been avoided in the first place if the lead times for the items 
had been identified and put into the CCSP.  All too often the job of the CCO is one of 
being reactive vice proactive.  The CCSP is a vital part of contingency contracting.  The 
CCSP needs to be thoroughly addressed during the planning process, especially since this 
issue continually comes to the forefront after operations are completed.  
3. What to Change 
In developing a solution or recommendation, the group considered what should be 
changed and/or modified.  Several options warrant consideration: (1) a review/ 
modification of the design factors of the organization; (2) institution of a new structure to 
ensure contingency contracting is routinely considered in the Joint Staff and COCOM’s 
                                                 
68 Appendix F, Joint Planning Summary. 
69 Anderson, M. and Flaherty, G.  MBA Professional Report: Analysis of the Contingency Contracting 
Support Plan within the Joint Planning Process Framework  (Monterey: NPS, December 2003), 41.  
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planning exercises; (3) examining ways of lessening the parochial nature of the Military 
Services; and (4) setting requirements for the educational level, training and experience 
of those who serve in contingency contracting organizations.   
According to Henry Mintzberg, “the structure of an organization can be defined 
simply as the sum total of the ways in which its labor is divided into distinct tasks and 
then its coordination is achieved among these tasks.”70  Mintzberg also notes that, “the 
elements of structure should be selected to achieve an internal consistency or harmony, as 
well as a basic consistency with the organization’s situation…”71  Through research the 
group has come to recognize that Mintzberg’s book has great merit in regard to the case 
of structuring the JCCC. 
Understanding its environment and setting a well-defined strategic direction are 
essential elements for any organization’s success.  A good fit between these elements and 
the design factors will ensure outputs and outcomes are directly linked back to the 
strategic direction.  Mintzberg highlights five coordinating mechanisms that explain the 
way organizations could do their work, “…mutual adjustment, direct supervision, 
standardization of work processes, standardization of work outputs, and standardization 
of worker skills.”72   
Taking this into account, the group feels the time has come and a new 
organization should be created to instill a culture of Jointness instead of Army green, 
Navy blue, Marine Corps scarlet, and Air Force blue.  The time is right for a truly Joint 
organization to emerge, especially in light of the military’s current activities.  As the U.S. 
conducts the GWOT, the U.S. military will find itself deployed more often to new 
countries that exhibit Second or Third World qualities. 
As the U.S. downsized the military following the Cold War, contingency 
contracting operations have been increasing as the major source of support.  The current 
paradigm is that the military provisions in forward theaters because of the reductions in 
                                                 
70 Mintzberg, Henry. Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations (New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1993), 2. 
71 Ibid., 3. 
72 Ibid., 4. 
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organic (non-contracted) support capabilities.  A new JCCC would enable the theater 
combatant commanders to provide improved support to coalition forces and to achieve a 
transformation of the economic landscape which is vital for accomplishing theater 
objectives.   
There have been many critics on how the military operates.  The General 
Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office (GAO)) is the first one 
that comes to mind.  It has been noted that the military has not learned the hard lessons 
from previous contingencies, namely to improve the ability to effectively and efficiently 
conduct coordinated contracting support.  Also, the military must integrate the 
“combatant commander’s theater objectives with the myriad of stakeholders deemed 
essential for success.”73  Through research, the group reached a conclusion that an 
inclusive, collaborative approach, which involves key stakeholders, is vital to the future 
success of contingency contracting operations.   
4. The Yoder Three-Tier Model 
a. Organization 
The Yoder Three-Tier Model and “its employment will allow for better 
planning and coordination, tactical, operational and theater force and objective 
support.”74 Using this model as a baseline could improve the current state of Joint 
contingency contracting.  The Yoder three-tiered model for contingency contracting 
operations consists of three levels: 
x Ordering Officer (OO) 
x Leveraging Contracting Officer (LCO) 
x Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) 
The first level is the OO.  The OO does the most basic contracting 
support; specifically, reviewing contracts that are in theater and placing orders against 
them.  This action does not require any knowledge of the strategic theater operations.  
The OO should have completed some business-related courses and have at least one year 
                                                 
73 Yoder, E. C., "The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning and 
Execution," Naval Postgraduate School, Working Paper, 2004.   
74 Ibid, 2. 
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of contracting experience.  As for training, he should have completed the Level I 
requirement for DAWIA certification, and a sufficient rank would be junior 
enlisted/officer or civil servant.   
The second level is the LCO.  The LCO should be able to perform those 
basic OO duties, but must have the skills of “leveraging the capacities and capabilities of 
the local and regional economies in the contingent theater.”75  Due to the increased 
responsibilities, the LCO must be able to interface with the local businesses, higher 
military organizations, and any non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the area.   
The LCO should have a graduate degree in a business-related field.  The 
LCO should have at least two years of contracting experience, and their training should 
have consisted of completion of all the DAWIA Level II certification requirements.  The 
rank of these members should be senior enlisted, junior to mid-grade officers or mid-
grade civil servants.    
The third level is the IPE.  This is the highest of the three levels.  The rank 
of the IPE should be at least an O-6 (Colonel, or Navy Captain).  The IPE must have 
completed at least a master’s level education in a business-related field.  The IPE should 
have vast contracting experience and training should have included all coursework for 
DAWIA Level III certification.     
The CCOs are integral into the operational planning phases of 
contingencies.  This is important because traditional contingency contracting and the 
duties of CCOs during contingencies are missing from Joint Staff and COCOM OPLANs 
and OPORDs.  This position should rotate among the Services, much like the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in order to ensure an equitable disbursement of 
perceived power.   
With a fully functioning IPE, the new organization will be able to ensure 
that contingency contracting operations are planned and executed to meet U.S. National 
strategic and theater objectives.  In addition, the IPE will work with any NGOs in the 
local or regional area to increase their overall efficiency and effectiveness of operations 
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and integrate them into the planning and execution of contingency operations.  The 
researchers agree with the Yoder Three-Tier Model when it proposes that “the integrated 
planner and executor CCO (IPE CCO) be utilized in a broader planning and execution 
environment.  The CCO, with higher-level certification, education, and experience, 
should be integrated within J-4 and J-5 Logistics and Planning/Operations and Exercise 
organization structure.”76  The researchers want to note that the IPE will also have a 
warrant.   
b. The Foundation 
Utilizing the Yoder Three-Tier Model can lay the framework for a new 
structure and the creation of a new organization, the JCCC.  This command would be 
able to make certain that the Joint Staff and COCOM operational planners can leverage 
integration of all key stakeholders (military, contractors, NGOs, Defense Agencies or 
Cabinet level posts (inter-agency)).  A by-product of this will be the elimination of 
competing and conflicting demands of the participants.  A core competency of the 
command will be to “allow for the creation of robust CCSPs, and integrate such plans 
into broader operational plans in support of theater operations.”77 
Mintzberg would probably describe this organization as a professional 
bureaucracy.  Organizations like this rely on the “skills and knowledge of their operating 
professionals to function.”78  The skill sets needed for this are identified in the DAWIA 
contracting certification matrix.  Like any other professional bureaucracy (hospitals, 
schools, or production firms), the JCCC would need to have its people embody skills of 
the Level One COs.  According to Mintzberg, these personnel would be the 
organization’s “operating core.”79  
The research team believes that through implementation of the Yoder 
Three-Tier Model, the JCCC will address some of the current problems and issues with 
                                                                                                                                                 
75 Ibid., 15 
76 Ibid., 16-17. 
77 Ibid., 17. 
78 Mintzberg, H., 189. 
79 Ibid., 190. 
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how the DoD conducts Joint contingency contracting (Figure 20).  At each level, it would 
be valuable if members from all the Services were represented.  In addition, if DCMA 
had a member in Level Two, it would enable that person to liaison back with DCMA and 
inform them of upcoming contingency contract management missions.   
 
Model Tier Level 





Highlights and Drawbacks 
Ordering  Officer-  
Tier One 
x basic ordering 
x some simplified acquisitions 
x training: DAU CON 234 
x DAWIA Certified CON Level I or II 
x junior to mid-enlisted, junior 
officers, GS-7 to GS-9 1102 series 
civilians 
 
x simple buys 
x little integration 
x no operational planning 
x no broad liaison functions 
 
Leveraging 
Contracting Officer-  
Tier Two 
x leverages to local economy 
x reduces “pushed” material support 
x training/education: DAU CON 234,      
recommended higher education 
x DAWIA Certified CON  Level II or 
III 
x senior enlisted, junior to mid-grade 
officers, GS-11+ 1102 series civilians 
x better local operational 
planning 
x some integration 
x more capability for the 
operational commander 
x no planned theater integration 
x no broad liaison functions 
x may perform to optimize local 
operations at the detriment to 
theater ops 
Integrated Planner 
and Executor (IPE) 
Tier Three 
x highest level of planning and 
integration - joint 
x linked/integrated with J-4 and J-5  
x creates and executes OPLAN CCO 
strategy 
x provides direction to tier two and 
one 
x links operations strategically to 
theater objectives of COCOM 
x education: master(s) degree or 
higher and, JPME Phase I and II  
x DAWIA Certified CON Level III, 
and other DAWIA disciplines (LOG, 
ACQ, FIN, etc) 
x senior officers (0-6+), senior 
civilians, GS-13+ or SES 
 
x performs operational and theater 
analysis, integrates results into 
OPLAN 
x link between COCOM and 
OPLAN to all theater 
contracting operations 
x coordinates theater objectives 
with best approach to contracted 
support 
x can achieve broader national 
security goals through effective 
distribution of national assets 
x includes planning, 
communication, coordination, 
and exercising with NGO and 
PVO in theater 
 
Figure 20.   The Yoder Three-Tier Model 
(Source: From the Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting 
Planning and Execution) 
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c. Stakeholders 
The stakeholders affected by this proposed new organization have been 
identified (Figure 21).  First, OSD shall be addressed.  Having been sanctioned and 
approved, the JCCC will be able to conduct integration from its inception.  The JCCC 
could even provide input to the Joint Staff, J-4 and J-3 (Operations) as to what Service 
should be appointed for the contingency under discussion.  
Second, the Joint Staff, J-4 (Logistics) has its focus on logistics instead of 
the function of integrative contracting and logistics.  A new organization would enable all 
stakeholders to see the “Big Picture.”  It would provide the link between logistics and 
Strategic Plans and Policy by working with the Joint J-5.  In this way, the OPLANs and 
OPORDs would have better logistical support due to the integration of all theater assets 
including contracting.  
Third, the COCOMs are usually more focused on getting warfighters into 
theater and accomplishing the mission than what happens on the ground with contracting.  
Without having the JCCC, the COCOM J4 and the Joint Staff will not be able to 
effectively or efficiently utilize all participants.  The researchers believe the COCOMs 
would benefit significantly from more integration. 
Fourth, Military Services and their respective COs all have a stake in the 
model.  If there is better integration of what CCOs need to do when the OPLAN is 
developed, everyone in the contracting chain of command wins.  Since each Service will 
have a representative in Level One and Level Two of the Three-Tier Model, the link 
between the Joint Staff, COCOM and Military Service will occur and no one will be left 
out of the information loop.    
There are some costs associated with adopting this proposed structure.    
First, for the COCOMs it adds a layer of bureaucracy.  This results in the combatant 
commander having a reduced internal contingency contracting capability because the 
resources would now fall under this new organization.  Upon deployment the JCCC 
would send the appropriate amount of COs with the COCOM.  The COs would assist the 
COCOM’s J4 to make sure contingency contracting is conducted appropriately.  The 
 105
individual Military Services may lose personnel to this organization and without 
additional manning authorized by Congress, these additional billets would cause other 
billets in the various Services to remain vacant.  Where to locate this organization and 













Figure 21.   Stakeholder Analysis80 
 
5. The Vision of the JCCC 
The research team’s vision of the JCCC is that it would consolidate each 
Service’s contingency contracting organizations into one entity.  Utilizing a modified 
version of the Yoder Three-Tier Model, the assigned personnel would have the right 
education and training, and the organization would have the right structure to perform its 
mission.  Again, this would enable more synchronization of missions among the Joint 
Staff, COCOMs and contingency contracting organizations.  Buy-in from the following 
offices would be needed: the ACA, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)), Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 
(SAF(AQ)), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) and Headquarters, Marine Corps.   
The location of the JCCC could be near Washington, D.C. with separate regions 
(north, south, east, west, Pacific, Europe) that would provide support to nine UCCs.  The 
region itself would have responsibility of serving as the COCOM’s contingency 
                                                 
80 Created by the research team based on research and data collected/analyzed. 
 
Stakeholder Type Primary/ 
Secondary 
Key? 
OSD Supportive Primary Yes 
Joint Staff, J-4 Supportive Primary Yes 
Combatant 
Commands 
Supportive Secondary Yes 
Services Marginal Secondary Yes 
Contingency 
Contracting Officers 
Supportive Secondary Yes 
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contracting requirements board, much like the PCCOWG did for PACOM.  Specifically 
the JCCC would: 
x Provide an environment for centralized coordination and decentralized 
execution. 
x Establish common contracting procedures for the Service Components. 
x Establish a JLPSB for each COCOM. 
x Ensure Service Components are not bidding against each other for the same 
commodity or supplies. 
x Develop and maintain a contingency contracting source database. 
x Coordinate contingency contracting warrants. 
x Coordinate and recommend contingency contracting assignments. 
x Leverage each Service’s contingency contracting resources. 
x Coordinate the assignment of military CCOs to ensure the right person with 
the right experience is put in the right job. 
x Ensure contracting authority flows from the Head of Contracting Agency 
(HCA) to the PARC to the CCO. 
If a COCOM deployed its headquarters into theater (like CENTCOM during 
OIF), then the JCCC region supporting that COCOM would send a branch/cell forward to 
assist with setting up a mini-JCCC.  Allowing the commander of the JCCC to rotate 
enables it to remain truly Joint and not just one Service’s new “rice bowl.”  It would 
provide an incentive for the Services to groom the personnel necessary to fill the billet.  It 
would still need to be decided if the JCCC should be an independent DoD entity or fall 
under the Joint Staff J4. 
6. JCCC Recommendations 
There are several ways one can modify/fix the perceived shortcomings with Joint 
contingency contracting.  The research team will offer some suggestions.  The first is to 
let everything remain as it is and to maintain the status quo.  Second, establish a 
PCCOWG type organization within each COCOM.  Third, establish the JCCC by 
implementing a modified version of the Yoder Three-Tier Model.  The Mintzberg 
principles of structure to design an organization could be applied to ensure contingency 
contracting is integrated in the Joint and COCOM task orders, OPLAN, and OPORDs.  
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Each option has its pros and cons which are captured in the Strength, Weakness, 
Opportunity, Threat (SWOT) Analysis (Figure 22 and Figure 23).   
If the first option was selected, then DoD would continue to muddle through 
eventually getting the job done.  The current ad-hoc methods have minimal integration of 
contingency contracting plans, which is inefficient and ineffective.  Are the Services 
better off continuing to conduct Joint contingency contracting in this manner?  Should 
DoD create a new organization?  The group believes that DoD should create a new 
organization.  There must be a fundamental redesign of existing organizations or the 
creation of a new structure to fit the strategic needs of the contingency contracting 
community.  The research team believes the benefits of undertaking this endeavor 
significantly outweigh the costs associated with it. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats: Current Structure81 
                                                 
81 Created by the research team based on research and data collected/analyzed. 
Strengths 
 Each service can currently handle individual 
operations on their own. 
 Commanders have the ability to “do what they 




 Each service handles their contracting (and 
the training of personnel) differently. 
 Current personnel vary significantly 
according to rank and experience. 
 Those services with more robust structures 
end up shouldering more of the burden. 




 Service parochialism 
 A structure that isn’t flexible and cannot 
react to the ever increasing “joint 
contingencies” can result in increased friction 




 Maintain the Status Quo (“Muddle 
Through”) 




In the research group’s opinion, the JCCC SWOT analysis reveals that the JCCC 
is better suited to fill the void that exists in conducting strategic contingency contracting 
operations.  There is no one organization that has this responsibility today.  Therefore, the 
JCCC will be able to accomplish the planning, communication, integration, and execution 
required in contingency operations.  In addition, the JCCC will be able to ensure all the 
CCOs, no matter what level in the Yoder Three-Tier Model, have the right DAWIA 
education, perform the proper jobs, and provide contingency contracting support to the 
warfighter.  The JCCC will able to facilitate the creation of more robust CCSPs, OPLANs 
and OPORDs.   
 
Figure 23.   Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats: JCCC 
 
Strengths 
 Form one new organization that will liaison 
with Joint Staff and Combatant Commands 
 Ensure that Defense Acquisition University 
certified and trained contracting officers are 
used 
 The Commander will be educated, have Joint 
experience, and be JPME/CGSC qualified   
 Contingency contracting will be integrated in 
CCSP, OPLAN, and OPORD 
 
Weaknesses 
 DoD and Military Services will be resistant 
to change 
 Services will have to give up people to man 
this organization 
  Must get buy-in from key stakeholders 
(OSD, Joint Staff, Combatant Command, 
Services) 




 Service parochialism 
 Scarce resources 
 
Opportunities 
 Blocking by Services who don’t support this 
 Change in director might become political 
much like the position of Chairman of the 
Joint Staff 
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F. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
Contingency contracting is a fluid environment that must have the right people in 
the right place at the right time.  The troops on the ground expect and deserve the best; 
therefore, it is critical that CCOs perform this mission as efficiently and effectively as 
possible. 
The research team believes the Yoder Three-Tier Model and the creation of a 
JCCC are keys to success.  Remember, the IPE is the one with wisdom to ensure a 
comprehensive CCSP integrates contracting into the theater objectives of the OPLAN for 
the combatant commander.  If structured and organized properly, the IPE will be 
“integrated at the J-4 level, will plan, exercise, and call for adequate theater contingency 
contracting personnel provisioning (which may vary depending on the phases of the 
contingency operation) to effectively and efficiently meet theater objectives.”82  
In order to get the Yoder Three-Tier Model implemented, it would take buy-in 
from all the stakeholders and consensus that it is worth pursuing.  The group recommends 
getting buy-in from the Military Departments and AOs, COs, and CCOs who are already 
part of contingency contracting community to validate this idea.  If proven worthy, the 
research team believes it should be presented up the Services’ acquisition and contracting 
chain of command.  The group would suggest it then be sent through the Joint Staff, J4 
and finally, the Joint Staff and OSD.   
With the military’s operational tempo, there will be even more demands placed on 
the contracting community to provide services and theater support.  It is now necessary to 
have an organizational structure that is designed and staffed to accomplish the COCOM 
theater objectives.  The contingency contracting organizations must take a proactive 
approach instead of being reactive; the JCCC will allow the Services to do that and be 
successful.  
If OSD approves the JCCC concept, it would have to tie some incentive/cost to 
making this happen so it is not just given “lip service.”  The JCCC would have to work 
                                                 
82 Yoder, E., 21. 
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closely with all the UCCs, especially the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), 
since it is “the single manager of America's global defense transportation system…”83   
This chapter discussed COCOM’s diverse approaches to planning for and 
conducting contracting support operations.  The research team’s recommendation to 
mitigate the wide variety of issues discussed includes the establishment of the JCCC and 
adoption of the principles presented in the Yoder Three-Tier Model as a possible solution 
to improving DoD contingency contracting.  The following chapter will analyze DCMA’s 
role in contingency contracting and validate their proposed entry and exit criteria.    
 
 
                                                 
83 Retrieved 6 May 05 from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/transcom.htm. 
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V. VALIDATION OF DCMA ENTRY/EXIT CRITERIA 
A. OVERVIEW 
As of May 2005, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the 
Department of Defense (DoD) have not established criteria outlining the initiation, 
duration and termination of DCMA’s Contingency Contract Administration Service 
(CCAS) support during DoD contingency operations.  This chapter evaluates DCMA’s 
newly proposed standards upon which they would decide to deploy and re-deploy their 
CCAS support teams to and from a contingency.  The chapter concludes with a brief 
summary of findings and associated recommendations. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In the early part of December 2004, the Commander of DCMA’s International 
District (DCMAI) approached the applied research project team and asked if the team 
would be willing to expand the scope of the project to explore, “When and how does 
DCMA engage/disengage in contingency contracting operations?”  His particular areas of 
interest were how DCMA received the “invitation to the ball” and once they were there, 
how was it determined that it was time to leave?  In other words, what were the 
appropriate entry and exit criteria for DCMA’s contingency contracting missions?   
To answer this question, amongst others, an extensive literature review was 
undertaken and personal interviews were conducted with staff of Service Secretaries, 
Joint Staff, two unified combatant commands (UCC), several Service Component 
contracting offices, and DCMA.  The purpose of the literature review and the personal 
interviews was to develop an understanding of how contingency contracting operations 
and policies, regulations and guidelines are planned, developed, established, implemented 
and executed.  Interviews of particular importance to the DCMA contingency contracting 
mission include: 
x January 17-21, 2005: United States (U.S.) Pacific Command (PACOM), each 
of the Service Component’s contracting offices, and DCMA’s liaison officer 
(LNO)  
x February 22, 2005: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and DCMA’s LNO  
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x February 24, 2005: DCMA Headquarters Combat Support Center (CSC) and 
DCMAI   
C. DCMA’S PROPOSED ENTRY AND EXIT CRITERIA 
DCMA’s proposed entry and exit criteria84 as presented to the researchers is 
provided below.  This draft language has not been changed by the researchers.  DCMA is 
proposing that the following language be included in the combatant command’s 
(COCOM) deliberate and crisis action plans as follows:   
 
UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 
 
DCMA Input to XXXXXX Plan XXXX 
 
Para _ (U) DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY (DCMA) 
DCMA Contingency Entry/Exit Criteria: Entry.  DCMA provides 
contract management support to contingency operations for a period of 
one year or until sustainment contract operations commence, whichever is 
sooner under the following conditions:   
A. Contingencies include: 1) Limited Conflict; 2) Regional Conventional 
Conflict; and 3) Acts of Terrorism. 
B. The contract management support must be consistent with DCMA 
core competencies, or;  
C. Tasked by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with 
subpara 7.3, DODD 5105.64, Sep 27, 2000. 
Exit.  Whichever of the following conditions occurs first: 
A. At the end of one year from the declared contingency, or an earlier 
mutually agreed upon date; 
B. The mission area is no longer declared a contingency operation area or 
there is an Executive Order or law downgrading the operation, or; 
C. The supported customer establishes a garrison permanent party/Area 
Support Group with support of a Contracting Directorate. 
 
                                                 
84 DCMA draft language provided by PACOM LNO, January 2005. 
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Contingency Operations Support. 
 
1. (U) Upon receiving delegation from the procuring organization and 
approval from the Director, DCMA, an Initial Response Team 
(IRT) is deployed to provide quick response and short-term 
contract administration services.  The IRT will perform site 
surveys in conjunction with the Civil Augmentation Program 
(CAP) and assess follow-on force requirements for remaining 
CCAS support.  As a minimum, an Officer in Charge will be 
assigned to the IRT. 
2.  (U) Provide full service CCAS on contingency CAP and External 
Theater Contracts as delegated by the procuring organization and 
accepted by DCMA, at one or multiple sites (this does not include 
base, post, camp and station contracts).  Provide CCAS in a 
declared contingency with the exception of services listed in 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 
242.202 (a)(i) and (ii). 
3. (U) Provide program awareness and visibility at the industry level 
for major weapon systems, fielding, modernization, 
recapitalization, and any depot level maintenance provided by 
contracted support for which DCMA has been delegated contract 
administration.  Maintain readiness “Reach Back”85 for major 
weapon systems for which DCMA has delegated contract 
administration services oversight.  Provide actionable information 
as required on the status of aforementioned system that affects the 
COCOM during contingency operations.  Leverage adjacent 
combat Support agencies such as the Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA) or Program Executive Officers (PEO) to assist as required. 
4. (U) Acquire, as required, industrial surge capability for critical 
component on contracts delegated to DCMA for oversight, as 
directed by the contracts’ Program Managers (PM).  Work with 
PEOs/PMs/DLA by providing Industrial Analysis/Surge 
information and “Reach Back” capability for critical component 
shortages on contracts where DCMA has delegated oversight.  
DCMA can assist with accelerating such contracts upon request 
from procuring organizations. 
 
                                                 
85 “Reach Back” is the ability to provide visibility into the industrial base for capability and capacity 
assessments, to influence processes affecting the development, production, inspection, delivery and 
transportation of critical weapon systems, items or replacement parts, and to expedite these processes as 
necessary to support the warrior.  The LNO provides the link between the COCOM’s shortfalls and 
equipment needs with DCMA’s “reach back” capability to expedite/facilitate delivery and shipment.  
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UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 
The most obvious shortcoming of the proposed exit criteria is the void that would 
exist if DCMA withdrew from the contingency after just 12 months—who would perform 
the contract management function after the first year?  Recommendations to avoid this 
void and improve or clarify this draft language are found in section E, Conclusions and 
Recommendations, of this chapter.        
D. FINDINGS 
1. PACOM 
a. Span of Control 
The DCMA liaison officer (LNO) serves many roles including, but not 
limited to: facilitate COCOM/DCMA information sharing, link COCOM shortfalls and 
equipment needs with DCMA’s “Reach Back” capability, and assist with the Combat 
Support Agency Review Team (CSART) inquiries.  DCMA’s PACOM LNO is currently 
responsible for seven COCOMs including PACOM and is scheduled to retire mid-2005.  
The DCMAI’s Pacific Commander also acts as PACOM’s LNO since this COCOM falls 
within his area of responsibility (AOR).  Most Services are experiencing difficulties 
filling their own acquisition billets, let alone those in DCMA, especially at this senior 
officer level.  DCMA is initiating plans to hire civilians to fill several of these LNO 
positions; however, it is unclear whether this will be a permanent solution or a stop-gap 
measure intended to mitigate the Service’s shortfalls.     
b. Customer Relationship Management 
At the time of the research group’s January 2005 visit, the LNO had laid 
out an aggressive plan that would allow him to visit each of his assigned COCOMs over 
the coming months.  The intent of each visit was threefold:  (1) establish initial contact 
and begin the process of forging relationships with the J4 staff; (2) brief senior leaders (as 
well as the J4) about DCMA’s mission, capabilities and core competencies, and current 
CCAS activities; and (3) secure a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) or Understanding 
(MOU) that would define DCMA’s entry and exit criteria for CCAS operations.  The 
MOA/MOU could then be incorporated as an Appendix to the Logistics Annex of all 
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Operation Plans (OPLANs), Concept Plans (CONPLANs) and/or Operation Orders 
(OPORDs).  It is highly reasonable to conclude two facets of his plan are feasible: 
establish initial contact and brief senior leaders.  It is improbable that this LNO would be 
able to successfully fulfill the remaining elements of his plan given his delegated span of 
control and time constraints.  
In any environment it takes considerable time and effort to identify the 
target audience, understand their requirements and design a product or service that meets 
those needs.  The degree of dialogue and information exchange that would need to occur 
to establish and nurture these new relationships and negotiate an MOA/MOU would 
require a considerable investment of time.  This LNO does not have sufficient time to 
accomplish these tasks given his wide span of control and pending retirement.  Interviews 
with mid- and senior level officials on the J4 staff demonstrate that the DCMA LNO was 
respected and appreciated for his contract knowledge; however, it was also apparent the 
staff was not savvy enough about the contracting arena or the contingency contracting 
environment to determine if the proposed entry and exit criteria were acceptable or 
unacceptable.  One staff member commented “that he trusted the LNO to lead him in the 
right direction… After all, DCMA knew what needed to be done.”    
c. Integrative Planning 
Prior to this LNO’s arrival, DCMA did not participate in planning 
meetings wherein OPLANs, CONPLANs or OPORDs are generated. The J4 Staff wants 
DCMA’s involvement in these planning activities.  At this time, DCMA is the only 
contracting presence on the J4 Staff, which lends credibility to their contracting planning 
efforts.  
This fiscal year, DCMA’s focus is on two specific mission areas: (1) 
provide acquisition life cycle support (Agency Mission Essential Task List (AMETL) 1-
6) and (2) provide contingency contract management support (AMETL 7-9 in Figure 24).   
Mission Area (MA) 2, contingency contract management support (including “Reach 
Back” to the industrial base) accounts for just five to seven percent of DCMA’s current 
work load.  The vast majority (95 percent) of DCMA’s resources is still devoted to MA 1.  
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As stated previously, DCMA currently staffs contingency contract management support 
on an ad hoc basis.  While DCMA is prepared to provide this critical support during a 
contingency, they are not authorized sufficient resources to perform routine contract 
management activities in a mature, sustainable environment.  With the exception of the 
Balkans Support Contract (BSC), DCMA does not typically provide contract 
administration for base, post, camp and station contract actions.  In a later interview with 
a senior DCMAI representative, it was suggested that DCMA might pursue this type of 
business provided a fee for service arrangement could be reached or Congress authorized 
additional resources for this service. 
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CSA Mission: What We Do
 
Figure 24: DCMA Mission Areas  
(Source: From DCMAI Briefing, April 28, 2005) 
 
d. Initial Response Team 
IRTs are normally made up of only military personnel; however, DCMA 
quickly rotates in qualified civilian employees to augment CCAS support teams.  The 
IRT usually includes an Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) and a Quality 
Assurance Representative (QAR).  IRT personnel complete the initial site survey and 
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recommend demographics for follow-on teams.  Minimum skill sets for deployed 
personnel include Level II Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 
certification in their applicable career fields; however, Level III personnel are preferred. 
Interviews with mid- and senior level officials on the J3, J4 and J5 Staffs 
found that PACOM does not plan contingency contracting at the strategic level.  
OPLANs do not adequately address contracting; however, J4’s annexes designate a lead 
service or “executive agent” (EA) for each plan.  Responsibility for creating a 
comprehensive Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) is rotated between 
Services for Joint exercises and crises.  No qualified DAWIA certified contracting 
personnel were found on the J3, J4 or J5.  Neither J3 nor J5 had contact with the DCMA 
LNO, yet everyone interviewed indicated they would like to have a “knowledgeable 
contracting type” on staff.  PACOM’s current resource authorization levels will not 
support a contracting billet especially since most “plus ups” are only occurring in 
CENTCOM’s AOR.  In fact, the interviewees indicated that almost every COCOM was 
losing billets to CENTCOM.  They shared with the research team that PACOM itself had 
recently experienced a 15 percent reduction in staff.     
2. Service Component Contracting Offices 
a. PACOM 
Only Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) has any sustained dealings 
with DCMA.  Pacific Air Force (PACAF) and Army Contracting Agency Pacific (ACA-
Pacific) are knowledgeable of DCMA; however, they have no on-going interface with the 
Agency.  Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific (NAVFACPAC) is primarily 
involved with military construction.  NAVFAC typically retains administration of their 
own contracts and is not working with DCMA on any current construction capabilities 
(CONCAP) projects. 
 MARFORPAC’s largest contract action is an on-going $60M cost plus 
CAP effort for Camp Lemonier in Djibouti (Horn of Africa).  The Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract was awarded to Kellogg, Brown and Root 
(KBR), a Halliburton subsidiary, in mid-2002.  MARFORPAC wants to replace the 
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LOGCAP contract with a firm fixed price (FFP) indefinite delivery indefinite quantity 
(IDIQ) contract vehicle.  There are plans to restructure this effort by October 1, 2005.  
DCMA is currently providing CCAS support.  MARFORPAC is satisfied with DCMA’s 
performance and states there is no impetus for change.  MARFORPAC was not aware of 
DCMA’s proposed entry and exit criteria.  Once MARFORPAC had the opportunity to 
review the draft language, they expressed reservations about DCMA’s calendar driven 
exit criteria.  
b. CENTCOM 
Due to time constraints and the geographic dispersion of the Services’ 
contracting offices supporting CENTCOM, it was not possible to conduct individual 
interviews with these offices.   
3. CENTCOM 
a. Span of Control 
DCMA’s LNO is currently responsible for CENTCOM and provides 
support on an as requested basis to the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).  
Like his PACOM counterpart, the CENTCOM LNO is scheduled to retire mid-2005, and 
turnover to a civilian replacement LNO is in progress.  However, the new LNO will be 
responsible for CENTCOM only.  DCMA CSC plans to hire a qualified senior civilian to 
represent SOCOM and the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).   
b. Integrative Planning 
Allegations were raised by the CENTCOM LNO that since the DCMA 
was stood up in March 2000, the DCMA CSC was never properly organized to 
accomplish their full mission including recruiting, training, and providing forces for 
deployment as well as participating in the Joint Staff and COCOM planning processes.  
For example, the LNO stated that even though CENTCOM knew U.S. forces were going 
into Iraq, DCMA was not involved in the advance planning.  As a result, many DCMA 
representatives believed inadequate measures were taken to plan for the associated 
contracting mission.  Once tasked to provide contingency contract management support, 
DCMA was immediately forced into a reactionary planning mode.  In spite of the late 
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formal notification, the CSC as the force provider and DCMAI were ready to respond 
based upon informal communications received earlier.  DCMAI was responsible for 
executing the mission including providing the IRT to perform mission analysis and early 
contingency contract management.   
The DCMA LNO and J4 implied that the initial CCSP was not responsive 
to the OPLAN/OPORD and did not incorporate lessons learned from past operations.  It 
was not clear how the contingency contracting team was going to contract for all the 
required logistics support.  The establishment of the Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian (ORHA), which was later absorbed by the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA), established the Army as the EA for contracting in Iraq.  Unfortunately the Army’s 
responsiveness to this new mission was slow, and resources were not immediately in 
place to execute the contracting mission.  Since DCMA was already on the ground and 
ready to perform contract management, DCMA was granted a six-month waiver to 
perform preaward contract actions to alleviate the Army’s position.  In September 2003, 
DCMA began transitioning all preaward contract requirements back to the Army.  
Senior officials with the J4 staff indicated that in the beginning the lack of 
organization and structure led to a communications breakdown.  The first teams were 
only deployed in theater for six months, which resulted in a lack of focus on long-term 
(18+ months) needs such as heaters.  Handoffs between rotation personnel were hit and 
miss.  The Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS) was not being fully utilized 
to capture lessons learned.  In effect, the feedback loop for improving contingency 
contracting operations was broken.  DCMA indicated they now stagger CCAS support 
team86 rotations in an effort to alleviate this potential issue.  Staggering rotations ensures 
incoming/outgoing team members overlap one another, which allows the Agency to 
retain and build upon its corporate knowledge. 
                                                 
86The CCAS teams consist of civilian and military contract administrators, property specialists, quality 
assurance specialists, and other functional specialists who are mostly volunteers for the six-month mission. 
The team personnel come from DCMA contract management offices (CMO) all across the U.S.  Each team 
conducts a six-month tour.  
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4. DCMA International  
a. The Force Deployer 
DCMAI deploys the forces required to support contingency contracting 
management missions around the world.  Trained, deployment ready forces are provided 
by the DCMA CSC.  DCMAI’s senior officials view the hierarchy within the Agency 
akin to the Army’s structure: 
  
         
            
      
 
DCMAI deploys CCAS support teams that are comprised of either 
military or civilian employees or both.  For example, during the initial stages of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), there was a decision to limit the number of civilians 
forward deployed; therefore, DCMAI’s initial CCAS team was comprised of only 
military personnel, many of who were not certified in the functions they were tasked to 
perform.  Team members were deployed on January 3, 2003, with a cell phone and 
guidance literally tailored after the Excel 2002 for Dummies book series except the 
subjects addressed pertinent contract management career fields including, but not limited 
to: Contract Administration, Quality Assurance, Production Surveillance, and Property 
Management.  When the forward deployed CCAS support team member ran into a 
situation they were not sure how to address, they used their U.S. Government issued cell 
phone to call back to the 32 member CCAS support team based in Kuwait.  This team 
was comprised of experienced, trained, educated and DAWIA Level II and III certified 
acquisition personnel.  These civilian technical experts “walked” their (novice) military 

















b. Planning and Communication 
JP 4-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Common-User 
Logistics During Joint Operations, states: 
Ultimately, commanders of geographic combatant commands are 
responsible for coordinating with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), 
the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), [U.S. Transportation 
Command] USTRANSCOM, and Service component commanders to both 
provide an integrated distribution and support system from origin to 
destination during theater contingency operations and to develop a theater 
plan or capability for capture of related in-transit visibility (ITV) data. 
DCMAI indicated that they rarely get an opportunity to plan for and 
coordinate contingency contract management support prior to the actual event.  DCMAI 
indicated the LNO’s lack of involvement during the planning stages affects their ability 
to ensure that the plan being developed is sustainable through the planned contracting 
vehicles.  DCMAI acknowledged that resource constraints and the expansive span of 
control negated some of the LNO’s ability to get involved early in the planning process; 
however, DCMAI believes the CSC could do a better job.  Planning and coordination are 
typically reactive since notification is received so late.   
The current language in JP 4-07 needs to be updated to reflect DCMA’s 
capabilities, services and proposed entry and exit criteria.  Based on today’s language, 
disconnects exist between what the publication states DCMA can do and the mission 
DCMA is actually prepared to execute.  For example, according to the JP 4-07, DCMA 
can manage multi-source and theater support contracts, yet problems arose in Iraq when 
6,000 contracts were handed over to DCMA for contract administration and the majority 
of the effort was for commercial items (SF44) for which DCMA does not normally 
provide contract oversight.87   
In addition, the proposed entry and exit criteria language proffered by the 
LNOs for inclusion in the Appendix of the Logistics Annex is not in concert with the 
publication’s language.  In chapter IV.4.a: Contractor Planning, the JP 4-07 states, 
                                                 
87 DCMA Guidebook, Supplier Quality Assurance, paragraph 1.1.11: Commercial Items, 
http://guidebook.dcma.mil/45/guidebook_process.htm (last accessed June 2, 2005) 
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“Short-notice contingency contracting support commences immediately after the 
notification of an operation and generally continues until replaced by military capabilities 
or Host Nation Support (HNS) or until cessation of the operational requirement.”  
Appendix B.5.g: CCAS Teams, discusses developing an exit strategy for the CCAS team 
in conjunction with the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) requirements and states, “This 
decision will be based on the individual operational situation and will be made in concert 
with the supported combatant commanders and/or subordinate JFC’s staff and reassessed 
as the complexity of the theater changes.”  DCMA’s proposed entry and exit criteria were 
developed without customer buy-in.  As a result, resistance to the calendar-driven one 
year time limit is being experienced. 
c. Contract Management Authority 
DCMA provides CCAS in accordance with Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) Part 42 and DFARS Part 242.  DCMA support three types of contracts: 
 
x System Support88,  
x External Theater Support89 (CAPs such as LOGCAP and Air Force Contract 
Augmentation Program (AFCAP)), and  
x Theater Support90.   
 
Contract administration delegation is pre-established with the Acquisition 
Executive for System Support contracts.  DCMA normally administers LOGCAP and 
AFCAP.  Theater Support contracts are awarded and administered by the Joint Task 
Force contracting chief. 
DCMAI does not deploy a CCAS support team into a theater until contract 
administration authority is received, which is derived via a contract delegation from a 
Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO).  Upon receipt of the PCO delegation, DCMA will 
                                                 
88 Contract personnel, normally with high levels of technical expertise, hired to support specific 
military systems (JP 4-07, Glossary, p GL-11) 
89 US national or third party contract personnel hired from outside the operational area (JP 4-07, 
Glossary, p GL-7) 
90 Contract personnel hired in, and operating in, a specific operational area (JP 4-07, Glossary, p GL-
11) 
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provide an IRT, conduct a site survey, and assess follow-on requirements.  As detailed 
above, DCMA provides full CCAS support for System Support and External Theater 
Support contract; however, contract management support for Theater Support is 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis.  Typical functions performed by DCMA CCAS teams 
include: 
x Issue administrative modifications to contract 
x Issue delivery and task orders 
x Negotiate supplemental cost and price agreements 
x Monitor costs 
x Monitor quality assurance compliance and inspection of services 
x Perform property administration 
x Perform production surveillance 
x Monitor contractor’s safety program 
x Provide technical support to negotiations 
x Participate in award fee boards 
 
DCMA is currently supporting both OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF).  OIF support is closely coordinated through the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq 
(JCC-I) including the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC)-Forces 
and PARC-Project and Contracting Office (P&CO).  In an effort to plan and coordinate 
future resource requirements, DCMA is pursuing a MOA with the PARC-P&CO.  Initial 
estimates are that 24 contract management personnel will be required to provide CCAS 
support.  DCMA recognizes that additional support will also be required as this P&CO 
mission grows.  DCMAI indicated that numerous contracting offices as well as the Joint 
Staff keep asking for more support.  Notwithstanding CENTCOM’s recent attempts to 
consolidate contracting operations under the JCC-I, the Services’ overall contracting 
mission is still fragmented.  While individual offices are aware of the support they 
receive from DCMA, it is very difficult to maintain high level visibility of the entire 
effort.  DCMA’s contingency support to the warriors as of April 13, 2005, is depicted in 
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Figure 25: DCMAI CCAS Support  
(Source: From DCMAI Briefing, April 28, 2005) 
 
d. LNO Support 
DCMAI’s perspective of the LNO’s performance is that each LNO brings 
a different set of experiences to the game, and an opportunity to engage on an overall 
Agency level is sometimes lost in this unstructured approach.  For example, DCMAI 
stated that the LNO covering seven COCOMs was spread too thin, and he tended to stress 
MA 1, which he was most familiar with, over MA 2.  On the other hand, the CENTCOM 
LNO stresses MA 2.  In DCMAI’s opinion, only one LNO (U.S. European Command 
(EUCOM)) was considered to provide the geographic combatant commander a balanced 
overview of the Agency’s entire capabilities and services.  The interviewees stated that 
this LNO was instrumental in securing DCMA’s forward-leaning posture in supporting 
OIF’s Northern front through Turkey, which was later abandoned.  This same LNO also 
played a crucial role in extricating DCMA’s CCAS support team from further contract 
management support of the BSC.    Since the U.S. military presence in Bosnia, Croatia, 
and Hungary began with Operation Joint Endeavor in late 1995, the Agency, including 
the former Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC), has provided CCAS 
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teams to fill the logistics support needs in theater.  According to JP 4-07, DCMA should 
continue to provide contract administration services as long as U.S. military forces 
remain in the Balkans region; however, DCMA’s contingency contract management 
support mission in the Balkans will finally come to a conclusion at the end of this fiscal 
year since the Services have established a permanent party with support of a Contracting 
Directorate to support the customer.    
3.   DCMA Headquarters, Combat Support Center  
Including DCMA, there are seven Combat Support Agencies (CSA) plus the 
Service Components’ contracting offices currently operating in Iraq.  Contracting is not 
Joint.  Each Service brings their own supplements to the FAR and DFARS along with 
Service specific policies, regulations and guidance.  Even though the Army was identified 
as the EA, resources requirements are being vetted through individual Service 
Components directly to the Department of Defense (DoD).  Like their DCMAI 
counterparts, senior CSC officials expressed frustration with total visibility of DCMA’s 
CCAS support.  They indicated that visibility of total DCMA assets is lost since there is 
no central point of contact within the theater.  It is hard for DCMA to make everyone 
aware that (as of February 2005) they had 90 resources deployed in support of these 
contingency operations.  Often, a particular contracting office is only familiar with those 
DCMA resources they interact with on a day-to-day basis, which makes it difficult for the 
Joint Staff to understand DCMA’s resource constraints in supporting these on-going 
missions.  
DCMA CSC recruits, trains and assembles CCAS teams.  Teams are made up of 
active-duty and reserve military members as well as two types of civilians: emergency 
essential (EE) and non-EE volunteers.  Only active-duty military and EE civilians must 
be deployable, reserve military and non-EE civilians fill CCAS team vacancies on a 
voluntary basis only.  DCMA is trying to recruit 200 EE civilians to establish a pool of 
qualified individuals for contingency contracting operations.  As of February 2005, only 
48 positions were filled.  To try to encourage more civilians to apply for EE positions or 
volunteer for CCAS assignments, the following pay-related incentives are offered in 
addition to their base pay: 
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x Overtime 
x Hostile Fire Æ Iraq: 25 percent of base pay 
x Imminent Danger Æ Iraq: 25 percent of base pay 
x Temporary Duty (TDY) Per Diem Æ Iraq: ~ $11/day; Kuwait ~ $350/day 
 
Administrative incentives include one week of rest and recreation (R&R) upon 
return from deployment.  In addition to these incentives, EE personnel may be 
temporarily promoted to the next highest grade for the length of their deployment (e.g. 
GS-12 to a GS-13).  It is interesting to note that DoD civilians are not eligible for the tax 
free earnings incentive that their military and non-DoD civilian are entitled.  The DCMA 
Director is aware of and attempting to work this issue at the highest levels.  All civilians 
in theater should be treated equally.  
As previously stated, DCMA CSC utilizes a self-developed Microsoft Access 
database along with the Military On-Line Personnel System (MOPS) to track and create 
team assignment rosters based on the best form, fit and function.  Individuals can expect 
to deploy at least twice in a 36-month assignment; however, the first deployment will not 
commence before the member completes the first 90 days with the Agency.  DCMA’s 
goal is to space repetitive deployments 12 months apart.  
The CSC realizes that it must step up its visibility on the Joint Staff as well as the 
UCCs.  Aggressive plans are in place to place a LNO at each COCOM by the end of this 
fiscal year.  Assignments may be through full-time hires with shortfalls covered on a 
TDY basis.   
E. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Liaison Officer  
Recruitment and assignment of qualified LNO candidates are critical to the 
success of the COCOM/DCMA information sharing process since the LNO serves as the 
DCMA focal point for planning and execution of deliberate and crisis action planning at 
both the Joint Staff and COCOM.  The research indicates that for effective and efficient 
planning and coordination, it is imperative that LNOs are assigned to the Joint Staff and 
all UCCs. The ideal situation would be to assign a senior (O-5 or O-6) military member 
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and a senior civilian (GS-14 or GS-15) with a broad knowledge of DCMA’s services and 
capabilities to each position; however, in today’s resource constrained world that is not 
probable.  In these circumstances, a civilian LNO might be the more ideal candidate since 
corporate knowledge would not be lost every few years when the military member 
rotates.   
In addition to a broad knowledge of the Agency, candidates should complete at 
least Phase I of the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements and be 
willing to pursue JPME Phase II training as it becomes available.  LNO responsibilities 
for two or more geographically dispersed COCOMs should be minimized especially if 
one or more of those commands are actively engaged in a contingency operation, military 
operation other than war (MOOTW) or Global War On Terrorism (GWOT).  For 
example, one LNO should not be assigned to U.S. CENTCOM and SOCOM even though 
they are co-located since each command is actively engaged in separate, current 
operations. 
Based on the research each LNO should be familiar with both of DCMA’s MAs 
and be prepared to educate each COCOM with regards to the Agency’s services, 
capabilities, and core competencies.  The LNO must facilitate information sharing and act 
as the focal point for deliberate and crisis action planning, exercise planning and 
execution.  Additionally, the LNO should assist in the Joint Strategic Planning System 
(JSPS) process and development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), OPLANs 
and CONPLANs.  Finally, LNOs need to be prepared to leverage DCMA’s capabilities to 
meet the COCOMs needs by providing “Reach Back” into the industrial base for 
capability and capacity assessments, acquisition life cycle support, especially supply 
chain interventions to expedite/facilitate delivery and shipment and contingency 
contracting management support including IRT and tailored CCAS team site support.    
2. Initial Response Team  
DCMA’s IRT reaction to contingency contracting opportunities is impressive 
considering the consistently late notification of impending operations.  This process can 
be improved dramatically once the assigned LNOs establish and nurture the 
COCOM/DCMA relationship.  This information sharing will lead to more timely 
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notifications, which should feed back into the mission planning cycle and the IRT 
processes.   
 Working around current resource constraints, DCMA needs to develop a cadre of 
qualified military acquisition professionals, DAWIA Level II certified in the contracting, 
property, and quality and production career fields.  As part of the IRT, this cadre should 
have the knowledge, experience and skills needed to provide effective initial CCAS 
support.   
3. Mission Planning 
The research shows that it is difficult for DCMA to plan for their CCAS mission.  
It is difficult to know when a mission will arise and how long it will last.  Yet based on 
past experiences and lessons learned, it is possible to project what core competencies will 
be required.  Based on the unique characteristics of each contingency contracting 
operation, DCMA can tailor the specific core competencies required to support the 
contingency.  As previously proposed, the Limitre Personnel Assignment Model (LPAM) 
will allow DCMA to rapidly review different scenarios and estimate resource needs.    
4. Entry and Exit Criteria 
While the proposed language the LNOs is offering the COCOMs for inclusion in 
the Appendix of their Logistics Annex represents a good initial effort, the research shows 
that DCMA should delay having this language incorporated until differences can be 
resolved with their customers.  For the most part, the research indicates the entry criterion 
are acceptable to their COCOM customers; however, there is significant resistance 
against the proposed calendar-driven exit criteria, especially to the one-year time limit 
requirement.   
DCMA CCAS on-going support in the Balkans spans nearly a decade, and 
DCMA is already well into their third year in Afghanistan and second year in Iraq.  
Contingency contract management operations cannot be held hostage to a one-year 
moratorium for CCAS support.  Straightforward, honest dialogue needs to be opened 
with the Joint Staff, the COCOMs and Service Components.  These exit criteria must be 
thoroughly discussed and agreed upon.  Whatever language is eventually agreed upon 
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should be incorporated in JP 4-07.  In the interim, the research group recommends that 
paragraph “A” of DCMA’s proposed exit criteria be deleted in its entirety and replaced 
with the following:  
A.  Each year on the anniversary of the declared contingency, or an earlier 
mutually agreed upon date, key stakeholders will participate in a 
collaborative summit to determine the extent of DCMA’s contingency 
contract management support that will be required in the coming 12 
months to support the Combatant Commander’s tactical, operational and 
strategic goals.  Future requirements will be based on current capabilities 
already available in theater, the phase of the operation, dependence on 
CAP contracts and national directives and objectives. 
While the proposed exit criteria are calendar driven, the review process described 
above needs to be capability/capacity driven, especially in the dynamic contingency 
environment.  Performance metrics need to be developed that would enable key 
stakeholders (Joint Staff J4, Combatant Commander, COCOM J4 Staff, Service 
Components, LOGCAP and AFCAP contractors, and DCMA) to focus this periodic 
decision-based review on established capability and capacity, which are in turn linked to 
available resources.  In this manner, the continued need for DCMA’s presence could be 
determined with the Joint Staff’s, Combatant Commander’s and Services’ buy-in.  In 
addition, this capability/capacity driven decision process would enable the team to 
develop time-phased plans for DCMA’s disengagement and transferring contract 
management to permanent garrison party, area support group, host nation or other 
identified responsible party. 
F. SUMMARY 
Before DCMA can define the standards or criteria for entering and exiting 
contingencies, they must first listen to their customers.  Hiring qualified, knowledgeable 
LNOs and placing them at the Joint Staff and COCOMs is an effective first step in that 
direction.  The LNO must establish and nurture relationships that allow them to facilitate 
COCOM and DCMA information sharing, assist in the JSPS development process, and 
link COCOM shortfalls and equipment needs with DCMA’s “Reach Back” capability.  
The development of mutually agreeable entry and exit criteria should be by-product of 
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this relationship—a negotiated set of standards agreed upon by all key stakeholders.  
Finally, entry and exit criteria must be capability, not calendar, driven.      
The next chapter provides overall findings, conclusions and recommendations.  
Additionally, this chapter will provide answers to research questions and suggest related 
areas for further research.   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  OVERVIEW 
The purposes of this Master of Business Administration (MBA) Professional 
Report were to investigate and analyze the means by which Contingency Contracting 
Officers (CCOs) can effectively operate in a Joint contingency environment and to 
validate the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA) entry and exit criteria.  
This chapter provides overarching conclusions regarding improvements in how CCOs 
operate within the Service Components and DCMA in Joint contingency operations.  
Three options are presented for improving current contingency contracting operations.  
These options may be adopted in whole or on a case-by-case basis.  Major 
recommendations include: (1) adopting the Yoder Three-Tier Model for the Department 
of Defense (DoD) to improve manning, experience and billeting; (2) establishing a Joint 
Contingency Contracting Command (JCCC); and (3) creating universal guidance, 
regulations, and policies to govern contingency contracting.  Lastly, this chapter provides 
answers to the original research questions and suggests areas for further research.   
B.  CONCLUSIONS 
The findings and analysis conducted throughout this report brought to light 
several deficiencies in the way Service Components conduct contingency planning.   The 
common threads that link these findings primarily stem from process deficiencies that 
affect planning, integration, communication, and execution.  Conclusions summarizing 
these major deficiencies are listed below. 
1. Planning  
As highlighted throughout the research, Services can improve their planning 
processes when it comes to Joint contingency operations.  Chapter IV cites specific 
examples of two combatant commands’ (COCOM) [United States (U.S.) Pacific 
Command (PACOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)] contingency contracting 
planning process. The research indicates that although a contingency contracting 
planning process is in place, the resultant contingency contracting support plan (CCSP) is 




As discussed in Chapter IV, it is paramount that COCOM billets are staffed with 
qualified personnel at the appropriate levels to properly create, review and influence Joint 
contingency contracting planning documents such as the CCSP, Operation Order 
(OPORD) and Operation Plan (OPLAN).   
3. Communication  
When standing up a contingency contracting cell, there is often a lack of 
communication between the participating units/Services.  One such instance is the 
discussion of capability versus rank.  When one Service (or unit) requests support from 
another, the requesting unit currently asks for personnel of a specific rank vice the more 
logical approach of requiring a certain certification or experience level.   
If the Services would make the effort to communicate their actual needs, they 
would be able to discuss the issues and develop the requirements to meet the current 
mission demands and not plan for the last mission or to a standard that is not required.  
Additionally, as mentioned in the matrix organization debate (e.g. a person working 
under two chains of command), effective two-way communication may alleviate sub-
optimization, foster more cooperation, and facilitate improved contract support. 
4. Execution  
During the conduct of this MBA Professional Report, the project team became 
aware that CENTCOM had established a variation of the JCCC in its Area of 
Responsibility (AOR), the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I).  To date, this 
approach appears to be an effective clearing house for contract requirements; however, it 
was noted that PACOM does not have a similar organization.  Nor is there an 
organization responsible for synchronizing the entire Joint contingency contracting effort 
across DoD.  The contracting organizations in theater are currently addressing some of 
these issues, but there remains a capability gap between the Joint Staff, COCOM and 
Service Components when it comes to the execution of the CCSP.   
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C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since the advent of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), there has been an 
increase in the number of contingencies (as well as their length) throughout the world.  
This coupled with the downsizing of our Services has put an increased emphasis on 
performing Joint operations in order to capitalize on each Service’s inherent strengths.  If 
adopted, the following recommendations will assist DoD in ensuring the CCO can 
provide the warfighter with the appropriate products, services and construction necessary 
to complete their vital missions as effectively and efficiently as possible. 
1. Adopt the Yoder Three-Tier Model   
As highlighted in Chapters IV and V, the Services and DCMA would greatly 
benefit from adopting the “Yoder Three-Tier Model” approach with respect to manning, 
experience and organizational structure requirements.  Implementation of this proposed 
structure or a modified variant will not only ensure that DoD has the right person in the 
right job, it will allow for better planning and coordination of tactical, operational, and 
theater force objective support.91 
2. Establish the JCCC 
As stated previously, we propose that a JCCC be established, within the 
continental U.S.  The JCCC should be responsible for setting the strategic direction for 
contract planning in a contingency.    Some of the tasks this command would assume are: 
(1) coordination of contingency contracting assignments; (2) development and 
maintenance of a contracting source database; and (3) coordination and conferring of 
contracting warrants.  The JCCC should have the authority to leverage each Service’s 
contingency contracting resources.   
Planning for today’s contingency contracting operations must occur at a strategic 
level.  All key stakeholders need to be involved early in the process—this would ensure 
that each facet of the operation is considered and that processes and resources are 
optimized to attain superior contingency contracting support. 
                                                 
91 Yoder, E. C., "The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning and 
Execution," Naval Postgraduate School, Working Paper, 2004.   
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3. Create Universal DoD Contingency Contracting Guidance, 
Regulations, and Policies 
Regardless of which Service is appointed the Executive Agent (EA) for 
contingency contracting, DoD should formulate policy that ensures all Service 
supplements to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) are set aside when conducting 
contracting operations in this environment.   
It is recommended that DoD create a Joint contingency contracting guidebook 
based on the best practices captured in each Service’s individual appendices, instructions, 
and orders, as listed in Table 1 in Chapter II.  
DoD should create a Joint Publication (JP) for contracting and consolidate JP 
information/guidance (JP 3-0, JP 4-0, JP 4-07, and JP 4-08) on contingency contracting 
into a detailed and robust publication.  While all of these publications touch upon broad, 
top-level aspects of contracting, none provide a detailed strategic approach for 
articulating and understanding the mission, objective, purpose of the operation, and 
commander’s intent.   
D.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This MBA Professional Report and the aforementioned conclusions and 
recommendations addressed our primary research question—how can the U.S. Army, 
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and DCMA organize to better conduct Joint contingency 
contracting?  There needs to be one overarching organization that maintains the 
responsibility and oversight for contingency contracting.  A possible solution to this is the 
establishment of the JCCC.  This organization would be tasked with assisting in the 
creation of the doctrine and policies necessary to conduct Joint contingency contracting 
organizations.  In addition they would maintain oversight of the CCO community and 
theater requirements and be able to more rapidly match requirements and resources to 
accomplish the mission. 
 135
The following section provides answers to secondary research questions.   
1. Is the current Joint contingency contracting guidance/policy/doctrine 
useful?  
The literature review and interviews conducted by the project members led the 
team to conclude that the current Joint contingency contracting guidance, policy and 
doctrine does not adequately address today’s challenging contracting environment.  The 
current guidance is too broad and sweeping to provide practical guidance for day-to-day 
operations.  
2. Is it appropriate that only one Service is designated the EA for 
contingencies?  
Yes, it is appropriate to designate one service as the EA for contingencies.  This 
approach potentially provides the following benefits:  
x A single point of contact for Joint logistics and Joint contingency contracting 
support. 
x Realization of dollar savings through economies of scale.  
x Reduction in support footprint in theater of operations.  
x Ability to anticipate warfighter needs and match to available resources.   
However, it was noted that DoD does not fully capitalize on all of the stakeholder 
inputs.  Despite having an EA, the Services still operate in a stovepiped manner and fail 
to coordinate Joint requirements.  This may lead to sub-optimized support to deployed 
units.   Regardless of which Service is designated as the EA, the EA should have the 
requisite authority to integrate and prioritize all stakeholder inputs during contingency 
planning and execution.   
3. Do PACOM and CENTCOM have qualified personnel and the appropriate 
structure to effectively plan contingency contracting operations?  
As the research reflects, these commands are extremely diverse in their ability to 
effectively plan contingency contracting operations.  Some of the reasons CENTCOM is 
more advantageously positioned to conduct this planning and execution is they were 
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forced to develop the requisite skills and personnel during previous and ongoing 
contingencies.  As a result of increased operational tempo, their staffing requirements are 
more robust than those at PACOM.   They have had the ability to develop and train their 
staff in the requisite skills required to prosecute the mission.  In contrast, PACOM lacks 
the manning, education, and structure of a CCO cell (or branch) in their J4 office.   
4. Is the DoD truly moving to a Joint contingency contracting environment?  
Due to the numerous conflicts DoD has been involved in since 1990, DoD has 
been induced into moving toward a Joint environment.  As Services have been 
downsized, each Service now more than ever has to rely on the strengths of its sister 
Services to complete the assigned missions. As Services enter a theater of operations, 
they are forced to work together as a part of the whole.  Together they shape the Joint 
contingency contracting environment.   The only option available to a Service working 
individually is inefficiency.  By working together, the Services are able to effectively 
deal with the issues of scarcity and can often achieve greater savings by effecting 
economies of scale.    
5. Should all the Services recognize each other’s warrants during 
contingency contracting operations? 
It would be ideal if each Service would recognize each other’s warrants.  Based 
on interviews the research team conducted with each Service Component, warrant 
recognition seems to be a continuing issue. For example, interviewees shared with the 
team that Air Force personnel’s warrants tend to be readily accepted due to the fact that 
Air Force personnel usually have significant experience.  This may be attributed to how 
the Air Force views contracting and how they focus on early entry into the career field.  
Conversely, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps contracting personnel who were accessed 
into the contracting field at mid-career may not have the same level of contracting 
knowledge and experience as their Air Force counterparts.  As such, their warrants may 
be subject to greater scrutiny.  
The time required to re-issue a warrant in theater is too long.  Stories abound that 
delays of up to five to six weeks occurred between the time a CCO arrived in theater and 
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the EA issued a warrant.  Since the creation of the JCC-I and the appointment of a Head 
of Contracting Agency (HCA), the cycle time has decreased approximately 50 percent 
(three weeks); however, this is still unacceptable.  The establishment of a JCCC would 
resolve this issue since the resident HCA could provide all warrants for deploying CCOs 
prior to their deployment. 
6. Should all Services’ CCOs have the same length (time) of deployment? 
The researchers concluded it would be in the best interest of the Joint contracting 
operations that its personnel be synchronized to avoid any shortfalls due to uncoordinated 
rotations.  Historically, Army contingency contracting personnel deploy for one year, 
whereas the Navy and Marine Corps deploy for six months and Air Force contingency 
contracting personnel deploy for four months. This disjointedness permits opportunities 
for requirements to get overlooked and provides an opportunity for contractors to “play” 
CCOs against one another.   
The above situation could also give rise to Service rivalries.  For instance, during 
an Army CCO’s one-year tour he could see three Air Force CCOs come and go, which 
might lead to feelings of unfairness. Finally, a shorter deployment cycle is severely 
impacted by the warrant re-issue cycle time.  New CCOs in theater cannot perform a full 
range of functions until their new warrant arrives.  This fact, coupled with short 
deployment times, could cause those “long-term” personnel to be continually forced to 
shoulder an inordinate amount of the contracting burden.  For this reason, deployment 
times should be of a similar nature.  Short deployment times (between four to six 
months), are desired.  It may be appropriate to have longer deployment periods for senior 
contracting personnel to maintain continuity of service.  
E.  AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This report covers many issues dealing with Joint contingency contracting, but 
there is still much research that could be done in this area.  Major areas requiring further 
research include: 
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1. Conduct a more thorough analysis of JPs and Service specific information 
on contingency contracting and develop the aforementioned JP or Joint Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (JFARS) document. 
2. Conduct a critical analysis on why DCMA needs clear contingency 
contracting entry and exit criteria. 
3. Draft a robust CCSP model that can be easily adapted for incorporation in 
deliberate, crisis action and concept plans. 
4. Develop a business model that would optimize DCMA Contingency 
Contracting Administration Service (CCAS) support team assignments based the best fit 
for each operational requirement.  Ideally, the assignment model would allow DCMA to 
create personal profiles for each military member or civilian employee upon entry to the 
Agency and rapidly respond to changes in mission requirements.  


























LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Anderson, M. S., and Flaherty, G. P., Analysis of the Contingency Contracting 
Support Plan within the Joint Planning Process Framework., p.41, Naval 
Postgraduate School Printing Office, December 2003. 
 
2. Bolton, Claude M., Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology). Appointment Letter for General Seay as the Head of Contracting 
Agency, October 27, 2004. 
 
3. Expeditionary Engineering Division home page. Retrieved on April 11, 2005 
from http://www.afcesa.af.mil/cex/cexx/cex_afcap.asp 
 
4. Global Security home page. Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/logcap.htm 
 
5. Global Security home page. Retrieved on May 18, 2005 from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/transcom.htm 
 
6. McMillon, Chester L., Contingency Contracting within the Department of 
Defense: A Comparative Analysis, p.5, Naval Postgraduate School Printing 
Office, December 2000. 
 
7. Mintzberg, Henry. Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organization, p.2, 
Prentice Hall, New Jersey, December 1993. 
 
8. Navy home page. Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from http://www.c3f.navy.mil 
 
9. U.S. CENTCOM home page. Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from 
http://www.centcom.mil/home 
 
10. U.S. EUCOM home page, Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from 
http://www.eucom.mil/home 
 
11. U.S. JFCOM home page, Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from 
http://www.jfcom.mil/home 
 
12. U.S. NORTHCOM home page, Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from 
http://www.northcom.mil/home 
 




14. U.S. SOCOM home page, Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from 
http://www.socom.mil/home 
 
15. U.S. SOUTHCOM home page, Retrieved on April 11, 2005, from 
http://www.southcom.mil/home 
 
16. U.S. STRATCOM home page, Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from 
http://www.stratcom.mil/home 
 
17. U.S., Defense Acquisition University, Contingency Contracting Student 
Handbook, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., December 2000. 
 
18. U.S., Defense Contract Management Agency, DCMA Instruction and DCMA 
Guidebook, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC., January 2005. 
 
19. U.S., Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms homepage. Retrieved 
on April 8, 2005 from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/s/05084.html 
 
20. U.S., Department of Defense, Federal Acquisition Regulation Case 2003-D087, 
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., December 2003. 
 
21. U.S., Department of Defense, Federal Acquisition Regulation Case 2003-022, 
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., January 19, 2005. 
 
22. U.S., Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint 
Interdiction Operations, page V-1, Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C., December 2001. 
 
23. U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement, Appendix CC-102, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 
December 2002. 
 
24. U.S., Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-10-2, Contracting 
Support on the Battlefield, Appendix D Sample Contracting Support Plan, 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., December 2002. 
 
25. U.S., Department of the Army, United States Army Pacific Command Appendix 9 
to Annex D to USPACOM CONPLAN XXXX-04. Retrieved on January 18, 
2005. 
 
26. U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems Command, Memorandum 
of Agreement Between NAVSUP and NAVFAC, Transmittal on May 5, 1997. 
 
27. U.S., Naval War College and Naval Postgraduate School, NW3276 (Joint 
Maritime Operations) and MN3303 (Principles of Acquisition and Contract 
 141
Management) Course Handouts, Naval Postgraduate School Printing Office, 
Monterey, CA, January 2005. 
 
28. United States Central Command J4 (Logistics) Branch Brief. Received on 
February 22, 2005. 
 
29. United States Pacific Command home page. Retrieved on May 18, 2005 from 
http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml 
 
30. Walker, David M., United States Comptroller General, Testimony before the 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, General 
Accounting Office, Washington D.C. 
 
31. Yoder, E. C., "The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimizing Contingency 

















































LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
1. Bazin, Christopher P., GS-13, Chief, Multinational Logistics Branch, U.S. Marine 
Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), Camp Smith, HI.  Personal interview 
conducted on January 18, 2005. 
 
2. Booker, Col, USAF, J4 Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Liaison 
Officer (LNO), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), Camp Smith, HI.  Personal 
interview conducted on January 18, 2005. 
 
3. Breen, Greg, CDR, USN, and Lowery, Bruce, CIV, Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition), Pentagon, Arlington, VA. 
Personal interview conducted on September 22, 2004. 
 
4. Broadwell, Gary A, CDR (P), USN, Joint Staff Logistics, J-4, Pentagon, 
Arlington, VA.  Personal interview conducted on February 24, 2005. 
 
5. Brundidge, Lawrence A., Lt Col, USAF, PACOM J3 Future Operations Planning, 
Camp Smith, HI.  Personal interview conducted on January 18, 2005. 
 
6. Campbell, Gordon L., CIV, Principal Deputy to the Commanding General for 
Acquisition, Combined Arms Support Command. Fort Lee, VA.  Personal 
interview conducted on February 23, 2005. 
 
7. Cannaday, John E., Lt Col, USAF, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) J4 
Multinational Logistics & Contracting Branch Chief; Perry, Steve, COL, USA, 
DCMA LNO; and Riordan, Matthew T., LTC, USA, U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) J4 Acquisition Officer, MacDill AFB FL. Personal interview 
conducted on February 22, 2005. 
 
8. Culbreth, Edward, Maj, USAF, Secretary of Air Force/Acquisition and 
Contracting, Washington, D.C.  Personal interview conducted on September 23, 
2004. 
 
9. Davis, Chris, LTC, USA, Chief of Contingency Contracting, Army Contracting 
Agency-Pacific, Fort Shafter, HI.  Personal interview conducted on January 19, 
2005. 
 
10. Davis, Herman, LTC, USA, PACOM J4 Sustainment & International Logistics 




11. Fearn, Judy, Lt Col, USAF and Wical, Steve, LTC, USA, Defense Contract 
Management Agency Headquarters, Combat Support Center, Springfield, VA.  
Personal interview conducted on February 24, 2005. 
 
12. Fowler, Matthew J., Maj, USMC Staff Officer, Headquarters Marine Corps, 
Arlington, VA.  Phone interview on September 23, 2004.   
 
13. Fowler, Matthew J., Maj, USMC Staff Officer, Headquarter Marine Corps, 
Arlington, VA.  Personal interview conducted on February 25, 2005. 
 
14. Hayes, Sean D., Maj, USMC Staff Officer, Arlington, VA.  Personal interview 
conducted on February 25, 2005. 
 
15. Jarrett, Steven M., GS-14, CENTCOM J4 Joint Logistics Planner, MacDill AFB, 
FL.  Personal interview conducted on February 22, 2005. 
 
16. Keener, Richard, U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific 
(NAVFACPAC), Lead Contract Specialist (GS-13), Pearl Harbor, HI.  Personal 
interview conducted on January 20, 2005. 
 
17. Kness, LTC, USA, PACOM J4 Plans, Camp Smith, HI.  Personal interview 
conducted on January 18, 2005. 
 
18. Lowry, Doug, CIV, Assistant Secretary to the Navy for Research Development 
and Acquisition, Pentagon, Arlington, VA.  Personal interview conducted on 
February 24, 2005. 
 
19. Timberlake, Craig, LtCol, USMC and Walker, Charlie, LtCol, USMC, PACOM 
J5 Current Plans, Camp Smith, HI.  Personal interview conducted on January 18, 
2005. 
 
20. McKeithins, LTC, USA, Joint Staff, J4, Pentagon, Arlington, VA.  Phone 
interview conducted on September 22, 2004. 
 
21. Ramirez, Rolando, LCDR, USN, CENTCOM J3 Plans Officer, MacDill AFB FL. 
Personal interview conducted on February 22, 2005. 
 
22. Risser, Scott, COL, USA, Army Contracting Agency, Falls Church, VA.  Personal 
interview conducted on September 22, 2004. 
 
23. Scullion, Bill, CDR, USN, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) J3. Phone 
interview conducted on February 9, 2005. 
 
 145
24. Short, Constance, GS-15 and Wical, Steven, LTC, USA, Defense Contract 
Management Agency Headquarters, Combat Support Operations Center, 
Springfield, VA.   Personal interview conducted on September 23, 2004. 
 
25. Smith, MSgt David, Contingency Contracting Manager, U.S. Pacific Air Force 
(PACAF), Hickam AFB, HI.  Personal interview conducted on January 19, 2005. 
 
26. Tillman, Mark, COL, USA, J5 Plans Deputy. Phone interview conducted on 
February 9, 2005. 
 
27. Timperley, Bill and Schneider, Susan, Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Pentagon, Arlington, VA.  Personal 
interview conducted on September on September 22, 2004. 
 
28. Timperley, Bill and Schneider, Susan, Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Pentagon, Arlington, VA. Personal 
interview conducted on February 25, 2005. 
 
29. Tryon, Michael, CAPT, USN, DCMA District International Commander, and 
Watson, Herbert, DCMA International, Springfield, VA. Personal interview 
conducted on February 24, 2005. 
 
30. Varner, Cynthia R., CAPT, USN, Assistant Secretary to the Navy for Research 
Development and Acquisition, Pentagon, Arlington, VA.  Personal interview 
conducted on February 24, 2005. 
 
31. Weaver, Michael S., LTC, USA, CENTCOM J5 Long Range Plans, MacDill AFB 
















INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Fort Belvoir, VA 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
3.  Professor Jeffrey R. Cuskey 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA 
 
4. Professor E. Cory Yoder 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA 
 
5. Dr. Keith F. Snider 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA 
 
6.   COL Scott O. Risser 
 Army Contracting Agency 
 Springfield, VA 
 
7. CAPT Cindy Varner 
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Navy (Research, Development, & 
Acquisition) 
 Arlington, VA 
 
8. CDR Gary Broadwell 
 The Joint Staff, J4 
 Arlington, VA 
 
9. LTC Matthew Riordan 
 U.S. Central Command, J4 
 MacDill AFB, FL 
 
10. LTC Herman Davis 
 U.S. Pacific Command, J4 
 Camp Smith, HI 
 
 148
11.    Ms. Constance Short 
 Defense Contract Management Agency 
 Springfield, VA 
 
12. CAPT Walter Melton 
 Defense Contract Management Agency International  
 Springfield, VA 
 
13.   Marine Corps Representative 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
14.  Director, Training and Education, MCCDC, Code C46 
Quantico, VA 
 
15.  Director, Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Code C40RC 
Quantico, VA 
 
16. MAJ Randy Culbreth 
 Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition 
 Washington, D.C.  
 
17.    Mr. Gordon L. Campbell  
 Principal Deputy to the Commanding General for Acquisition 
 Combined Arms Support Command 
 Fort Lee, VA 
 
18.   Director, Acquisition Career Management (DACM) 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Fort Belvoir, VA 
 
 
 
